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ABSTRACT
This thesis accounts for the failure of Catalan opposition to Franco between 1939 
and 1950. Catalan opposition was part of a wider external opposition to Franco that 
developed after the Spanish Civil War, both inside Spain and in exile, and which 
ultimately had as its aim a degree of self-determination for Catalonia. In 1950, the 
international community made clear its acceptance of Francoism, dashing the hopes of 
Catalan both at home and abroad.
In the aftermath of the Civil War, many Catalans moved to France, trying to 
establish an infrastructure of opposition there, only to see it occupied by the Germans. 
Seeking refuge in the UK, in the USA and Latin America -  Mexico in particular -  
Catalans of all stripes tried to overcome those difficulties imposed by their dispersion, 
amongst other problems, in order to mount an effective opposition to the dictator. The 
situation in a newly liberated France in 1944 took centre stage once again.
Anticipating that a victorious Allied side would assist in their struggle, Catalan groups 
instead watched the ambassadors return to Madrid, in November 1950.
In previous accounts, it is argued that Catalan opposition to Franco failed, at 
least in part on account of such factors as lack of resources, Franco’s effective 
establishment and maintenance of control, and a lack of support for the anti-Francoist 
movement within the international community. Whilst these factors were no doubt 
important in determining the course of events, it is argued here that the Catalan 
element of external opposition to the regime was more significant than has generally 
been acknowledged. In addition to difficulties of communication and economy, the 
Catalans suffered internal divisions, recurrent clashes of leadership and poor relations 
with other opposition groups, and failed to establish either a unitary political 
programme or governmental institutions, at a cost to legitimacy. Therefore, their 
failure was partly due to their incapacity to organise themselves.
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INTRODUCTION
There is still much historical work to be done on the early period of exile. On the 
one hand, the traditional texts of Joan Sauret, Felip Calvet i Costa and J M Rosich and 
some of the Spanish classics are still referred to ffequendy. On the other hand, the 
most recent studies of Daniel Diaz Esculies, Josep Benet or Miquel Caminal, amongst 
others, have shown us that there is still a long way to go in terms of exhausting 
primary sources and confirming of lines of research. The existing bibliography 
demonstrates that there is great fragmentation and division in studies about the Catalan 
exile of 1939. In other words, we are still lacking an integrated panoramic, general and 
structured view of this period of contemporary history.1
This thesis addresses the historiographical gap relating to the Catalan exile of 
1939 to 1950 that Francesc Vilanova and others have identified. A complete account 
of Catalan opposition to Franco must include a general and comprehensive work on 
the Catalan exile of 1939 through to 1950. Such a work is presented here.
The dispersion of Catalans in exile necessarily had historiographical as well as 
historical consequences, making its study relatively difficult. Francesc Vilanova has 
emphasised the difficulty of researching Catalan opposition in this particular period 
due to the various experiences of the exile. With each local population came a specific 
set of cultural, social and political circumstances, each following a particular course, 
according to a unique set of currents. The result, for Vilanova, militates against
r\
establishing an overall or integrated vision of the period.
The focus of the study is the failure of Catalan political groups both inside and 
beyond Spanish borders to organise effective political opposition to Franco in the 
1940s. The thesis offers improved understanding of both the phenomenon of 
Francoism and of opposition to it. It seeks to provide insight into the origins of 
Catalan political parties, and their development, which casts more light on present day 
Catalan political culture and organisation.
Two key insights are suggested by the study. First, it shows that the failure of 
Catalans to organise cohesive opposition to Franco between 1939 and 1950 was not
1 F. Vilanova, Als dos costats de lafrontera, (Barcelona, Abadia de Montserrat, 2001) p.10.
2 Vilanova, Als dos costats, p. 16.
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simply attributable to international factors, as existing accounts have suggested, but 
was, in some measure, due to divisions within Catalan nationalism itself. The thesis 
also investigates the extent to which the failure of Catalans was due to internal or 
external factors.
A second claim of the thesis is that Catalans could have effectively opposed 
Franco only through an alliance with the left wing groups in opposition -  in other 
words, by presenting a common front against Franco. It is the contention of the author 
of this study that as an isolated political force, Catalan nationalism could achieve little 
more than local irritation of the regime. With a restoration of the republic offering the
<3 4
sole realistic means of overthrowing Franco , and given the extent to which this was 
recognised by members of the Catalan movement, it is possible to point to a failure to 
focus sufficiently on the necessary alliance and the consequent failure to orchestrate a 
common front against the Francoists as a principal cause of the failure of Catalan 
opposition.
Opposition to the regime was both extensive and varied. Following the Spanish 
Civil War and in some cases, prior to its conclusion, many decided to leave the country 
and to go into exile. A number remained, organising domestic forms of opposition. It 
is useful to distinguish internal and external opposition to the regime. In this study, 
internal opposition to the regime refers to those internal dissident elements within 
Francoism. External opposition instead refers to forces outside the boundaries of the 
regime, in particular, the forces of the Left and the regional nationalists. Internal and 
external opposition could be found both inside and outside the Spanish territory. 
Internal opposition included members of the Falangist rank and file, dissatisfied with 
Franco’s monopolisation of power, and disaffected monarchists, who had expected the 
dictator to restore the Spanish throne but soon realised that this was not going to 
happen.4 Among the external groups, it was the left-wing parties -  the losing side in 
the Civil War -  that led a varied and divided community of anarchists, Communists,
3 PRO FO 371/34821, Cl 1/665. In 1943, Gil Robles claimed that if the Allies overthrew Franco, a left
wing government could be installed in Spain. Josd Mana Gil Robles y Quinones de Le6n was the 
CEDA leader. He spent the war in Portugal. He was the leader of the legalist Right, later shunned by 
Franco.
4 Monarchist opposition has been treated by numerous authors such as J. M. Toquero, Franco y Don 
Juan, (Barcelona, Plaza y Jands, 1989). A fundamental work concerning monarchist opposition is J. 
Tusell, La oposicion democratica al franquismo, (1939-1962), (Barcelona, Planeta, 1977).
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Republicans,5 Socialists and regionalists (Galician, Basque and Catalan nationalists6), 
amongst others. For the most part, the external opposition hoped to restore democracy 
in Spain. The various regionalist claims were based on a desire to obtain more 
autonomy for Galicia, the Basque country, and Catalonia. These three regions had 
historically enjoyed a greater or lesser degree of sovereignty and looked to recover it.
Catalan opposition was then a part of the external opposition to Franco, both 
domestically and abroad. Catalonia had a distinct culture, ethnicity, language and 
history.7 The Catalan nationalist objectives were to overthrow Franco, secure 
autonomy within a Castilian Spain, and ultimately attain complete self-determination 
within an Iberian federation. Overthrowing Franco was a necessary priority for 
Catalan nationalists since the dictator would never accept their demands for autonomy. 
Two central principles described the ideology of those Catalan nationalists opposed to 
Franco: the commitment to democracy and the principle of self-determination.8 The 
failure of Catalan opposition to Franco must be assessed then both in the context of the 
Catalan project, and in the wider context of its place in a more generalised failure of 
external opposition to Franco.9
Opposition to Franco took one of four political forms. Cultural opposition was 
based on the defence of the Catalan language and traditions, carried out through
5 To avoid confusion, Republican will be used for specifically Republican, i.e., liberal bourgeois 
partiesOike Izquierda Republicana) and republicans will be used for all those forces that opposed the 
military rebels throughout the Spanish Civil War, (which includes Communists, anarchists, Socialists 
and liberal Republicans). The most important publication to date is H. Heine’s La oposicionpolitica al 
franquismo de 1939 a 1952, (Barcelona, Editorial Crftica Grijalbo, 1983), whose coverage of the 
republican and monarchist opposition, both in Spain and in exile, is as yet unsurpassed. Heine’s 
coverage of Catalan nationalism is good, but brief. Another work of note on the opposition in the 1940s 
is D. J. Dunthom’s “Britain and the Spanish Anti-Franco opposition 1940-1950”, (Bristol, thesis 
submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of West England, July 1999). Once 
again though, the focus is republican and monarchist opposition, rather than Catalan nationalism. 
Dunthom’s book has been published. David J. Dunthom, Britain and the Spanish anti-Franco 
opposition, 1940-1950, (London, Palgrave MacMillan, 2000).
6 The term Catalan is meant to include political parties other than Catalan nationalist ones. The term
Catalan nationalist refers to all the Catalans with regional aspirations. It should not be confused with 
the term nationalist which was attached to the Francoist side during the Civil War.Catalan 
nationalismCatalan nationalismCatalan ‘Basque nationalist’ here however refers to Basque 
regionalism, and "Galician nationalist" similarly is intended to represent Galician regionalism.
7 For an explanation of nations without a state see M. Guibemau, Nacionalisme Catald, (Barcelona,
Pdrtic, 2002), p.27 and for the reasons of the emergence of Catalan opposition to Franco see 
Guibemau, Nacionalisme Catala p.48
8 APSG, 1943, Lhora de Catalunya, 'Per lapatria iper la llibertat'.
9 P.Vilar, Histdria de Catalunya, (Barcelona, Edicions 62,1988).
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propaganda and a system of secret presses both inside Spain and abroad.10 Direct 
action was organised by youth groups, confronting the Francoist apparatus head-on 
and attempting to stage local and general strikes.11 Also, a certain amount of political 
lobbying had to be done in the international political arena. It was believed that, by 
supporting the Allied effort in World War II through the cooperation of secret agents 
and sharing networks of secret information, Catalan nationalism would, in return, 
receive support from the international community. Catalan institutional opposition, in 
the event, remained meagre, with no institution of government from 1939 to 1945, and 
all attempts to resuscitate the Generalitat (the main Catalan governmental institution) 
ending in failure.
The aspiration to regional autonomy was shared by other groups in Spain. In 
this, the Catalan nationalists felt very close to the Basque nationalists. Unlike the 
Catalan nationalists, the Basque nationalist groups united under the aegis of a single 
party, the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Basque Nationalist Party, PNV), which 
coordinated Basque nationalist activity both at home and abroad. Better funded, 
Basque nationalism provided a major ally with strategic interests in common.12
The Basque nationalists were better organised than the Catalan nationalists, yet 
achieved relatively little more, except perhaps a higher intensity of reaction from 
Franco. Less organised, the Catalans were taken to present less of a material threat to 
the dictatorship. The Galicians were a third group to express demands for regional 
autonomy in the period. Despite a comparable historical claim however, the Galicians 
did not achieve a comparable level of political organisation, and carried much less 
weight at the national level.13
A certain amount of realpolitik would have its influence on policy. Thinking that 
the Western powers would favour restoration of a republic after the war, an effort was
10 A good definition of cultural resistance may be found in M. Guibemau, Los Nacionalismos, 
(Barcelona, Ariel, 1996), pp. 119-120.
11 A. Viladot i Presas, Nacionalisme ipremsa clandestine, (1939-1951), (Barcelona, Curial, 1987), 
pp. 192-194.
12 The Basque exile is not directly in die scope of this study, except insofar as it impacts on the issues at 
hand. The works of J. C. Jimdnez de Aberasturi Corta, De la derrota a la esperanza: Politicas 
vascas durante la II Guerra Mondial (37-47), (Bilbao, Institute Vasco de Administration publica, 
1999) and S.P. Pablo, L. Mees, J.A., Rodriguez Ranz, Elpendulo patridtico, Historia del Partido 
Nacionalista Vasco, Vol. landII (1895-1975), (Crftica- Contrastes, Barcelona, 2001) provide a full 
account of the Basque regionalists in this period.
13 The Galicians, like the Basques, will be examined only insofar as they have influence on the Catalans.
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made to make common cause with the republican groups.14 There were attempts to 
form alliances with the groups of the left, in the main, the Socialists, as well as the 
Republicans, but these were never more than sporadic and did not endure.15
The period 1939-1950 is very significant for the development of Catalan 
nationalism. Though winning the Civil War, which had ended 1 April 1939, the 
Francoist regime had not yet fully taken root. As Francoism began to consolidate, a 
basis of opposition developed. The Catalan side was expectant and hopeful of 
assistance from the international community. Between 1939 and 1950, the Catalan 
opposition passed through several stages of development.
Though many refugees left Spain after 1 April 1939, a huge number had already 
begun to seek refuge abroad from the beginning of that year, fearing a Francoist 
victory in the Civil War. The majority of Catalans that left Catalonia did it before the 
fall of Barcelona. It is calculated that around 300,000 Catalans left during this period. 
Once Barcelona fell to Francoist hands16, borders were closed and it became 
progressively more difficult to leave the country. The situation for Catalans under 
Franco became very difficult. It is estimated that Catalonia’s population in 1939 was 
approximately 1,300,000 people, and that some 300,000 Catalans went in exile after 
1939. Among these, very few Catalans participated in the anti-Francoist Catalan 
parties (perhaps between 10 and 15 per cent) since the majority were largely 
preoccupied with the question of their own survival.17 Up to 1940, opposition was 
halting, doubtful and somewhat anaemic after the Civil War. With fascism on the 
march and an expectation that Hitler would prevail in World War n, it seemed that the 
Francoist hold on power would be confirmed. During 1939-1940, Catalan activity
14 Some voices from the British Foreign Office confirmed that the most likely option in case of the 
overthrow of Franco would have been a restoration of the republic. PRO File FO 371/49582, Joan 
Ventosa's documents, Victor Mallet to Sir Bevin, London, 30-10-1945, PRO, File FO 371/39744, 
Letter Lizaso to Aguirre, Basques relations with the left, London, 10-12-1944.
15 The left-wing opposition to Franco will be considered in this study insofar as it related to the Catalans.
16 The fall of Barcelona to Francoist hands is very well documented in AT, Poblet, Box C l579, 'El fina 
de la republican For some secondary literature on this topic, see R.Carr, The Republic and the Civil 
War in Spain, (London, McMillan, 1971), E.Ucelay da Cal, La Catalunya populista: Imatge, cultura i 
politica en Vetapa republicana (1931-1939), (Barcelona, Magrana, 1982), A.Aranzazu, Ve y cuenta lo 
que pasd en Espaha, (Barcelona, Planeta, 2000); F.Vilanova, Les ruptures de T any 1939, (Barcelona, 
Fundacid Pi i Sunyer, 2000); M.Risques, F.Vilanova and R.Vinyes, 1939 Barcelona any zero.
Histdria grafica de V ocupacio de la ciutat, (Barcelona, Edicions Proa, 1999); J. Villarroya i Font, 
1939 Derrota i exili, (Barcelona, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2000).
17 Gran Enciclopedia Catalana Vol.IV, (Barcelona, Enciclopedia Catalana, 1973).
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focused on France. 1940-1942 was a more successful period for Catalan nationalism 
that was organising in the UK, USA and Latin America.
If the preceding years appeared to offer promise, 1942-1944 was a period of 
crisis and scant activity for Catalan nationalism. The anti-Francoist opposition 
expected that, after a victory of the Allies over the Axis powers and the overthrow of 
Hitler and Mussolini, collaboration with those forces seeking to overturn the Francoist 
regime would be a natural next step. During the period lasting from 1944 to 1946, the 
Catalan opposition perhaps reached its zenith. Both the international and Spanish 
framework of the period is central to understanding the development of Catalan 
nationalism. The experience of the Civil War (1936-1939) took a huge toll, morally 
and materially. The violence and repression of the Civil War in Spain had been 
ferocious, and the loss of life severe. The anti-Francoist opposition found itself in no 
position to enter another conflict, lacking the will, the resources, and the unity required 
for it. Although Spain remained neutral when World War II broke out in 1939, the 
prevailing atmosphere of threat and insecurity affected the Spanish psyche, further 
weakening the will to fight against the Francoist regime, all the more so whilst an Axis 
victory seemed in prospect. At the beginning of hostilities, Spaniards feared a 
German invasion of Spain. The ambiguity concerning diplomatic intent and 
subsequent withdrawal of international support had been problematic. Later on, an 
Allied victory in Europe proved less propitious to the Catalan cause than had been 
hoped.
The efficiency of the Francoist repression also had severe effects. Franco 
successfully established a dictatorship, supported by a very efficient machinery of 
repression, impeding the formation of solid political opposition. As, in time, he was 
careful to point out to both the international community and to the Spanish middle and 
upper classes, Franco could ensure stability.18 Shrewdly, Franco catered for the 
interests of the moderates, fought very vigorously against monarchist opposition and 
presented himself as the only viable alternative to a Communist succession. So much
18 H. Heine, La oposicion, p.478. J.M. SoldlSabatd, La repressio franquista a Catalunya (1938- 
1953), (Barcelona, Editions 62,1985); M. Richards, A time of silence, Civil War and the culture of 
repression in Franco’s Spain, (1936-45), (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998).
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is duly recognised in the literature. It is also true that Catalan nationalism may have 
itself contributed to the set of factors ranged against it.
The present study examines those internal reasons for the failure among 
Catalans. Their shortcomings and mistakes were various and significant. As has 
already been indicated, the Catalans lacked the confidence to recover and reorganise 
after Civil War; whilst aware of the restrictions it imposed, they could not manage to 
overcome their tendency to faction and dispute. The representative institutional 
organisations required to legitimise the struggle were not established. A government 
was not created in exile. Common cause was not made between those at home and 
abroad, and the strength and effectiveness of the regime was persistently 
underestimated. In such circumstances, a credible democratic alternative to Franco 
was not developed.
The Catalan exile posed particular difficulties of organisation. More, those in 
opposition were insufficiently pragmatic; their personal clashes proved stronger than 
any desire for unity. In fact, all those opposition groups finding themselves in exile 
were, in the event, reluctant to make political concessions. By extension, Catalan 
groups were not able to establish good relations either with the Left or with other 
opposition forces. If a cohesive bloc was required to overthrow Franco, a lack of clear 
leadership and certain arrogance on the part of disparate groups prevented its 
formation. The international powers were not presented with a realistic alternative to 
Franco. Fresh memories of the Civil War, in which Left and Right had been rivals, 
had made it hard to reach compromises; it was difficult to accept as allies, those who 
had been regarded at best with suspicion. Finally, the Catalans relied too much, and 
arguably a little naively on the help of the Allies, even if it had not been promised 
formally. Allied diplomacy, particularly British diplomacy in Spain, Europe and 
around the world was one of anti-fascism and, even more important, one of anti­
communism. If Catalans had united with the rest of the anti-Francoists groups, 
especially anti-fascist and anti-Communist groups (since they subscribed to these 
ideologies), and had presented a cohesive bloc to the eyes of the Allies, they would 
have stood a chance of overthrowing Franco. The evidence that key movers (UK, 
USA and UN) were not looking to get into bed with Franco, even if covertly, is that 
they condemned his policies and made some contacts with the anti-Francoists.
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Furthermore, the Allies only approved of Francoism when they were pushed to take 
anti-Communist measures facing the beginning of the Cold War. 
HISTORIOGRAPHY
There are a number of excellent works on aspects of anti-Francoist opposition. 
The focus tends to be very much on Republican, monarchist and Basque nationalist 
opposition to Franco rather than on the Catalan nationalism per se. There is also a 
tendency in the literature to cite external factors for the failure of opposition to Franco, 
rather than internal factors. A number of writers contend that the principal reason for 
the failure of the opposition was the lack of international help. By contrast, only in a 
few works like Jose Borras’ Politicos de los exiliados espanoles 1944-1950,19 is it 
argued that organisation may have been lacking in opposition forces, and that 
responsibility for that cannot be laid elsewhere. Borras’ treatment however, is not 
focused on Catalan nationalism.
As has been said, there is as yet no full account of Catalan opposition, as is the 
case for monarchist, Basque nationalist or Republican opposition. Here, secondary 
material has been consulted in order to develop an integrated view of Catalan 
nationalism in the 1940s, such as Francesc Vilanova’s A/s dos costats de lafrontera,
90relacions politiques entre exili i interior a la postguerra, 1939-1948, and Les 
ruptures de Vany 193921. Again though, Vilanova - albeit explicitly - does not give a 
comprehensive account of the period. In particular, Les ruptures de Vany 1939 focuses 
exclusively on the end of the Civil War and the first exile to France. Als dos costats de 
lafrontera surveys a wider period, but focuses on Catalan developments in France and 
Spain alone.
Montserrat Guibemau’s Nacionalisme Catala22 points to personal failures in 
Catalan leaders preventing the movement from getting organised. Guibemau explains 
the incapacity of Catalan opposition to found a unified bloc, the division between those 
in exile and those in Spain, and their naivete in relying on unconditional support from 
the Allies. Guibemau then suggestively indicates several arguments for failure but,
19 J. Borr&s, Politicos de los exiliados espanoles 1944-1950, (Paris, Ruedo Ibdrico 1976).
20 F. Vilanova, Als dos costats de lafrontera, relacions politiques entre exili I interior a la postguerra, 
1939-1948, (Barcelona, Biblioteca Sena d’Or, Publications de 1’ Abadia de Montserrat, 2001).
21 F. Vilanova, Les ruptures de / ’ any 1939, (Barcelona, Publications de 1’ Abadia de Montserrat, 2000).
22 Guibemau, Nacionalisme Catala,.
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given the wide chronological span of her study, does not set out to provide a full 
historical account.23
Given the poverty of printed sources, public and private archives have provided 
the principal primary sources for this study. A comprehensive list of sources is given 
in the bibliography. Several sources have proved of particular value.24 Concerning 
primary sources, the memories of Carles Pi i Sunyer are crucial since he was one of the 
main political leaders of the period and he described every political move he made in 
detail. Nonetheless, Pi i Sunyer provides only a partial view of the development of 
Catalan nationalism in the 1940s. Some reference has been made to British archives, 
particularly those documents of the Public Record Office received by the British 
Foreign Office from Embassy and Consular staff in Spain. These have proved of use 
in tracing the British perspective on the creation and development of the Catalan 
opposition. Furthermore, they have proved useful in order to trace British and Allied 
diplomacy towards the Spanish question in the 1940s. Two Catalan archives 
contributed particularly to the study: namely, the Pi i Sunyer foundation and the 
Tarradellas archive. The Pi i Sunyer foundation, in Barcelona, collects the 
correspondence between Carles Pi i Sunyer and other leaders of right-wing Catalan 
nationalism in the 1940s. The Tarradellas archive in Poblet provides a very broad 
account of the left-wing spectrum of Catalan nationalism in the 1940s through 
correspondence between Josep Tarradellas and others in the movement. By 
researching these two archives, an integrated view of both the right- and left-wing 
Catalan opposition to Franco during the 1940s was built up.
The thesis also makes reference to a number of interviews conducted by the 
author with some of the relevant figures from the period. Few of those figures are still 
alive, which is why their testimony becomes very valuable. Finally, it should be noted 
that the study focuses on European developments (particularly those in Spain, France, 
and the UK), rather than those in the American communities. The majority of, and
23 Guibemau, Nacionalisme Catala, p.96.
24-Tarradellas archive- Poblet- Catalonia-Spain; -Archive of the Basque nationalist party in Artea- 
Basque country-Spain; -Pi i Sunyer foundation-Barcelona-Spain; -Personal archive of the Sindic de 
Greuges (Catalan ombudsman), Ant6n Canellas-Barcelona-Spain; -Varela's private archive, C&diz- 
Spain; -Pabelld Sert, Pabelld de la Republica, centre d'estudis dUistdria contempordnia- Barcelona- 
Spain; -Public Record Office (London), UK.
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most significant of Catalan political decisions and developments happened in Europe. 
This being the case, the American communities are not of such central relevance, but 
certain aspects of this exile are examined in chapters 4 and 5 and the research in the 
main concerns the press.
STRUCTURE
The context and antecedents of Catalan opposition up to 1939 are considered in 
Chapter 1. This heritage was responsible for certain features of the movement of the 
1940s. The chapter includes a summary of the impact of the Civil War and the 
establishment of Francoism, with its efficient repressive measures, as well as the 
creation of anti-Francoist opposition groups. One of the priorities of the Francoist 
repressive machinery would be Catalan nationalism precisely because Catalan 
nationalism had developed politically in the first quarter of the century and was 
considered a threat for Francoist centralist policy. During the last quarter of the XIX 
century and the first quarter of the XX century, Catalan nationalism had developed a 
concrete political programme. Its principal party during the period had been the Lliga, 
a moderate Catalan political party led by the Catalan businessman Francesc Cambo. 
Catalans produced the first documents to compile their political aspirations in the 
Memorial de Greuges and the Bases de Manresa. Catalans also founded the first 
institutional embodiment of, and vehicle for their demands, the Mancomunitat (1914- 
1925). Catalan political organisation was backed by economic strength based on the 
development of the industrial revolution, which had made Catalonia the richest region 
of Spain. In the cultural domain, Catalan claims were supported by the Renaixenga, a 
cultural movement of recovery of the Catalan language, history and identity.
These developments were, to an extent, a response to the centralist policies 
advocated and imposed under the Restauracion system of Canovas, based on an 
alternation in power of just two parties, the conservatives and the liberals. The system 
allowed for the monopolisation of power by rural landowners who controlled the vote, 
and who acted to repress regionalist claims quite severely. At the beginning of the 
XlXth century, Catalan nationalism had become politically organised.
Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship between 1923 and 1930 would see the effective 
suspension of all such developments for seven years. The second republic in Spain
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(1931-1936) was welcomed by Catalans. The Generalitat, a Catalan government, was 
founded and presided over by Francesc Macia. After Maria’s sudden death on 
Christmas Day 1933, he was replaced as president by Lluis Companys. The Catalans 
would also produce an estatut (1932). The principal Catalan party of the period was 
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), a radical Catalan party which sought 
complete independence for the region. The Civil War (1936-1939) once again brought 
all developments to a standstill. Worse was to follow. Franco’s Burgos decree in 1938 
suspended the Generalitat and the Catalan statute. In the spring of 1939, as the Civil 
War drew to a close and the dictatorship was established, opposition to Franco began 
to foment. Catalan nationalism played an important role. Spain had been devastated 
by the Civil War and the losing side had scant resources and low reserves of morale. 
Franco moved quickly to capitalise on his victory and established totalitarian 
measures, including a very effective machinery of repression, which would be targeted 
against any potential sources or forms of opposition.
The Civil War caused a deep rift in Catalan society. Some sections of the 
wealthy Catalan bourgeoisie inclined to support Francoism believing that Franco better 
served their economic interests. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the move was considered a 
betrayal by hard core Catalans, and the fault line lay across a Catalonian society 
traumatised by the horrors of a Civil War. During the conflict, the Generalitat, 
conscious of its incapacitation, decided to allocate its remaining available financial 
resources to the Republican government. The funds would not be repaid, leaving the 
Catalans impoverished. The overall situation was then precarious in Catalonia. In 
conditions of great adversity, Catalans founded an opposition to the regime. A great 
number of Catalans decided to go into exile, seeking both refuge from Francoist 
repression and a place more conducive to achieving any sort of organisation.
Chapter 2 provides an account of the first Catalan exile to France from April 
1939 to June 1940. The Catalan exodus to France is described, and an account is made 
of the problems faced by a movement indefinitely displaced and suffering the loss of 
its leader and primary governmental institution. The first destination for the refugees 
was neighbouring France, whose government welcomed the first Catalans to escape 
through the Pyrenees. The Generalitat and its president, Llufs Companys also moved 
to France. After his arrest in 1939 by the Germans, the Generalitat effectively ceased
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to exist. Catalans in France responded with efforts to found a unitary left-wing 
platform, the Front Nacional de Catalunya. Yet again, the development of Catalan 
political organisation met immediately with a severe obstacle, this time the German 
occupation of France in October 1940. Those Catalans in France were dispersed 
across a number of nuclei, and, after the arrest of Companys, found themselves without 
leadership. Due to their financial position, the scattered population relied upon the 
help of the Republicans and the Basque nationalists, which substantially reduced their 
capacity to manoeuvre. Policy was muddled and communication was poor between 
those remaining in Spain and those in exile, owing both to patchy networks of 
communication and to clashes of leadership.
The main subject of Chapter 3 is the subsequent Catalan exile to Britain 
between July 1940 and August 1942. The chapter offers a full account of the Consell 
Nacional de Catalunya (National Catalan Council, CNC), the leading Catalan 
organisation at the time, and the challenge made by the French-based president by 
default, Josep Irla. After the German occupation of France, many Catalans sought 
refuge in the UK, since it was the last remaining democratic country in Europe ready 
to receive them. Catalan political activity between 1940 and 1942 settled there, under 
the leadership of Carles Pi i Sunyer, a member of ERC. An attempt to create a 
surrogate institution for the Generalitat in the UK was made, in the form of the 
Consell Nacional de Catalunya (CNC).
Chapter 4 is concerned with the same period as chapter 3. It provides an 
account of the Atlantic exile from July 1940 to August 1942, taking in events both in 
the USA and in Latin America. The impact of Miquel Santalo’s mission, designed to 
wrest influence from the CNC is described. In parallel to the UK exile, there was also 
a significant Atlantic exile by Catalans, going both to the USA and to several countries 
in Latin America. The USA exile was less significant on account of the much smaller 
number of Catalans domiciled there. Nevertheless, the Catalan community in New 
York played a part in trying to lobby the American government and in seeking support 
from the Allies. By contrast, Catalans in Latin America organised themselves in 
comunitats, quite independent communities, based upon shared cultural and linguistic 
experience, which were ultimately responsible to the CNC of London. Mexico was the 
largest of these by some margin, followed by Argentina and Cuba. Not without
20
difficulties, the period from 1940 to1942 was quite a successful one for political 
Catalan nationalism.
Chapter 5 surveys developments in Catalan nationalism between August 1942 
and October 1944, a time of crisis, confusion and disorder for Catalan nationalism. An 
account is made of the development of the Front Nacional de Catalunya (National 
Front of Catalonia, FNC), whose core activity was in France, and the Latin American 
based Junta de Liberacion (JL), an attempt to create a unitary platform with the left- 
wing anti-Francoist forces. In November 1943, the Socialists and a variety of Spanish 
and Catalan liberal Republican groups joined together in Mexico to found the Junta 
Espanola de Liberacion. Those Catalans in France did not accept the supremacy of the 
CNC of London, and Josep Irla, de facto president of the Generalitat, decided to send 
Miquel Santalo, an ERC member of France, to Mexico at the end of 1941 endowing 
him with presidential powers. The intention was a direct challenge and neutralisation 
of both Pi i Sunyer’s power, and the strength of the CNC of London. The action 
would create confusion and division among Catalans, particularly amongst the 
comunitats in Latin America, which no longer knew to whom they should report. In 
response to the new arrangements, Pi i Sunyer decided to dissolve the CNC of London 
in 1943. If that part of the ERC initiative had succeeded, Miquel Santald would fail in 
his attempt to found a new Consell in Mexico and a new Catalan consensus.
Chapter 6 provides an account of developments of Catalan opposition between 
August 1944 and June 1945, as World War II approached its conclusion and Allied 
policy toward the Iberian Peninsula was revealed. The period from 1944 to 1945 was 
to an extent determined by the circumstances of the war’s end. An Allied victory now 
seemed more than likely, fuelling Catalan hopes of soon obtaining support from the 
Allies. France, freed from German occupation in 1944, soon recovered its role as 
Catalan nationalism’s centre stage. After the failure of Santalo’s mission, Pi i Sunyer 
reconstituted a radicalised Consell of London in 1944 that would last just a year. In 
France, Catalan nationalism developed, led by the FNC. Other parties re-established 
themselves, such as EC and ERC.
The study is concluded in Chapter 7, with a consideration of what was, in effect, 
the onset of the Cold War. The reconstitution of the Generalitat and belated 
achievement of a degree of unity is discussed in the light of the Allies’ seemingly have 
already determined on a policy of conciliation with the dictatorship. After 1947, the
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secret presses, which had done so much to support the struggle throughout the war 
years, fell silent; their ink - formerly the lifeblood of a culture under siege - dried up.
A large number of Catalans returned home after the end of World War D. One of the 
most active Catalan groups, the Mexican one, had come back to Catalonia and had 
stopped fighting politically for Catalan reasons. Many members of the Mexican group 
were present in the popular homage to the Virgin of Montserrat on 27 April 1947, a 
Catalanist cultural and religious gathering. The currents of international politics too 
played their part. The Western powers did not wish Spain to enter World War II and 
accepted that Franco would remain in power since he maintained Spanish neutrality. 
The long awaited help from the Western powers never came. Indeed, it is often 
claimed that the Allies never seriously considered helping the anti-Francoist 
opposition. In November 1950, key members of the international community (the 
USA, France, UK and USSR) instructed their ambassadors to return to Spain, 
signalling an acceptance of Franco’s regime. With the Iron Curtain descending, the 
Western powers were evidently more exercised by Communist expansionism: a fascist 
but neutral Spain was seemingly preferred to a Communist one. Recognition of this 
position caused a significant change in opposition attitudes. Better organisation on the 
anti-Francoist side could have elicited the desired response from the Western powers.
If the anti-Francoist opposition would have presented a realistic solid alternative to 
Franco, the Allies would have been more prone to help them. The Allies were not pro- 
Francoists. They were anti-Communists and looked for the best possible means to 
ensure that Spain would not become Communist. With its former aspirations in tatters, 
Catalans looked to attempts at reconstituting the Generalitat, which was resurrected 
after repeated tries in 1945, and finally dissolved in 1948, leaving Catalans without 
their principal institution. Moreover, Catalans made efforts to develop such unitary 
platforms as the CNDC, (which intended to build a broad coalition including Basque 
nationalists and the left-wing opposition groups) to restore a sense of progress. It was, 
to an extent, too little too late: the Allies had already determined not to intervene in 
Spanish affairs. Anti-Francoists and Catalans alike did not command the resources to 
organise themselves. Catalans had not presented a credible alternative to the regime in 
the eyes of Western governments, and had signally failed in their own attempts to 
overthrow the dictatorship. Acceptance of the necessity of a broad, solid and stable 
consensus had come at a great cost, in time. For too long, at a critical period in the
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course of affairs, internal divisions and leadership clashes, as well as policy 
disagreements would impede any real collaboration and suffocate any capacity for 
organisation on the ground.
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CHAPTER 1 - THE CONTEXT AND ANTECEDENTS OF CATALAN 
OPPOSITION BEFORE 1939
1.1 INTRODUCTION
'II est toujours joli le temps passe.
Unefois qu His out casse leur pipe,
On pardonne a tous ceux qui nous ont offenses: 
les morts sont tous des braves types. '2S
The context and antecedents of the Catalan opposition to Franco that emerged in 
the 1940s were responsible for certain features of the movement in that decade. It is 
arguably crucial to an understanding of the configuration of Catalan groups after 1939 
that an account be made of their origins and evolution. Thus, the international,
Spanish and Catalan background before 1939 is summarised here, as is the impact of 
the Civil War. The establishment of Francoism, its roots, organisation and apparatus 
of repression, as well as the development of the anti-Francoist opposition and the 
stance of the regime toward the Catalan opposition in particular, is also considered.
1.2 THE CONTEXT AND ANTECEDENTS OF CATALAN OPPOSITION 
(1875-1936)
Tensions between Catalans and the central state are centuries’ old, and were 
heightened in the period 1868-1875, which saw the restoration of the liberal regime in 
Spain, led by a handful of families, dependent on military power, on landowners, and 
on the power of the Church. It was a period of enormous political instability that 
impeded a process of democratisation in Spain, while it was happening in the rest of 
Europe.26
In 1874, a military coup restored the Bourbon monarchy in the person of Alfonso 
XII. The next year marked the beginning of the era of the Restauracion (Restoration) 
based on the alternation of Liberal Conservative (led by Antonio Canovas del 
Castillo27) and Liberal (led by Mateo Sagasta) parties using a method of electoral fraud
25 Georges Brassens: "Le temps passd".
26 J.M. Soria, Ta politizacidn del catalanismo', La Vanguardia, 05-08-2001.
27 Antonio Cdnovas del Castillo was bom in Malaga in 1828. He was a politician and writer. As head of 
the government in 1875, Cdnovas set up a political system called Restauracidn based on the Tumo
24
(caciquismo). The parties were made up of groupings of leaders of sub-factions, which 
were in the hands of local bosses, the cacique, who commanded the local 
administration as well as the judicial apparatus and secured support by giving jobs.
The system came to depend on the rural vote and was based on the manipulation of the 
elections by the government. Votes were often bought or falsified. The bourgeoisie, 
the military and the church were the pillars of the Restauracion. The liberals accepted 
the 1876 constitution, which implemented the jury system and universal male suffrage, 
but these parties were artificial constructs from above, held together by patronage. The 
governing elite mainly formed by landowners were still monopolising power. The 
succession in government of liberals and liberal conservatives was known as Tumo 
Pacifico (Peaceful Rotation).28
A conflict between centre and regions was already obvious in the XIX century 
under the liberal system of Canovas in the form of the continual repression by the 
centralist state of both Catalan and Basque regionalist aspirations.29 The Restauracion 
was a centralist-based system that did not make any concessions of autonomy to the 
Catalans. Thus, the Catalan movement of the XIX century was a reaction to the state 
modernisation project of the Spanish liberals.30
Parallel to Canovas’ Restauracidn was a movement in Catalonia that came to be 
known as Renaixenga (Catalan Cultural Renaissance).31 The Renaixenga was the 
Catalan response to the Romantic Movement, which had produced a Europe-wide 
phenomenon of interest in the past of nations with and without state. In Catalonia, the 
Renaixenga was a project of cultural revivalism to restore a broken continuity with the
Pacifico, including liberal ideas and centralist politics. Canovas’ program of government was based 
on the rotation in power of the two big parties of the time, the conservatives of Cdnovas, and the 
liberals of Mateo Sagasta, under caciquismo. Caciquismo refers to a political system based on the 
power of the corrupt local bosses in the country who manipulated the votes of the population to their 
advantage. Mateo Sagasta was bom in La Rioja (1827). A politician, he organised the Partido 
Liberal, forming a pact with Canovas (1885).
28 F. Romero Salvadd, Spain (1914-1918) Between War and Revolution, (London, Roudedge, 1999), p.l
29 S. de Pablo, S.P., Mess, L., Rodriguez Ranz, J.A., Elpendulo patriotico, Historia del Partido 
Nacionalista Vasco, Vol.I (1895-1936), (Barcelona, Crftica- Contrastes, 2001), p.20; R. Carr, Modem 
Spain 1875-1980, (Oxford, Oxford University press, 1982).
30 M. Keating, Nations against the state: the new politics of nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia and 
Scotland, (New York, Palgrave Me Millan, 1996), p.30.
31 J.M. Soria, Ta politizacidn del Catalan nationalismo', La Vanguardia, 05-08-2001.
32 For more information on the Renaixenga see M. Guibemau, Nationalisms. The nation state and 
nationalism in the twentieth century, (Cambridge, Cambridge press, 1996); A. Balcells, Historia 
contemporanea de Cataluha, (Madrid, S.XXI, 1977).
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past under which Catalan intellectuals studied and promoted the Catalan language, law 
and folklore. The publication of Carles Aribau’s Oda a la patria33 (Ode to the 
fatherland) in 1833 was seen as the beginning of the Renaixenga. The Renaixenga was 
linked to the industrial revolution in Catalonia.
The XIX century Catalan economy was reasonably advanced; much more so 
than that of the central state, which lagged behind the rest of Europe in terms of 
capitalism and industrialisation. The impact of the industrial revolution in the Basque 
and Catalan territories greatly increased the economic disparities between these two 
regions and the rest of Spain, whose economy continued to be dominated by 
agriculture.34 The twin processes of Catalan industrialisation and the Renaixenga 
boosted Catalan aspirations during the XIX century.
In October 1880, the federalist Valenti Almirall35 called the first Catalan 
congress, inspiring the creation of the Centre Catala (Catalan Centre), a self­
consciously Catalan group. In March 1885, Almirall founded the first newspaper in 
Catalan, Diari Catala, and participated in the writing up of the Memorial de Greuges 
{Report o f Grievances), put before Alfonso XII, a document in which industrialists, 
farmers and intellectuals alike made the case for Catalan nationalism and for freedom 
from the Spanish state. The reading of the Memorial de Greuges was an important 
moment for the development of Catalan nationalism36 since it was the first public 
commitment to a Catalan nationalist political agenda. The report demanded the 
maintenance of the Catalan legal code and called for development of Catalan industry. 
Though moderate, the document provoked a tremendous reaction in Madrid since it 
was the first time the government of Madrid realised that the Catalans were beginning 
to achieve political organisation. Even if the Memorial de Greuges was not 
implemented practically, the Catalans continued working toward the concretion of 
their political agenda.
33 Carles Aribau was bom in Barcelona in 1833. He was a writer, an economist and a politician. He 
wrote La Patria (1833), a poem which marked the beginning of Romanticism in the Catalan language.
34 For more information on the development of the industrial revolution in the XIX century in Catalonia 
and the Basque country see Pablo, Elpendulo patriotico, Vol.l, , pp.26-27.
35 Valenti Almirall was bom in Barcelona in 1841. He was a politician and a writer.
36 J.M. Soria, Ta politizaci6n del catalanismo", La Vanguardia, 05-08-2001.
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The Unio Catalanista (Catalan Union) was created in 1891 as a federation of 
Catalan associations mainly drawn from middle class youth and intellectuals and 
which marked the beginning of the political organisation of Catalan nationalism. The 
Unio Catalanista convened a conference in Manresa in 1892, in which a document was 
drawn up to delineate the Catalan nationalist agenda. The manifesto of the conference 
was entided Bases for a Regional Constitution, which formulated and declared that 
only the Catalan language would be accorded official status.
The next significant milestone in the development of Spanish-Catalan relations 
was the colonial disaster of 1898, in which Spain lost the remnants of her Empire -  
Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines. Spaniards did not easily adjust to the loss of 
their colonies and the Restauracion party system started to decay, ultimately failing 
because there was no powerful national organisation and no party discipline. The 
monarchy could count on very litde support during this period, with the events of 1898 
strengthening regional claims and left-wing protest. This led to the loss of legitimacy 
of the central state.37
From 1870 until the disaster, Catalan business had benefited from the existence 
of Spain’s colonial empire. In Catalonia, the loss of Cuba and the Philippines in 1898 
was taken to demonstrate the failure of Castilian state policy. The Catalan bourgeoisie, 
mercantile and industrial, moved to defend its economic interests, firstly in a purely 
economic way and subsequently through developing political Catalan nationalism.38 
After the colonial disaster of 1898, several political forces consolidated in Spain that
<JQ
had been somewhat left out in the cold during the Restauracion.
For instance, the Catalan bourgeoisie founded Lliga Regionalista (Regionalist 
League), in Barcelona on 25 April 1901. The Lliga established hegemony in political 
Catalan nationalism between 1901 and 1923, thereby making the Catalan question 
increasingly difficult to ignore. It was mainly associated with the ideas of Enric Prat 
de la Riba,40 whose program was based on increasing economic autonomy and
37 Pablo, El pendulo patriotico, Vol. I, pp.23-24;
381. Molas, Lliga Catalana, vol.I, (Barcelona, Editions 62,1974), p.36.
39 F. J. Romero Salvad6, Francisco, Spain 1914-1918 Between war and revolution, (London,
Routledge, 1999), p.43; Balcells, Historia contempordnea de Cataluna,; D. Agustf, Historia breve de 
Cataluiia, (Madrid, Sflex, 2002).
40 Enric Prat de la Riba was a politician, secretary of Uni6 Catalanista, and an elected member of the 
Barcelona council.
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intervention in Spanish politics in order to modernise the state. The organisation was 
created through the merging of Unio Regionalista (Regionalist Union) and the Centre 
Nacional Catala (National Catalan Centre).41 The newspaper Veu de Catalunya was its 
principal vehicle of public expression. The Lliga would work for Catalan autonomy 
and was created to contest the national elections of 1901 in opposition to the centralist 
parties. Given the close links between Catalan industry and the Spanish markets, the 
Lliga did not look for separation from the Spanish state 42 At the time, the general goal 
of the Catalan nationalist parties was autonomy rather than separation. The Lliga 
would push the central government of Madrid for economic concessions for 
Catalonia 43 Thus, 1901 marked the first time Catalan political groups were taking 
shape that could win elections and make themselves heard in Madrid with some hope 
of obtaining state reforms. These groups hoped to obtain some concessions from the 
government of Madrid. More importantly, the turn of the century saw a number of 
more radical Catalan groups become active.44
The beginning of the XX century was marked by the reign of Alfonso XIII 
(1902-1917), an era of growing tension whose most serious manifestations occurred in 
Catalonia, with the growth of the regionalist movement and working class anarcho- 
unionism 45 One example was the Centre Nacionalista Republica (Nationalist 
Republican Centre or CNR), founded in 1906 by a breakaway segment of the Lliga, 
providing a platform for a number of young radicals to make their first moves on the 
political stage. The CNR supported a Republican, democratic and autonomous regime. 
The anti-Catalan, anti-clerical republicans of Barcelona also gained strength under the 
helm of Alejandro Lerroux46, leader of the The Partido Radical (Radical Party), an
41 For information on the developments of the Lliga see B. de Riquer, Lliga Regionalista, (Barcelona, 
Aedos, Vol.1,1969).
42 Balcells, Historia Contemporanea de Cataluna,, p.121;.
43 Romero, Spain 1914-1918 , p.43
44 J. Sold Tura, Catalanisme I revolucio burgesa, (Barcelona, Ariel, 1967); Charles E.Ehrlich, The 
Lliga Regionalista and the Catalan industrial bourgeoisie', Journal of Contemporary History, vol.33, 
n.3, July 1998, pp.399-417.
45 J. Termes, De la revolucid de Setembre a lafi de la guerra civil 1868-1939, (Barcelona, Edhasa, 
1987), p.79.
46 Alejandro Lerroux was bom in Andalusia in 1864. He was a Republican politician who participated in 
the reorganisation of Uni6 Republicana in 1903. He was a minister under the second republic and 
presided over several governments between September 1933 and September 1935. The Republican 
Radical party was created in 1908 in Santander and was led by Alejandro Lerroux. It was anti­
clerical, anti-monarchist and a revolutionary party. Lerroux declared his anti-Catalan nationalism. In
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anti-monarchist and revolutionary who fought for workers’ leadership. The Partido 
Radical was financed by Madrid to create working class opposition to the Catalan 
movement. During this period, there were increasing tensions between those Catalans 
who had radicalised their views (e.g., the CNR), and the Partido Radical of Lerroux, 
which hoped to put a brake on the development of Catalan nationalism.
Radical street actions at the beginning of the XX century culminated in the 
burning of the Barcelona offices of the Catalan Cu-Cut magazine and the Veu de 
Catalunya newspaper in 1905, by regular officers from the Barcelona garrison.47 The 
army officers were offended by what they considered the publications’ anti-Spanish 
editorials and cartoons. This event became a symbol of the growing tension between 
the centralist state and Catalan nationalist demands. 48
Between 1907 and 1909, Catalans were united under Solidaritat Catalana 
(Catalan Solidarity), which included the Lliga, the CNR and other Catalan parties. 
Solidaritat Catalana was a unitary electoral platform, whose driving intellectual force 
was Francesc Cambo, the leader of the Lliga 49 The provincial and legislative elections 
of 1907 saw Solidaritat Catalana consolidate itself as a political coalition. By the 
municipal elections of 1909 however, the coalition had already broken down since 
Solidaritat Catalana had not achieved a satisfactory degree of autonomy.
These three years also saw a strengthening of anti-clericalism in Spain, 
culminating in the Setmana Tragica (Tragic Week) of 1909. This popular revolt in 
Barcelona against the sending of Catalan troops to Morocco provided the touch paper
1904, the Radical Party won in the electoral meetings due to the support of the immigrant workers and 
the small bourgeoisie. The Radical party was in close contact with anarchism. J. Alvarez Junco, El 
emperador delparalelo: Lerroux y la demagogia populista, (Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 1990).
47 J.M. Soria, "El ultranacionalismo espanol', La Vanguardia, 06-08-2001; J.M. Soria, "Dialdctica entre 
centralismo y radicalismo, La Vanguardia, 07-08-2001.
48 Romero, Spain 1914-1918, p.44
49 Francesc Cambd i Batlle was a lawyer, businessman and a politician (1876-1947). When Prat de la 
Riba died, Camb6 became the President of the Lliga and he was minister twice (in 1918 and in 1921). 
He withdrew from political activity after the Lliga's failure and his failure in Madrid, and returned in 
1923 under the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera. After failing in the elections of 1936, he left public 
life to undertake a long trip to Switzerland, the USA and Argentina. A writer, politician, art collector, 
and businessman, Cambd was the leader of the Lliga and represented the conservative classes. Cambo 
started off supporting the Francoist cause for economic reasons and would later come to regret the 
decision once Francoism proved itself anti-Catalan. For information on the biography of Camb6, see 
J. Pabdn, Cambo, 1876-1947, (Barcelona, Alpha, 1999) and F. Cambd, Memories (1976-1936), 
(Barcelona, Alpha, 1981); B. Riquer i Permanyer, L'ultim Cambo (1936-1947)La dreta catalanista 
davant la guerra civil i el franquisme, (Barcelona, Eumo Editorial, 1996).
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for a definitive break between moderate and non-moderate Catalans. Moderate 
Catalans accepted the power of the Church but non-moderate Catalans did not. 
Religious strife suddenly became a major issue since Catalans associated the Catholic 
Church with the central state of Madrid, a symbol of the unfairness and intransigence 
of the central government. Facing a general strike amongst the Catalan reservists, 
martial law was declared. During the Setmana Tragica, three members of the clergy 
were killed, and twelve churches and forty convents and religious establishments were 
destroyed.50
In 1914, the first institutional expression of Catalan nationalism, the 
Mancomunitat (Commonwealth) was founded, for the most part by members of the 
Lliga). The Mancomunitat unified Catalonia for administrative purposes, bringing 
together the four provincial diputacions (councils) -  Barcelona, Tarragona, Girona and 
Lleida -  and working within the tight legal framework of the bureaucratically 
governed provinces. The Mancomunitat mainly dedicated itself to the improvement of 
the Catalan infrastructure, promoted Catalan culture and was seen as the first step to 
greater Catalan autonomy.51 It was first presided over by Enric Prat de la Riba and then 
by Josep Puig i Cadafalch52 and became the vehicle of expression of the Lliga. Roads, 
telephones and technical installations were the major advances instigated by Prat de la 
Riba. The Mancomunitat (1914-1923) only represented a small step towards 
decentralisation, falling short of solving the longstanding question of how to integrate 
Catalonia into Spain.53
In the meantime, the First World War erupted. The war (1914-1918) saw all but 
a few European states -  namely Holland, Switzerland, and Spain -  involved in the 
conflict, as well as such nations as Australia, Canada and the United States.
Catalonian (and Spanish) society divided itself between those sympathetic to the 
German interest and those opposed to it, polarising the right and the left of the
50 J. M. Poblet, Histdria basica del catalanisme, (Barcelona, Pdrtic, 1977); J. Mestre i Camps, 
Diccionari d'Histdria de Catalunya, (Barcelona, edicions 62,1995).
51 Poblet, Histdria basica , p.389.
52 Josep Puig i Cadafalch was bom in the Maresme in 1867. He was an architect, a historian, and a 
politician. He was co-founder of the Lliga in 1901, and was second president of the Mancomunitat in 
1918,1919 and 1923.
53 J. De Camps i Arboix, La Mancomunitat de Catalunya, (Barcelona, Bmguera, 1968) p.35; R. Olivar 
Bertrand, Prat de la Riba, (Barcelona, Aedos, 1964).
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movement. Spain’s neutrality in the First World War allowed her to derive economic 
benefit from both sides. Her non-belligerence put her in the economically privileged 
position of being able to supply both sides of the war with agricultural and industrial 
products. Coal mine-owners from Asturias, Basque steel barons and shipbuilders and 
Catalan textile magnates all experienced a heady boom, which constituted the first 
dramatic rise of Spanish industry. Even if Spain was neutral in the conflict, it was 
substantially affected by it.54 There ensued an enormous debate between the supporters 
of the Central powers and those of the Allies. The First World War destroyed the 
Canovas system in Spain.55 Whilst the First World War proved very profitable for 
Spain, the Lliga reinforced its role in its position as the party of the Catalan 
bourgeoisie, which was benefiting significantly from the economic upturn.56
The Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia in 1917 gave succour to the Spanish 
labour movement, leading to a time of crisis for Catalan nationalism. At first, the 
anarcho-unionist Confederation Nacional del Trabajo (National Confederation of 
Labour or CNT57) aligned itself with the Bolsheviks, but later withdrew its support 
when the authoritarian nature of Bolshevism became evident. The end of the First 
World War and its corollary, the end of the economic boom, particularly in Barcelona, 
sharpened the class conflict of the time.58 Demands for regional autonomy in Catalonia 
were linked to a perception that taxation of the industrial profits made during the First 
World War had not been fair because Catalan interests were not represented in the 
Cortes (parliament). Catalan nationalism was not merely a manifestation of cultural 
division, but the result of its being the most economically advanced region of Spain, 
producing a quarter of the country’s wealth (with only one-eighth of the population), 
and receiving just a twentieth of government spending in return.
54 Romero, Spain 1914-1918 p. 179-185.
55 Romero, Spain 1914-1918 p.5.
56 Preston, The Civil War,, p. 17.
57 The CNT was an anarchounionist group constituted in Barcelona in 1911, which had a national 
spectrum. It became the most important workers union of Spain with particular influence in Catalonia 
and declared itself anarchist The CNT defended direct action and believed in the use of general 
strikes to achieve its aims. J. Mestre i Camps, Diccionari d'Histdria de Catalunya, (Barcelona, 
edicions 62,1995).
58 For the political developments in Spain in 1917, see J. A. Lacomba, La crisis espaHola de 1917, 
(Malaga, Ciencia Nueva, 1970); G. Meaker, The revolutionary left in Spain (1914-1923), (Palo Alto, 
Stanford University Press, 1974).
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A general strike in 1917 could not be averted and the Spanish military engaged 
once again in politics, through the creation of the Juntas de Defensa (Defence 
Councils). From 1917 onwards, workers’ unions multiplied. A state of war was 
promptly declared, and the army was used to restore order under a new government 
that enjoyed the support and active participation of the Lliga. The overall effect was to 
consolidate the power of the landowners in Spain. The death of Prat de la Riba in 
1917 signified an end to more moderate Catalan nationalism.59 The Lliga supported 
the military at this point because on balance Lliga members were most concerned 
about securing stability in order to safeguard their economic interests.
During the summer of 1917, the industrial bourgeoisie, the armed forces and the 
labour movement tried to overthrow the ruling liberal oligarchy. The result was a 
situation of complete chaos. The liberal monarchy barely survived the challenge of 
1917. The Allied victory, the post war economic recession and the Bolshevik triumph 
intensified the class struggle in Spain.60
The period 1918-1923 was known for open gun battles in a Barcelona ravaged by 
overt class conflict. In 1918 the revolutionary atmosphere continued, while the CNT 
enormously increased its influence in Catalonia. Francesc Macia,61 a republican leader 
of Catalan nationalism during these years, believed in Catalonia as a federal state 
within a federal Spain. Macia channelled his energies through the Federacio 
Democratica Nacionalista (National Democratic Federation or FDN) in 1919, to focus 
on the armed fight, and afterwards through the platform of Estat Catala (Catalan State 
or EC), created in 1922.62
Between 1917 and 1923, the Lliga became increasingly conservative, perhaps 
even close to monarchism, leading to a schism between it and more progressive 
Catalans. In 1921, a new government was formed, with Francesc Cambd i Badle as
59 J. Sold Tura, Catalananisme I revolucid burgesa,, (Barcelona, Ariel, 1967).
60 Romero, Spain 1914-1918, pp.179-185.
61 Francesc Maci& was bom in Vilanova la Geltru in 1859. After 1912, he got closer to Catalan radical 
Republicanism. He tried to group the petit bourgeois and the workers around an independent 
program, Federacid Democratica Nacionalista (1919), from which would derive Estat Catala, created 
in 1922. He went into exile in France in 1923 and then to Belgium and America. He returned to 
Catalonia in 1931. He was the leader of ERC and president of the Generalitat de Catalunya until his 
death on 25 December 1933. For information on the life of Francesc Macik, see E. Jardf, Francesc 
Macia, El camide la llibertat (1905-1931), (Barcelona, Aym&, 1977).
62 E. Jardf, Francesc Macia, El cami de la llibertat (1905-1931), (Barcelona, Ayrmt, 1977).
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its Parliamentary leader. Cambo believed in a moderate Catalan nationalism that 
would allow for the intervention of Catalonia in the national policy-making arenas. He 
pressed for the extension of Catalan autonomy, for more at any rate than mere 
administrative decentralisation allowed. After the death of Prat de la Riba, however, 
Cambo’s political orientation moved to the right and he began to advocate a 
collaborationist policy with Madrid. Cambo resigned in 1923 failing to both 
monopolise Catalan nationalism and extract significant gains from the government in 
Madrid. It was the end of the hegemony of the Lliga. A new party emerged, Accio 
Catalana (Catalan Action, AC), which had been created in 1922 by a section of the 
Lliga’s youth unhappy with the conservative policies of Francesc Cambd. Accio 
Catalana was liberal and nationalist. It was radical but non-separatist. It was well 
organised. Its foundation greatly weakened the strength of the Lliga Regionalista.
In the midst of a political vacuum and political turmoil, the King, the Army and 
the industrial bourgeoisie determined to support an attempt to take power by Miguel 
Primo de Rivera y Qrbaneja. Primo de Rivera, the Captain general of Catalonia, 
established a military dictatorship in Spain on 13 September 1923 with the support of 
the Lliga, who believed he would bring order to the country.63 Primo de Rivera would 
govern Spain for seven years, initially defending a coalition of industrialists and 
landowners that crystallised in 1917. Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship contributed to the 
country’s deteriorating situation. After some early successes, the dictatorship made a 
series of unsuccessful efforts at collaboration with a variety of political groups, 
including the Socialists, and in a desperate move, implemented more liberal policies, in 
search of the support of the labour unions and left-wing parties, which also failed.
After losing the confidence of former supporters, most significantly, the King and the 
military, Primo de Rivera left Spain in January 1930, only to die a few months later in 
France.64
During the dictatorship, the Catalan middle classes turned their backs on the 
Lliga, not accepting it could support a regime attacking Catalan culture. The fact that 
Primo de Rivera turned out to be a traditional military centralist de-legitimised the
63 S. Ben Ami, La dictadura de Primo de Rivera, (Barcelona, Planeta, 1983), pp.33-35.
64 M. T. Gonzdlez Calbet, La dictadura de Primo de Rivera, (Madrid, El Arquero, 1987);
J. L. Gomez Navarro, El regimen de Primo de Rivera, Reyes, dictaduras y dictadores, (Madrid, 
Cdtedra, 1991).
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Lliga. Primo de Rivera annulled the Catalanisation project of the Mancomunitat in 
1925, re-established public order and dissolved the CNT. The Lliga leaders that 
decided to support Primo de Rivera had not sensed the centralist ideology of the 
dictator, who would soon begin to repress Catalan nationalism. In 1926, the Barcelona 
Football Club was closed, as was Orfeo Catala (the Catalan choral society). Such 
cultural repressions of Catalan nationalism under Primo de Rivera resulted in a growth 
in Catalan claims. The Lliga itself was outlawed. In 1930, General Damaso 
Berenguer and Admiral Aznar65 assumed the government of the country, through 
Berenguer’s weak dictatorship was overwhelmed by labour action.
The August 1930 Pact of San Sebastian had united the republicans and the 
Catalan left against the monarchy. The Pact of San Sebastian was an attempt to 
establish a provisional government in waiting.The Catalans’ expectation was that once 
the republic was established, the Catalan councils would draft a statute of autonomy 
which would be ratified by the Cortes.66
In the meantime, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (Republican left of 
Catalonia or ERC) was created in 1931, which united the Partit Republics! Catala67, led 
by the labour lawyer Llufs Companys who had some influence on the moderate 
sections of the CNT, the Grup d’Opinio,68 which gathered around L ’Opinio, a weekly 
leftist journal, and the separatist group Estat Catala (EC). It was founded on 
recognition of the distinct personality of Catalonia. The first executive included 
Francesc Macia from Estat Catala, and Llufs Companys69. ERC was the hegemonic
65 Ddmaso Berenguer was a Spanish high ranking officer under Romanones (1918). In 1930, Alfonso 
Xin asked him to form a government, with the mission of restoring the constitutional regime, but 
Berenguer resigned a year later, and was replaced by another high ranking officer, Admiral Aznar. 
Berenguer then became minister of war.
66 Riquer, L'Ultim Cambo (1936-1947), p.17.
67 The Partit Republic^ Catal& was a political group created in Barcelona in April 1917. It was a federal 
and left-wing group which integrated both the Catalan aspirations and the workers claims.
68 One more left-wing group was created by the followers of L 'Opinio, a left-wing weekly journal, led by 
the lawyer Joan Lluhf. The Opinid group tried to bring together the various factions of Catalan 
republicanism.
69 Llufs Companys I Jover was a lawyer and a politician bom in Urgell in 1882. Companys intervened 
actively in the creation of ERC. He was the first president of the Catalan Parliament (1933) and was 
elected President of the Generalitat in January 1934 after the death of Francesc Maci&. Companys 
tried to reunite the Catalan Republican forces. The political crisis of 6 October 1934 led to the 
proclamation of the Catalan statute within the federal Spanish republic by Companys who would be 
put in prison until 1936. During the Civil War, Companys tried to deal with the republican 
government settled in Barcelona. Once the war was lost, Companys sought refuge in France.
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political group in Catalonia after 1931, which hoped to proclaim the Catalan republic. 
The result was a decisive victory for ERC over the Lliga in the municipal elections of 
12 April 1931. On the 14 April, Macia proclaimed the Catalan republic from the 
balcony of Barcelona town hall. The proclamation stated:
Interpreting the feeling and the wishes of Catalan people, I proclaim the 
Catalan republican state of the Iberian Federation; Catalonia, as a state, 
will be federated with other states. (...) Catalonia is constituted as an 
autonomous region within the Spanish state, arranging the present 
Constitution of the republic and the present statute. Its representative 
organisation is the Generalitat and its territory the one formed by the 
provinces of Barcelona, Gerona, Lerida and Tarragona. The Catalan 
language is the official language in Catalonia/70 
On 14 April 1931, the Second Spanish republic was proclaimed. The members of the 
Pact of San Sebastian formed a government and Macia’s proclamation would not last. 
Two days later, the government in Madrid managed to recommit Catalonia to the Pact 
of San Sebastian.71
In June, elections for the Constituent Cortes took place. The establishment of a 
republican state in Spain represented the fulfilment of both liberal and democratic 
ideals. The coming of the republic saw political power pass from the oligarchy to the 
moderate Left. The president of the provisional republican government was Niceto 
Alcala Zamora72. The constitution of 1931 proclaimed by the Spanish state recognised 
no official religion, announced an end to financing of the clergy, and established lay 
education. The constitution of 1931 also recognised the rights of women and legalised 
divorce.73 The second republic, however, faced political unrest throughout its lifetime. 
Whilst trying to pursue radical economic and political reforms, the republicans were at 
the same time attempting to moderate between the revolutionary impetus of left-wing 
organisations and right-wing pressure. In its first period of office, the republican
70 Poblet, Box G3, Document de proclamacid de Maci& el 14 d"Abril'. P. Preston, La destruccidn de 
la democracia en Espaha, (Barcelona, Grijalbo, 2001).
71 Preston, Revolution and war, p.88.
72 Niceto AlcaM Zamora was a right winger who was president of the republic since 1931. He had been 
minister of war under the monarchy.
73 J. Martin Casas, El exilio espafiol, (Barcelona, Planeta, 2002), p.23; Preston, The Civil War,, pp.24- 
25.
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government implemented social and economic reforms. By contrast, the second period 
saw earlier reforms dismantled. The republic failed because it neither carried through 
its intended reforms nor fulfilled the rather utopian expectations of its most fervent 
supporters. The republic coincided with a period of world economic crisis.74
Between 1931 and 1933, the Socialists from the Republican-Socialist coalition 
tried to introduce a programme of reforms in Spain in the midst of the Great 
Depression. However, these measures represented a threat to the finely poised social 
and economic equilibrium of Spain. The Socialists were the most important left-wing 
group in the 1920s and 1930s. The UGT was the Socialist union. Although 
traditionally a union of skilled urban workers, it was swamped in the early 1930s by 
rural workers who joined its land workers’ section, the Federacidn Nacional de 
Trabajadores de la Tierra.
As Prime Minister from 1931 to 1933, architect of the Popular Front in 1935 and 
President of the republic from 1936 to 1939, Manuel Azana was closely identified with 
the second republic. Azana hoped to modernise the Army and relations between 
Church and state, and introduce rationality to parliamentary life. Azana undertook the 
task of rebuilding the Republican-Socialist coalition. Azana’s efforts in early 1934 
were confined to attempts to facilitate the regrouping of left republican forces.75 
Throughout 1935, Indalecio Prieto76, the Socialist leader, would put his authority 
within the Socialist movement at the service of Azana who resigned the presidency of 
the republic on 27 February 1939, one day after France and Britain recognised the 
government of General Franco.
The Catalans welcomed the second republic since it was expected to help in 
breaking the centralist grip on power. As the Lliga had been discredited, Catalan 
nationalist aspirations would now be embodied by the local Republican left, the ERC. 
Realizing that Estat Catala lacked the electoral machinery to profit from its popularity,
74 For more information on the second republic, see Preston, La destruccidn de la democracia, and S. 
Juliii Diaz, Politica en la Segunda Republica, (Madrid, Martial Pons, 1995).
75 P. Preston, Comrades, (London, Harper Collins, 1999), pp.195-209.
76 Indalecio Prieto was bom in Oviedo in 1883. He was a moderate Socialist leader. A politician and 
journalist, he was minister of the republican government during the Civil War (1936-1937) with Largo 
Caballero and minister of defence in 1937-1938 under Negrrn. After the end of the Civil War, he went 
into exile in Mexico where he created the JARE.
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Macia organised a conference in March 1931 where ERC was created. With the 
successful fusion of Catalan Republicans, the Catalan autonomous government, the 
Generalitat, came to be governed by liberal Catalans. The Generalitat was a 
governmental institution that emerged as Provisional Generalitat of Catalonia on 17 
April 1931. It was presided over by Macia and was recognised by the provisional 
government of the republic on 21 April 1931.
Macia’s draft autonomy statute for Catalonia was approved on 9 September 
1932.78 The statute provided for Catalan control of local administration with a local 
Parliament, the Generalitat. There were elections to the Catalan Parliament on 20 
November 1932. ERC won with an absolute majority and Macia was ratified as 
President. The Generalitat was constituted by the President, the Parliament and an 
executive council, and was permitted to run the four provincial councils of Catalonia 
(as the Mancomunitat had done). The Catalan statute of Nuria of 1932, written by 
Macia’s coalition cabinet, was not generous. It created a Catalan Parliament, whose 
competence was limited to agriculture, transport, public health, control of municipal 
government and Catalan Civil Law. The statute also authorised the government to 
administer (without legislative powers) public education, major public works, labour 
services, police forces and law courts. Close state inspection in all these areas 
remained: the government in Madrid could intervene according to its own desires. For 
those seeking full independence, the worst of the original draft statute was reserved for 
financial matters: only one third of Catalan taxation was allotted to the Generalitat 
(that had to be handed over to cover the costs of existing state services). The
70remainder was retained by the state.
The Generalitat faced three central problems: there was continuous friction 
between this coalition cabinet and the central government in Madrid; ERC did not 
achieve good relations with organised labour and, last, the Generalitat still lacked in 
effective powers.80 The disproportionate influence of Madrid and the Castilians in
77 Preston, Revolution and war, ,  p.87
78 The texts of both the Catalan and Basque statutes under the second republic can be found in AT, 
Poblet, Box C362.
79 Preston, Revolution and war in Spain, p.93.
80 For information on the political developments under the republic in Catalonia, see E. Ucelay da Cal, 
La Catalunyapopulista: Imatge, cultura Ipolitica en I'etapa republicana, (1931-1939), (Barcelona, 
La Magrana, 1982).
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Spanish politics, combined with the disregard that had been shown to Catalans, united 
Catalans across classes to support the republic as a means of breaking the centralist 
grip on power. The second republic had ceded a degree of autonomy to Catalonia, 
which the Catalans had readily assumed, but devolution of power to the Generalitat 
was slow, and progress on reform was severely limited by financial constraints.81
After the death of Francesc Macia in December 1933, the Parliament elected 
Lluis Companys as the new president of the Generalitat. Labour conflicts multiplied 
in 1933, giving rise to continual strikes and public disorder in the absence of an 
effective labour policy, and in the face of the administration’s continuing inability to 
secure autonomous powers. In November 1933, the Radicals of Lerroux and the 
Confederation Espanola de Derechas Autonomas (Spanish Autonomous Right 
Confederation or CEDA) won the elections. The entrance of the Right into the 
government increased tensions with the workers groups. Lerroux became president, 
and relations between the Generalitat and the government of the republic promptly 
deteriorated. The result of elections in Catalonia was a two party system shared by the 
Lliga and ERC. The Lliga, a moderate right-wing Catalan party, with core support 
amongst the Catalan bourgeoisie, sought autonomy for Catalonia and was ready to 
coalesce with the central government in order to obtain it. By contrast, ERC was a 
left-wing Republican party, which began as a coalition of forcesCatalanand which 
ultimately hoped for complete separation from Spain.
Companys formed a four-party coalition government that included Accio 
Catalana, Unio Socialista82 , Grup d’Opinio and ERC. He hoped to complete the 
transfer of powers from Madrid.83 Spanish Socialism did not succeed in Catalonia, 
though such factions emerged as, for example, the Unio Socialista de Catalunya 
(Socialist Union of Catalonia) (1923), the Communist Bloc Obrer i Camperol (1930), 
and its successor, the Partit Obrer d’Unificacio Marxista (Marxist Workers unified 
party or POUM). Until the arrival of the republic, the Partido Socialista Obrero
81 A. Balcells, Crisis Economica y agitation social en Cataluna 1930-1936, (Barcelona, Ariel, 1971).
82 Uni6 Socialista was a political formation created in July 1923. It was Socialist, Catalan and 
democratic.
83 J.M. Poblet, Vida i mort de Lluis Companys, (Barcelona, Pdrtic, 1976); E. Ucelay da Cal, La 
Catalunyapopulista: Imatge, cultura ipolitica en I'etapa republicana, (1931-1939), (Barcelona, La 
Magrana, 1982).
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Espanol (Spanish Socialist party or PSOE) had shown itself to be hostile to Catalan 
nationalism, and this accounts for its marginal importance in Catalonia.
The period 1934 -1936 is known as the Bienio Negro. Politics were bitterly 
polarised throughout a period of republican government. From October 1934 to 
February 1936, Catalonia’s statute was suspended. The agreements secured in the 
period 1931-1933 were violated by the radical-CEDA government. Municipal 
elections in Catalonia were held on 14 January 1934. The Left won emphatically in 
every major town. The new government tried to put its programme into effect, and 
Companys travelled to Madrid to obtain the transfer of powers. By late April 1934, 
there were two separate anti-fascist campaigns in Catalonia: Alianza Obrera and ERC. 
Both fought for the hegemony of the Left. The Generalitat also held an anti-fascist 
demonstration, led by Companys. A five-month conflict opened between central and 
regional governments due to the Cultivation Contract Law,, which would lead to the 
revolt of the Generalitat. During the Bienio Negro, Catalan autonomy came to an end, 
and symbols of separate cultural identity were ruthlessly repressed.85
The Cultivation Contract Law, passed on 12 June 1934, was the Catalan 
Parliament’s first social reform. The law favoured the rabassaires86, Catalan tenant 
farmers who worked for their holdings as family units, often for several generations 
and only employing additional labours at harvest time. These farmers had suffered 
from falling market prices. The Cultivation Contract Law fixed the level of rent 
chargeable on these lands, guaranteeing the permanence of the rabassaires by giving 
them the option to purchase the land they farmed if they so desired, provided that they 
had farmed the land for more than eight years. In 1851 the Catalan landowners of 
Barcelona created the Institut Agricola Catala de Sant Isidre to defend themselves vis- 
a-vis the rabassaires.
84 R. Carr, The Republic and the Spanish Civil War in Spain, (London, Macmillan, 1971).
85 Poblet, Vida i mort de Lluis Companys.
86 La rabassa morta was a cultivation contract widely used in Catalonia during the XVIII and XIX 
centuries. The terrain was ceded to the rabassaire for him to work the land for a number of years.
The length of the contract depended on the life of the plants. By using fertilisers, the workers of the 
land managed to increase the life of the plants, making the contract increasingly lengthy. From this 
stemmed the conflicts between the rabassaires and landowners. During the second republic, the 
conflict emerged again when the rabassaires claimed the land they worked... For information on the 
rabassa morta see L. Ferrer I A16s, Pagesos, Rabassaires I industrials a la Catalunya Central, S.XIX 
IS.XX (Barcelona, 1987).
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This law became the main subject of negotiations between Madrid and 
Barcelona. However, by September 1934, Jose Maria Gil Robles87 made it clear that 
CEDA’s new government would not accept the Cultivation Contract Law and would 
remove all policy powers from the Generalitat.88
The Catalan Parliament passed the law once again whilst the Uni6 de Rabassaires 
(Rabassaires Union or UR) worked to stir up the peasantry. In the summer of 1934, it 
seemed that the negotiations were progressing. The Cultivation Contract Law was 
finally accepted in October 1934. Amnesty was conceded to the peasantry, leading to 
a more stable situation in Catalonia, even if the economic crisis continued to worsen.
On 4 October 1934, Lerroux formed a government that included three CEDA 
ministers. The socialists declared a nationwide strike. It was supported by the Alianza 
Obrera89 in Asturias. In Catalunya, the Generalitat declared a Catalan Republic.90 
Companys found himself under pressure from a number of sides, including the radical 
Catalan nationalists. Estat Catala worsened relations with Madrid.91 Moreover,
Alianza Obrera backed the rabassaires's claims. On 6 October, Companys proclaimed 
the Catalan statute of the federal Spanish republic. Within just a few minutes of 
Companys’ declaration, Lerroux ordered an end to the rebellion in Catalonia. A few 
hours later, Companys surrendered to the Army. The October rebellion was a setback 
for Catalan autonomy. The Parliament was closed, the statute was suspended, control 
of labour affairs and public order reverted to the central power, and the Cultivation 
Contract Law was annulled.92
87 PRO FO 371/60374, Foreign Office Report, 24-01-1945. “Josd Maria Gil Robles, spokesman of the 
Catholic-clericalist opposition to General Franco's regime is the only experienced conservative 
politician among those in exile. He established his domicile in Portugal in 1937. Until 1943, he made 
no sign of seeking to return to the political fray. Since then, however, he said that he would back up 
an army rising against Franco to remove the incumbus of the Falange party with its unionist shams 
and he offered the support for any movement designed to restore the monarchy and place the heir 
upon the throne.” Gil Robles felt a need for a radical departure from the policies of reprisal followed 
by Franco since they could never bring peace to Spain; only the monarchy could act as a force for 
reconciliation. The monarchy could offer a change of regime and an end to the divisions of the Civil 
War, but without the threat of social revolution. J. Gil Robles, La monarquia por la que luche (1941- 
1954), (Madrid, Taums, 1976), pp.120-122.
88 Preston, Revolution and war, pp. 103-104.
89 Alianga Obrera was an organisation that stemmed from the union of several workers groups in 
Catalonia when the Right won in the republican elections of 1933.
90 P.Preston, The coming of the Spanish Civil War.
91 A. Balcells, Crisis econdmica y agitacion social en Cataluna 1930-1936, (Barcelona, Ariel, 1971).
92 Preston, Revolution and War, p. 108.
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The treatment of Catalonia by the Right during the suspension of the statute 
prepared the ground for the victory of the Popular Front93 throughout the region in the 
general elections of 16 February 1936. The Left won 60 per cent of the votes, the 
statute was restored and Companys and his followers recovered their posts in the 
Generalitat in March. The Lliga returned to the Catalan Parliament as opposition for 
four months. Meanwhile, the populism of ERC, and its domination of Catalan 
nationalism through its power in the Generalitat, greatly accelerated the diffusion of 
Catalan nationalism under the republic. ERC maintained a degree of control of the 
political apparatus and part of the administration, counting on the support of both 
Catalan intellectuals and of some anarchists. 94
Other than the Lliga and ERC, an important political group in this period was 
Catalonia’s Christian Democratic Party, Unio Democratica de Catalunya (UDC95), 
founded in November 1932 and causing rifts in both Accio Catalana and the Lliga. 
UDC brought together elements of the Catholic middle classes.96 The UDC project 
was to create a party influenced by the European Christian tradition, to bring about a 
re-Christianisation and reconciliation of divided Catalonian society. Political 
polarisation in Catalonia left little space however for a party such as UDC, which in 
1936 had only 3000 members. UDC was a Catalan and right-wing party. UDC was 
closely linked to a Catalan religious association, Federacio de Joves Cristians 
(Federation of Young Christians or FJC), founded in 1931 by Albert Bonet. The FJC 
combined Catalan nationalism and Catholicism.
13 THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR 1936 -1939
The left wing popular front victory of 1936 increased tensions in Spain. The 
Right in Spain had lost ground after the years of the second republic and thus 
conspired to organise a military coup that would develop into a Civil War in Spain. 
The electoral victory of the Popular Front had provoked fears among the latifundistas
93 The Popular Front was an electoral coalition which was the revival of the 1931 Republican-Socialist 
coalition. The left and the centre left joined together on the basis of a programme of amnesty for 
prisoners, of basic social and educational reform for trade union freedom.
94 P. Preston, Franco, (London, Harper Collins, 1993), p. 111,113-115.
95 For information on the UDC, see H. Raguer, La Unid Democratica de Catalunya i el seu temps 
(1931-1939), (Barcelona, Publicacions de TAbadia de Montserrat, 1976).
96 Raguer, Unid Democratica de Catalunya I el seu temps 1931-1939, p.84.
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that the democratic system could no longer protect their interests; they consequently 
withdrew their support from the ostensibly legalistic Confederation Espanola de 
Derechas Autonomas (CEDA), giving it instead to those conspiring to overthrow the 
republic. The ‘great depression’ had removed any outlet for either migrating workers 
or returning emigres, and a succession of bad harvests combined to produce acute 
unemployment and social tensions. The military rebellion provided a final spur for 
revolution. The economic boom, supported by Spain’s policy of neutrality in World 
War I, had come to an abrupt end after the war, demonstrating Spain’s inability to 
compete in world markets due to the lack of investment in, and modernisation of the 
country’s agriculture and industry.97
Squeezed by an unfair burden of taxation and falling profits, industrialists 
implemented cuts both in wages and workforce. There was increasing militancy 
amongst urban trade unionists as a result of the decline in pay and working conditions, 
which provoked running batdes with employers and strikes, which were often brutally 
repressed. The state deprived of its coercive forces, with no dependable police, civil 
guard, or military force to command, and facing an increasingly armed populace, saw 
its power collapse virtually overnight. The military rebellion against the republic then
QO
provided the catalyst for a revolution that had been simmering since 1917.
The Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939 was, in fact, not one, but many wars. It 
was precipitated by a rebellion of army officers against a republican government that 
was supported in the Cortes by the Popular Front coalition of Communist, Socialist, 
and left-wing republican parties, elected in February 1936. Significant social 
constituencies in 1930s Spain were hostile to the Republic's progressive reforms. The 
rebellion was backed by a disparate grouping of Rightist organisations within Spain, 
including the Falange, the Carlists and the monarchists. Against the European 
backdrop of the 1930s, and the seemingly unstoppable advance of fascism, the Civil 
War was indeed perceived as an ideological war by many at the time, including
97 For information on the preparation of the military coup in 1936, see F. Bertrdn i Giiell, Preparation y 
desarrollo del alzamiento national, (Valladolid, Santar&i, 1939).
98 For more information on the Spanish Civil War developments, see P. Preston, The Spanish Civil War, 
(London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989) & R. Carr, The republic and the Spanish Civil War in
Spain, (London, Macmillan, 1971).
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Germans and Italians who had fled persecution in their own countries and who enlisted 
to fight for the republic, and by the volunteers who joined the International Brigade.
It remains a rather simplistic conception of the Civil War to view it as a neat 
precursor to the Allied fight against the Axis powers in World War II. The military 
rebellion of 18 July unleashed nothing so straightforward. The war had many 
dimensions: a class war ■ withinwar Spain’s within Spain’s largest cities; a class war; a 
fight for regional autonomy against centralists; battles for political hegemony within 
the republican and nationalist zones.
The Civil War in 1936 was also an armed conflict between defenders of the 
church and its opponents. Franco’s victory brought the Catholic church the most 
substantial privileges it had enjoyed in any contemporary state, with generous state 
funding, control of the entire educational system, ideological monopoly and legislative 
embodiment of its moral doctrine. The church, in kind, offered ideological and 
propagandists services to the insurgent army." The Spanish bishops were the 
godfathers of a crusade, and their troops fought for a Catholic Spain. Overall, the 
Spanish Civil War left Spain economically devastated and the experience weighed 
heavily on the national consciousness and clearly conditioned the emergence of the 
anti-Francoist opposition, which would lack not only an institutional framework and 
organisation, but the will to enter into new conflict.
It could be argued that the immediate origins of the Civil War had less to do with 
Catalonia than with other areas of Spain. There was a lower level of social tension in 
Catalonia, in contrast with the deteriorating situation elsewhere in Spain. However, 
the rebellion of the Generalitat was perceived as a threat to the essential unity of Spain 
by the Right. Josep Tarradellas was counsellor of the Generalitat (1931-1933). He 
assumed the presidency of the council of the Generalitat in 1936. Under president 
Companys, he established a path toward autonomy for Catalonia. Josep Tarradellas100 
created a government of concentration and unity from September to December 1936,
99 Guibemau, Nacionalisme Catala, pp.73,75. 
For information on J. Tarradel 
(Barcelona, Edicions 62,1978)
100 ellas see E. Udina, Josep Tarradellas, L'aventura d'unafidelitat,
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reuniting the UGT, CNT, ERC and the POUM.101 The CNT stands for Confederation 
Nacional de Trabajo, or National Workers Confederation, the anarchist trade union 
founded in 1910. The CNT was not principally founded by Catalans.
Josep Tarradellas was a politician bom in Cervello in 1899. He was the general secretary 
of ERC when it was constituted. He defended two theses: the necessity of 
collaboration with the republican governments and the necessity of maintaining the 
primacy of the Generalitat. He went to France into exile in February 1939 and was put 
in prison under the Vichy government. He managed to escape to Switzerland and went 
back to Paris in 1944. He would be nominated president of the Generalitat in 1954 
after Josep Irla. Tarradellas’ ideology may be summarised under three principles: he 
was a liberal from the Left, and a non-federalist, and considered the Generalitat the 
main instrument of Catalan unity. Companys was president of the Generalitat until 
1940. Tarradellas would become president of the Generalitat in 1954.
The military coup of 1936 failed in Barcelona, and its defeat led to the 
radicalisation of the working class and the outbreak of revolution. The Civil War in 
Catalonia had a particular complexion. Firstly, there was a clash between the 
anarchist-led revolution and the coalition of Republican forces in the ERC, supported 
by the Catalan socialists and communists of the Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya 
(PSUC)102. Until 1939, Catalonia was home to one of the most radicalised working 
class movements in Europe, dominated by anarchists. Secondly, there was a tension 
between the Generalitat and the government of the republic. Thirdly, the repressive 
measures of the Francoists were added to the cocktail. Another consequence of the
101 The POUM was the Partit Obrer dTJnificacid Marxista. It was a political organisation of heterodox 
Communist character that was founded in Barcelona on the 29 September 1935. It defended social- 
democracy.
102 The main component of the PSUC was the USC led by Comorera but it was also composed by 
Catalan communists.
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revolution in Catalonia was the assassination of 2000 priests and members of religious 
orders.103
After May 1937, the Spanish republican government took back responsibility for 
the maintenance of public order and the defence of the Generalitat, beginning a 
process of loss of powers that would not stop until the Catalan institutions had moved 
to the other side of the French border. On 18 May 1937, Juan Negrm became the 
president of the itinerant Spanish republican government, based in Valencia and then 
in Barcelona from 1 November. Negrm substituted another Socialist, Largo 
Caballero.104 The economic crisis grew, and war overwhelmed the revolution.105
In September 1936, a workers’ government of unity had been formed, under the 
leadership of Largo Caballero. He was overthrown in May 1937, however, by an 
alliance of Republicans, Socialists and Communists. After the Civil War, Prieto went 
into exile to Mexico and Largo Caballero to France.106
From 1938 to 1939, the Catalans allocated a large part of their finances to the 
republican government, which had moved to Catalonia for reasons of security. The 
republican Burgos government had been internationally recognised in 1938. The 
Francoist Burgos decree had abolished the Catalan statute on 5 April 1938, and this 
represented the beginning of repression of Catalan nationalism by Francoism. Later 
on, the Francoist offensive of Christmas 1938 seemed decisive, and led to a retreat of 
Catalan forces, provoking the first Catalan exodus to France. The Republic proved
1CY7unable to mount a serious defence of Barcelona , which fell into Francoist hands on
1 h r26 January 1939. Through the Pacte de Perelada signed in January 1939 by
103 J. M. Sold I Sabatd, La repressid a la reraguarda de Catalunya 1936-1939, (Barcelona, Edicions 62, 
1989).
104 Francisco Largo Caballero was a moderate during the early part of his career, before adopting a fiery, 
but empty, revolutionary rethoric from 1934 to 1936. His revolutionary sentiments gave away to 
pragmatism while he was Prime Minister and War Minister from September 1936 to May 1937.
105 For the political developments in Catalonia during the Civil War, see J. Benet, Catalunya I la guerra 
civil (1936-1939), (Barcelona, Abadia de Montserrat, 1988).
106 Preston, La destruccidn de la democracia, pp.380-381.
107 D. Dfaz Esculies, L'oposicio catalanista al franquisme: el republicanisme liberal i la nova oposicio 
(1939-1960), (Barcelona, Abadia de Montserrat, 1996), pp.9-22.
108 Katy Cooper in A. Aranzazu Usandizaga, Ve y cuenta lo que paso en Espaha, (Barcelona, Planeta, 
2000), p.271; F.Vilanova, Les ruptures de V any 1939, (Barcelona, Fundacio Pi i Sunyer, 2000); 
M.Risques, F.Vilanova and R.Vinyes, 1939 Barcelona any zero. Histdria grafica de I’ ocupacid de la 
ciutat, (Barcelona, Edicions Proa, 1999); J. Villarroya i Font, 1939 Derrota i exili, (Barcelona, 
Generalitat de Catalunya, 2000).
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Companys, Aguirre, Azana and Negrm, the Generalitat agreed to give its finances to 
the republic, hoping that it would help them in their war effort and hoping to recover 
the money after the war.109 The Generalitat had insufficient infrastructure to manage 
and administrate its own finances and went into exile without a penny.
Once Catalonia was occupied by Francoist troops in February 1939, the 
Generalitat had to go into exile.110 At this time, it was clear that the judicial and 
Francoist apparatus of state would be used to erase all signs of Catalan identity.111 
Antoni Rovira i Virgili, a man who had arrived in Montpellier on the 31 January, left a 
written message:
This is the final and absolute defeat: this time, the coup is not only 
military, political and administrative. It is not hitting the legal 
organisation, but the spirit, the idea, the culture, the strength and the life 
of Catalonia. They want to destroy not only the political Catalan 
building but also the national soul/112
1.4 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FRANCOISM
Franco emerged victorious from the Civil War in 1939 and successfully 
established a fascist rule. Franco’s dictatorship was based on an implicit pact with the 
church regarding institutions. He declared himself responsible only to God and 
History, and only the Church could pretend to limit his power. The regime was 
demonstrably totalitarian in nature. It was useful for the Francoists to claim God was 
on their side as it provided justification for their activities and increased their support. 
Indeed, the Church’s alliance with Franco became a fundamental instrument for the
113regime.
Franco’s dictatorship was based on a single party, the Falange, which counted 
amongst its members a large number of right-wing families, namely monarchists, 
Carlists and Catholics. After the war, the Falange gained institutional status as the
109 Atholl, Duchess of, Searchlight on Spain, (London, Penguin, 1938).
110 J.M. Sold I Sabatd, Cataluha en la guerra civil espahola, (Barcelona, Biblioteca La Vanguardia, 
1989).
111 Author' interview with Josep Benet, Barcelona, November 2001.
112 Avui, Barcelona, 12-02-1999.
113 F. Lannon, Modem Spain: The project of a National Catholicism, (Oxford, LMH, Oxford University 
Press, 1983), p.588; M., Guibemau, Nacionalisme Catala, (Barcelona, Pdrtic, 2002), p.73.
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only legal political group. Membership was compulsory for those jostling for position 
in the new political order of Spain.114 The new Spanish state was a totalitarian 
instrument in the service of an integral homeland. The unity of Spain was not an issue 
open for debate, but rather an article of faith. Free speech, free press, right of assembly 
and trial by jury were subordinated to the needs of the state. Free trade unions were 
also subordinated to the needs of the state and replaced by vertical unions based on the 
model of the Italian corporations, organised by industry and represented by three levels 
- workers, technical employees, and employers. The state, too, bore the imprint of 
fascist organisation. Franco did not restore the monarchy (to the dismay of some of his 
supporters115), but rather declared himself chief of state. He was headwashead of the 
Falange, with an absolute veto over all governance. He appointed and presided over 
the cabinet. When the Cortes was re-established in March 1943, he appointed many of 
its members. Franco could remove other members, elected or appointed by the 
corporate bodies of the state, as he desired.116 Civil War brought with it unprecedented 
economic blight. Franco established the political economy of autarky, or self- 
sufficiency of the country. This policy was associated with Catholicism. Autarky 
represented an extreme form of economic protectionism, which had always been the 
basis of elite demands upon the state.117
The Francoist apparatus of repression118 was extensive, including death, prison, 
exile, social, political, religious, economic and ideological discrimination, starvation, 
terror and cultural genocide.119 The regime operated on a cocktail of political 
repression, physical violence and material deprivation. Coercion was also applied 
through work. Franco’s dictatorship proffered forty years of political exception, based
114 A good summary of the Falange is found in Guibemau, Nacionalisme Catala, p.67-69.
115 Franco made reference to the possibility of Don Juan ascending to the throne in the future in order to 
calm the monarchist opposition. PRO FO 371/26895, C794/C3445.
116 P. Preston, Franco, (London, Harper Collins, 1993), p.374); Guibemau, Nacionalisme Catala,, pp. 
68-69; F. Franco, Discursos y mensajes del jefe de estado, 68-70, (Madrid, Fundaci6n Nacional 
Francisco Franco, Azor, 1993); R. Cierva, Ricardo & S. Vilar, Pro y contra Franco, Franquismo y 
antifranquismo, (Barcelona, Planeta, 1973); J. Fontana, Espana bap el franquismo, (Barcelona, 
Crftica, 2000).
117 E. Moradiellos, La Espana de Franco (1939-1975), (Madrid, Sihtesis, 2000).
118 A good definition of what a nation’s repression consists of is found in M. Guibemau, Nationalisms, 
(Barcelona, Ariel, 1996), pp.116-117.
119 Hilari Raguer's interview, El Miracle, Catalonia, November 2001.
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* 1 onon the repression of all and any opposition, including the peripheral nationalisms. 
Under Francoism, the repression accomplished a fundamental political role: that of 
paralysing the enemy through terror. Repression was not exercised with 
discrimination, but arbitrarily and widely. Franco kept many political opponents in 
prison, authorising the military tribunals to condemn to death countless numbers of 
republicans. Those who were detained indefinitely went to the provincial prison to be 
sentenced in war tribunals. The prisons were completely full. In the Modelo prison in 
Barcelona, in 1939, there were up to 13,000 prisoners. The new state initiated an 
intense campaign of persecutions throughout most of Spain. Unsubstantiated personal 
accusations of wartime crimes often effectively condemned a man to death. Political 
or union activity was considered an act of military rebellion, to be tried by courts 
martial. The secret police were perhaps the most efficient arm of government 
(particularly during the first years of Francoism), reputedly holding dossiers on all 
persons known or suspected of having points of view in any way subversive of the 
regime. The political death toll rose to levels suggestive of its systemic nature. In 
Madrid alone, some 200 to 250 people were executed every day; in Barcelona the 
figure was 150; in Sevilla, it was 80. Josep Benet, a Catalan historian and expert on 
the Francoist repression in Catalonia, has described its effects:121 ‘Francoist repression 
was incredibly effective both during the Civil War and after it.’ Therefore, Catalan 
society was mainly concerned with survival.122
One of the central pillars of Francoist repression was the Law of Political 
Responsibilities signed and approved by Franco in February of 1939. The law made it 
possible to bring a case against the disappeared and absent, but revoked any right to 
defence. This also operated against the dead thus making their families responsible. 
The National Tribunal could revoke the agreement of filing an expedient; the
120 Guibemau, Nacionalisme Catala, p.82, pp.84-85, p.88.
121 For more information on Francoist political repression see J. Benet, La repressid catalana, pp. 70- 
79; H. Heine, La oposicon politica al franquismo, (Barcelona, Grijalbo, 1983), p.42; J. Fontana, 
Espana bajo el franquismo, p. 18); 'Coloquio del Conde Ciano con el Generalfsimo Franco, 19-07- 
1939' in G. Ciano, Europa hacia la catdstrofe, (Barcelona, Los libros de nuestro tiempo, 1949), 
p.239; La Spagna contra Franco, Una lotta storica per la pace, problemi della pace', La Stampa 
Modema, Roma, 1952. J.M. Sold I Sabatd, La repressid franquista a Catalunya (1938-1953), 
(Barcelona, Edicions 62,1985); M. Richards, A time of silence, Civil War and the culture of 
repression in Franco’s Spain, (1936-45), (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998).
122 Author’s interview with Josep Benet, Barcelona, November 2001.
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expedient could be solved in camera. The law created crimes, established punishments 
and submitted the accused to a singular process. The law remained in force until April 
1945. However, in a very peculiar piece of juridical practice, people could still be 
brought before the civil courts to answer for "political responsabilities" defined as 
crimes under the law until 1966.123
Another facet of the Francoist repression was social. Workers’ unions were 
outlawed in 1939. Franco established a hierarchical organic structure, making Spain a 
national, unionist state with vertical unions, embracing both employers and workers 
and embodying Falangist ideals. Franco persecuted and banned traditional unions 
along with any form of revolt or complaint. The main objective was to restore the 
capitalist system and to insulate the mines from social unrest. Strikes were outlawed 
and known trade unionists found themselves constantly in danger of summary
124execution.
Francoist repression was particularly severe when it came to rival claims of 
autonomy, in particular those of the Catalan nationalists and the Basque nationalists, 
which the regime attempted to destroy.125 A unitary Castilian Spain -  devoted to 
empire and Catholicism -  could not be established otherwise. The major targets of 
repression in Catalonia were those holding high politico-social charges during the Civil 
War, those accused of direct participation in the war and important personalities at the 
local level. In addition to repression of the democratic organisations and the 
institutions of self-government, there was a draconian machinery of terror directed 
squarely at Catalan cultural life, attacking educational institutions, the freedom of press 
and the Catalan language itself.126 An example of Francoist repression of Catalan
123 For more information on the Francoist Law of Political Responsabilities see F. Vilanova, Les 
ruptures de Vany 39, pp.138-141; J. Benet, Catalunya sota el regim franquista: informe sobre la 
persecucid de la llengua i la cultura de Catalunya pel regim del general Franco, Vol.I, (Barcelona, 
Blume, 1978), p.47.
124 Duchess of Atholl, Searchlight on Spain, (London, Penguin, 1938), p.269.
125 For an explanation of Francoist repression in the Basque country, see PRO File FO 371/22699, Merry 
del Val vs Irujo, London, 04-12-1938. The repression in the Basque country in the aftermath of the 
Civil War is well documented in PRO CAB 118/16,15-11-1939, letter from Lizaso to Attlee. The 
document explains the renewal of the repression in the Basque country from October 1939 onwards.
126 G. Ciano, Diary, February 1939, pp.50-52; Author's interview with Anton Canellas, Barcelona, 
January 2002; Riera, Els industrials Catalans sota el franquisme, p. 145; Anon, Catalunya sota el 
regim franquista, vol.I, (Paris, edicions Catalanes de Paris, 1973); J. Benet, L ’intent franquista de 
genocidi cultural contra Catalunya, (Barcelona, Montserrat, 1995); C. Mir, La represion bajo el 
franquismo Ayer 43, (Madrid, Marcial Pons, 2001).
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nationalism was that in 1938, the leading member of UDC, Manuel Carrasco i 
Formiguera, was executed in Burgos, in spite of his Catholic fervour. The extent of 
repression was severe; Catalonian society was terrorised. A negotiator recorded the 
episode:
1 did what I could overnight to avoid the slaughter. (...) Some said 
they did not know about it, some that there was no way back to the 
decision. (...) Finally they told me that the resolution to murder Don 
Manuel Carrasco Formiguera was definite. (...) I understood then that I 
could do nothing against his death. I then entered his room and did not 
abandon him till he was buried/128 
Josep Maria Batista i Roca, a Catalan politician, described the totality and extent of the 
onslaught:
'General Franco’s bitter persecution of the Catalans -  suppression of 
their autonomy voted in plebiscite by 78 per cent of the people: abolition 
of all laws passed by the Catalan parliament; closing down of their 
schools; the ban on the public use of their language; and finally the 
execution of their president-has created a special situation in 
Catalonia/129
1.5 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ANTI-FRANCOIST OPPOSITION
Opposition to Franco comprised opposition inside the regime (monarchists, 
Falangists) and outside of the regime (Socialist, Republicans, Communists and 
anarchist) including Basques, Galicians and Catalanists who fought for their regional 
aspirations. Opposition in all cases formed both in Spain, and in exile. The internal 
opposition to the regime comprised those who had supported the military rebellion but
127 H. Raguer, La UDC (1931-1939), (Barcelona, Abadia de Montserrat, 1976), p.412.
128 ID, letter from Ignacio Romani to Don Luis Jover Nunell about the murder of Carrasco Formiguera, 
10-04-1938.
129 FPS, Box D5, J. M. Batista i Roca, 12-1944. Josep Maria Batista i Roca was bom in Barcelona in 
1895. He was a historian and a politician. Batista i Roca was History Professor of the University of 
Barcelona and justice advisor during the Civil War was sent by Companys to London in the middle of 
the war as representative of the Generalitat. He exiled to the UK in 1939. He was a History teacher 
in Cambridge and secretary of the CNC.
130 S. Payne, El regimen de Franco, 1936-1975, (Madrid, Alianza editorial, 1987), p. 581; Artea, ANV, 
EBB122-1, letter from Irajo to Aldasoro, Olazdbal, Belausteguigoitia, Sota, Pi i Sunyer, Etxebarria 
and Eguileor, London, 29-06,1940.
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did not agree with Franco’s monopolisation of power after his victory in the Civil War. 
Amongst these, there were monarchists (who had counted on the restoration of the 
monarchy once Franco had come to power) and Falangists who had hoped to get a 
share of power.
A number of writers such as Javier Tusell, Luis Maria Anson and Jose Maria 
Toquero have argued that the most important opposition to Franco came from the 
monarchist camp, since the Allies wished, above all, for a stable regime for Spain, and 
the Crown could attract more dependable support than the republic. Moreover, Franco 
faced a considerable amount of pressure from the army and the conservative classes to 
restore the monarchy.131 The Italian Foreign minister, Ciano, bore witness to the 
pressure: ‘Serrano Suner had gone towards Switzerland where the king resides now. 
The Monarchy will not solve anything but all the Spaniards want it. Therefore, we 
need to follow up on this trip.’132
Monarchist participation in the reactionary coalition of July 1936 arose from a 
confident expectation that the military insurrection would lead to the restoration of the 
monarchy. The monarchists’ participation was decisive in Franco’s victory in the Civil 
War. As Franco did not take a concrete stance on a restoration of the monarchy once 
the Civil War came to an end, the monarchist opposition began to grow133. Franco
131 Such writers as Luis Maria Ans6n and Josd Maria Toquero claim that the monarchist opposition was 
the strongest amongst the anti-Francoist opposition. J. M. Toquero .Franco and Don Juan, 
(Barcelona, Plaza y Jands, 1989); Luis Marfa Ans6n, Don Juan, (Barcelona, Plaza y Jands, 1984). 
Toquero presents four main arguments to support this thesis. Firstly, the failure of the second republic 
left bad memories among the Spanish people. There were severe confrontations between left and 
right-wing parties, a lack of respect for the Catholic Church, Communist tendencies and anarchist 
terrorism. Second, the post-war politico-economic failures of the Franco regime further disenchanted 
an already deprived Spanish population, both in material and moral terms. Third, the monarchy held 
some support within the Franco regime. From the very beginning, Franco was pressured both by army 
generals and the conservative elite to restore the monarchy. Especially between 1944 and 1946, after 
Germany’s defeat in World War n, the conservative classes deemed a monarchist restoration as 
fundamental, fearing an intervention of the Allied forces against the Spanish fascist regime. Finally, 
the monarchist opposition drew greater support from other Western powers, for instance, the UK, than 
the republicans did. Toquero, Franco and Don Juan, pp.380-382. “This person has not been judged 
with enough objectivity. We can affirm that for a long time Don Juan was one of the few social and 
political figures that rationally fought against Francoism with possibilities of succeeding.” Toquero, 
Franco and Don Juan,, pp.378.
132 G. Ciano, Ciano's diario, 12-06-1942, p.567. Ram6n Serrano Suner was Franco's brother-in-law 
who helped to lay the political and ideological foundations of the Franco's one-party state-falangist
133 PRO FO 371/31227. The monarchist opposition came from the conservative classes. They were 
often part of the army, even some of Franco's generals, academics, lawyers or bankers. “His 
Majesty’s ambassador in Madrid has been in touch with numerous Spanish leaders hostile to the 
Falangist regime, wishing to stand up to German pressure and possibly capable of setting up an
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ensured that senior monarchists were kept away from posts of responsibility. 
Moreover, Franco had the fundamental support of the Chuch and the Army. In terms 
of numbers, the monarchist opposition was not of great consequence, and its 
composition was far from homogenous.134
The monarchists tried in vain to organise several conspiracies against Franco. 
They were also divided. A majority of monarchists considered Don Juan de Borbon 
the legitimate heir to the Spanish throne. Not all monarchists agreed on the choice of 
the pretender though, and this weakened their organisation. Most visibly, Don Juan 
and his brother fought for their respective rights to the throne.135 In 1942, Don Juan 
declared publicly that he expected to be crowned King of the Spaniards. He 
espoused a traditionalist view of the monarchy137 and limited his activities, hoping that 
Franco would restore the monarchy. A year later, Don Juan publicly rejected the 
identification of the monarchy with the Falange, and, as World War II developed, 
identified himself increasingly with the Western democracies.138 Nonetheless, in 1945, 
in the wake of the Allied victory, Don Juan recovered some belief in his cause. On 19
alternative government. These leaders include monarchists, the Army, the Church and the centre 
parties and their program is based upon the return of a moderate monarchist regime.” From Foreign 
Office to Bume (embassy counsellor), 17-07-1942. PRO FO 371/425/423, Z4002/1484/41, Hoare to 
Foreign Office, 02-03-1941; PRO FO 371/34819, C2525/217/41.
134 H. Heine, La oposicion , p.252.
135 L. M. Ansdn, Don Juan, (Barcelona, Plaza y Janes, 1984).
136 PRO F0371/31228,11-11-1942, Political distribution from Switzerland, from Berne to Foreign 
Office. In November 1942, for the first time, Don Juan ever pronounced himself against Franco in an 
interview to the Journal de Geneve. He publicly claimed the Spanish throne and rejected Franco's 
regime. The declaration began as follows: “I am head of no conspiracy but I am the legitimate 
depository of secular political treasure of Spanish monarchy. I am sure it will be restored as soon as 
interest of Spain demands. When Spanish people think this time has come, I shall not hesitate a 
moment to put myself at its disposal.” Also, on 6 January 1943, Don Juan wrote a letter to Franco 
rejecting his identification with the Falange and made reference to Franco's regime as a “provisional 
and non judicial regime.” PRO FO 371/34819, C3858.
137 PRO FO 371/31228, Samuel Hoare, from Madrid to Foreign Office, 27-11-1942, “We as a 
traditionalist monarchist country naturally sympathised with the monarchist governments but his 
Majesty’s government felt that decision in Spain must rest with Spaniards alone.” The British stated 
their sympathy for the monarchist opposition but they also claimed their intention of respecting non­
intervention in other countries.
138 PRO F0425/422, C5031/225/41. In January 1944, Don Juan claimed that Franco's regime would not 
survive the end of the World War II and that unless the monarchy was restored, a civil war would take 
place. In a letter written to Don Alfonso de Orleans, his uncle, Don Juan asserted that Franco's refusal 
to modify his foreign policy towards the Allies and to return to strict neutrality had obliged him to 
oppose the dictator. The heir was finally taking an unambiguous stance towards Franco.
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March 1945, he announced the Lausanne Manifesto139, representing an overt rejection 
of Franco.140
From 1948 to 1950, the cards were increasingly stacked against monarchism.
The beginning of the Cold War brought with it a fear of Communist expansion in 
Spain. The international community preferred Francoism to Communism. A last 
desperate attempt to unite forces of the Right and Left against Franco was made with 
the pact of Saint Jean de Luz, but it came after Franco’s meeting with Don Juan in the 
Azor yacht, who was persuaded to send his son to be educated under the dictator’s 
wing. Don Juan had chosen to collaborate with Franco.141 Having seized the initiative, 
Franco fought actively against the crown, prohibiting all monarchist propaganda and 
press, and educating the nation’s youth in anti-monarchism.142
139PRO FO 371/49629, Z4138/1484/41, Bowker to Eden, 27-03-1945. Norton (embassy counsellor) to 
Eden. On 19 March 1945, Don Juan announced the Lausanne Manifesto: ‘Today, six years after the 
Civil War, the regime established by General Franco, inspired from the start by the totalitarian systems 
and the Axis powers, so contrary to the character and tradition of our people, is fundamentally 
incompatible with the circumstances, which the present war is creating in the world. The foreign 
policy followed by the regime is compromising the future of the nation. Spain runs the risk of being 
dragged into a new fratricidal conflict and of finding itself totally isolated from the world. The present 
regime, however hard it tries to adapt to the new situation, is responsible for this double danger. 
Moreover, a new republic, however moderate in its beginnings and its intentions, will not be long in 
shifting to one of the extremes, thus strengthening the other and finishing up in a new civil war. Only 
the traditional monarchy can be an instrument of peace and concord to reconcile Spaniards; it alone 
can obtain respect from abroad, by means of an effective state of law, and realize a harmonious 
synthesis of that order and freedom upon which is based the Christian concept of the state. Millions of 
Spaniards of the most varied ideologies are convinced of this truth and see in the monarchy the only 
saving institution.”
140 PRO, FO 371/49629, Z4041/1484/41, Norton (Embassy Counsellor) to Eden, 27-03-1945.
141 L. Lripez Rod6, La larga marcha hacia la monarqma, (Barcelona, Noguer, 1977), pp.112,113; PRO 
FO 371/89621, WS 1942/4.
142 J.M. Toquero, Franco y Don Juan.
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The Falangist opposition was led by some high-ranking generals143 under 
Franco144 who disagreed with Franco’s monopolisation of power145 and often decided 
to ally with the monarchists in their fight to obtain a share of power. The Falangist 
generals tried to organise several anti-Franco coups. In one, Jose Enrique Varela made 
an attempt against Franco.146 On the whole though, both monarchism147 and falangism 
expressed resistance in the form of declarations and manifestos148 rather than through
149concrete action.
The greatest single factor contributing to the failure of the exiled opposition was 
the persistence of Civil War ideological divisions. The history of exile was one of
143 The general Jos6 Enrique Varela Iglesias, Marques de Varela de San Fernando, was a Carlist. He got 
two medals of honour for his battles in the North of Africa during the reign of Alfonso XIII. He was 
minister of the war under Franco until 1942 and held the post of High Commissioner in Morocco. 
Varela was placed in charge of the Francoist attack on Madrid. Varela also participated in several 
monarchist petitions to Franco. Varela was clearly in favour of the monarchical restoration. AV29, 
Cddiz, 'La restauracidn de la monarqma". “The idea that the monarchy is today called to restore the 
organic and historic basis of Spain following Traditionalism is generally accepted within Spain. There 
is no other doctrine worth being considerate as an alternative to the monarchy. This is the only 
political solution for Spain. The military has to make sure that the monarchy has a national and 
popular character. The monarchy is a legitimate, national and organic institution.” AV28, Varela's 
archive, 08-04-1942, Varela further argued: “The government of the country is a disaster. There 
should be a radical unification and the same number of Falangist, Traditionalist and independent 
ministers.” Spurred on by Casilda Ampuero, his wife, Varela took all the opportunities to strike blows 
against the Falange. PRO FO 371/31237, C87740/220/41,04-09-1942, Yencken to Eden.
144 AV 149, Varela's archive, 'About Espinosa de los Monteros', In March 1942, Espinosa de los 
Monteros, ex-ambassador to Berlin, was accused of being involved with Alfredo Kindeldn and Luis 
Orgaz in preparations for an anti-Franco coup. “We know all the motives of the incident and it is 
considered a warning that the Army has made to Franco about the unhappiness of the enormous power 
that the Falange is acquiring.” AV149,28-04-1942, Tensions within the military corps'. “The event 
of Espinosa de los Montero envisages a possible change in the political procedures since the tension 
between the Army and the protagonists of the Falange is becoming unbearable.”
145 PRO FO 371/31228, letter of Hoare to Eden. “The generals are now more convinced that ever that 
they can get rid of Franco when they like, provided that the Germans do not intervene. They are 
waiting upon the course of the war and this being so they are discussing any immediate monarchist 
movement”
146 PRO FO 371/31228, letter of Hoare to Eden, 07-10-1942. Samuel Hoare (John Gurney) (2nd 
baronet) was a British statesman who was a chief architect of the government of India act of 1935.
147 AV32, C&liz, letter from Varela to Ponte, 23-03-1946. Monarchism lacked internal unity. “We are 
now going through difficult times due to the international pressure against the regime. It is now more 
than ever essential to appear externally united to save the fundamental principles that created the 
Movement. Any misfortunate intervention and this normally happens when they are not clever 
interventions, produce effects which are contrary to the purposes and in this sense we could say the 
present regime lives today thanks to the mistakes and divisions of the monarchists rather than thanks 
to its successes. The fact of not allowing the restoration is a terrible mistake but it is the reality we are 
living and we need to think of our possibilities to change this situation very cunningly to avoid 
harming ourselves in this cmsade. Our unity is fundamental to recover the political normality that will 
save our country.”
148 PRO F0371/34821, C8728. For example, in July 1943, many monarchists wrote a manifesto asking 
Franco to restore the monarchy.
149 L. L6pez Rod6, La larga marcha hacia la monarqma, (Barcelona, Noguer, 1977), pp.37-40.
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continuing fragmentation. Existing republican divisions were widened by 
geographical dissusion after 1939. The communists and the remaining groups deeply 
disagreed.
Several other groups contributed to the external opposition, but are considered 
primarily in relation to Catalan nationalism, which is the focus of this study. The 
Communists did not successfully reorganise until 1944. The Communist party 
(Partido Comunista de Espana or PCE) broadly followed the position of the 
Comintern, leaving the Communists isolated from other leftist groups in opposition to 
Franco.150 Slavish Communist adherence to Moscow quickly caused difficulties with 
the interior in the absence of a central committee. Stalinist methods also damaged the 
PCE’s relations with other groups who were generally referred to as traitors. Thus, 
there was hardly no relation between Catalan nationalism and the PCE. On the other 
hand, the Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya, the PSUC, was to some extent both 
Catalan and communist under the leadership of Joan Comorera151 until mid 1940s. 
Originally, the PSUC was the result of the fusion between communists and socialists 
and, moreover, it was independent from the PCE. Furthermore, the PSUC declared 
itself anti-Francoist and fought for democratic unity under the dictatorship.152
Military defeat in 1939 caused disruption on the republican side, with each 
section of the Popular Front separating out, and some, such as the Socialists, 
disintegrating altogether.153 The Socialists divided between Indalecio Prieto, who was 
anti-Communist, and Juan Negrih154, who was pro-Communist.155 Indalecio Prieto was 
the main leader of the PSOE, which tried to defend the republic. Prieto decided to help 
Azana after 1934, arguing that the first priority was to regain power in order to put an 
end to the sufferings of the working class at the hands of the CEDA-Radical coalition.
150 Pi i Sunyer, Memdries de Carles Pi i Sunyer, Vol.II, pp.l 18-119.
151 Joan Comorera was bom in Cervera in 1895. He collaborated in the creation of the PSUC, becoming 
its general secretary. He went into exiled in France and then on to Moscow and then to Mexico. Joan 
Comorera died in a Francoist gaol (Burgos) in 1958.
152 The Anti-Francoist opposition: the long march to unity' in P.Preston, Spain in crisis, (London, 
Harvester Press, 1976), pp.125-137
153 FPS, Box 11, Folder 351, letter from Irujo to C. Pi i Sunyer, London, 29-06-1940.
154 Juan Negrm was bom in Las Palmas in 1889. He was a moderate Socialist and ally of the 
Communists. He was appointed Prime Minister of the republic on 17 May 1937. hi October 1937, he 
moved the government to Barcelona. In March 1939, he went into exile after the Casado coup and 
created the SERE.
155 FPS, Box 11, Folder 351, letter from frujo to C. Pi i Sunyer, London, 29-06-1940.
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Prieto was replaced by Negrm in May 1937. Prieto went to Chile in December 1938, 
determined to help Spanish refugees. Socialism remained weak until the middle of the 
1940s in Spain, and relations between Catalan nationalism and Socialism were not 
significant.156 The PSOE was divided in the years following 1939. Moreover, the 
PSOE and the UGT were not ready for the secret fighting due to their history of mass 
parliamentary party. The PSOE sector loyal to the pro-communist government of Juan 
Negrm was led by Ramon Lamoneda helped by Julio Alvarez del Vayo. The pro- 
Negrinist sector was Union Socialista Espanola and some of its leaders such as Amaro 
del Rosal became communists. Apart from the problems originated by the exile, the 
main factor that contributed to the failure of the opposition outside Catalonia was the 
ideological divisions created during the Civil War and worsened after the geographical 
dispersion after 1939. The deepest divisions were those existing between the PSOE 
and the PCE and among the pro- and anti-communist factions within the PSOE. A 
minority led by Negrm and Alvarez del Vayo was in favour of a continuous 
collaboration with the communists whilst the majority turned towards the Allies 
seeking freedom.157
The most important figure among the Spanish Republicans after the death of 
Manuel Azana158 was Diego Martmez Barrio159, who fled to Mexico in 1939. He was 
part of Union Republicana (Republican Union), becoming president of the republic in 
exile, and tried to resuscitate the Republican process. Martmez Barrio did try to enter 
a pact with the Catalans. Several attempts would be made to unite Republican and 
Catalans forces, but none of them would bear fruit.
The anarchists were also divided. The old CNT, FAI and FJL were united on the 
25 February 1939 into the Movimiento Libertario Espanol, which was rapidly 
dispersed by war-time circumstances. The division was extremely complex but
156 P. Preston, Comrades, (London, Harper Collins, 1999), pp. 246-273.
157 P.Preston, Decadencia y resurgimiento del PSOE durante el regimen franquista', El socialismo en 
Espana, (Madrid, Pablo Iglesias, 1986), pp.349-350
158 Manuel Azana was bom in 1880. In 1925 he founded Accidn Republicana supported by the main 
Republican tendencies. When the republic was proclaimed, he formed part of the provisional 
government as war minister. In 1936 he led the republican government and in May he was elected 
president of the republic until 1939.
159 Diego Martmez Barrio, a politician, founded Uni6n Republicana and participated in the elections of 
1936. He was the president of the republic (1936) and in 1945 he became president of the republic in 
exile.
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broadly many exiled leaders in France adopted a purist position while the majority 
believed the Civil War was not over and a wide anti-fascist front was necessary.
The most important political alliance of Catalan nationalism throughout the 
period was with the Basque nationalists, owing to common interests and claims. The 
Basque territory was a small isolated territory that had been subject to few invasions 
throughout its history, fertile ground for establishing any potential claims to autonomy. 
Basque nationalism in the XIX and XX centuries looked back to the foral system160, 
which had granted radical autonomy to the administrations of the Basque territories.
Thq fueros (privileges), as they were called, were the original Basque constitutions, 
expressions of sovereignty and the right to self-government that they had enjoyed up to 
1839.161 An article found in Poblet defines the fueros as:
"Basque laws, made by the Basques in order to serve public collective 
order. In consequence, \h& fueros were also the faculty (...) of 
governing themselves, without influence of any foreign power. The 
fueros are therefore the expression of political sovereignty because 
according to them each one of the ex Basque states was organised freely 
in virtue of the agreements of the Juntas Generals and the Cortes.
Moreover, its sovereignty was especially guaranteed by the use of foral 
path administered by the Juntas/162 
During Canovas’ Restauracion, several Conciertos Economicos (Economic 
Agreements) were implemented in the Basque region. These were laws that confirmed 
economic autonomy for the Basque country. On 26 January 1865, Sabino Policarpo de 
Arana Goiri was bom in the Biscayne town of Abando. Arana would establish the 
pillars of Basque nationalist ideology. The Basque nationalists suffered something of 
an identity crisis with the 1876 abolition of the fueros. The law that put paid to the 
fueros provided for the full incorporation of the Basque territories into the 
constitutional unity of the Spanish monarchy, leaving the Basque society an orphan of 
its main, secular, symbolic, communitarian referent: the foral regime. Arana tried to
160 The foral system is summarised in AT, Poblet, Premsa 1939, '1839-1939 Fueros y libertad'.
161 Pablo, El pendulo patridtico.VolI, pp. 13,27.
162 Poblet, Box C362, Premsa Euzkadi, 03-01-1939.
reformulate Basque claims, conceiving a new ideology at the time of the enormous 
transformations of the industrial revolution in the Basque country.
Arana founded the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Basque Nationalist Party or 
PNV) in 1895, which would prove the leading force in opposition to Franco, and at the 
time of writing, still governs the Basque country. The PNV had a middle class 
orientation, submitted moderate policy proposals, and was linked to the church. It had 
strong racial connotations, and it was anti-fascist, anti-monarchist, and counter­
revolutionary.164 Arana claimed that the distinctions of race165, language, history and 
religion constituted the Basque national identity.166 Euskera, the Basque language, was 
not only the irrefutable witness of originality and purity of race, but also an efficient 
tool of protection and defence in order to preserve the purity of race and isolate the 
Basque nation from centralist Hispanic influences, guaranteeing the preservation of its 
essences and traditions.167 Moreover, Arana’s doctrine had a religious content, which 
was captured in his motto: everything for the country and the country for God (Gustija 
Errikarentzako Ta Errija Jaungoikuarentzako).168 Jose Maria de Areilza, a monarchist 
intellectual and politician, commented on Basque exceptionalism: ‘They never 
considered themselves Spaniards, always asserting that they were Basques only.’169 
In 1931, the proclamation of intent of the Basque statute under the republic 
resembled in some ways the constitution of the Catalan statute.170 The statute 
did not allocate the same degree of sovereignty to the Basque country as the 
foral system, but it was a step forward in the devolution of powers to the 
periphery, synthesising Basque autonomous rights and laws. Of course, Basque 
culture, language, parties and organisations were repressed during the Civil 
War, resulting in terrorism:
163 Pablo, El pendulo patriotico,VolI, p.24.
164 H. Heine, La oposicidn, ch.9.
165 AN, Artea, Alderdi, 1949, Xa raza vasca".
166 AT, Poblet, Box 99,18-01-1945, "Como piensan y actuan los vascos en Espana"; AT, Poblet, Box 
371,05-03-1939, "Declaracidn polftica".
167 Pablo, El pendulo patridtico, Vol. /, p.41.
168 Pablo, El pendulo patridtico, Vol. /, p.41.
169 File FO CAB 118-16, Areilza, London, 1940. Josd Maria Areilza (Conde de Motrico) was the 
ambassador to France, Argentina and Washington and was part of Don Juan’s shadow cabinet
170 PRO FO 371/22699,04-12-1938, Merry del Val "s letter to Irujo, "Basque political organisation 
before 1939", AT, Poblet Premsa 39,14-01-1939, "El problema vasco"; AT, Poblet Box 367, "Para 
informacidn de vascos desorientados".
58
In  July 1936, at the outbreak of the rebellion, the Basques were refused 
their rightful statute of autonomy. The Basque nationalists’ democrats 
and Christians found themselves attacked by the rebel army - 1 once 
again repeat that the executions carried out by the rebels in Euzkadi 
were numbered in thousands. (...) This uncontrolled conduct by the 
rebels aroused a strong reaction among the people in the Basque country 
-  acts of violence took place/171 
Bilbao fell to the nationalists in June 1937. The Basque government created 
social institutions, which allowed for the evacuation of the Basques to the Catalan 
territory not yet in Francoist hands. The Generalitat helped many Basque nationalists 
to escape Francoist domination. Jose Antonio Aguirre172 travelled to Barcelona in 
1937. A Basque government was established in Catalonia, reflecting a tradition of 
Catalan-Basque solidarity.173 However, the occupation of Barcelona by the 
nationalists, in 1939, made escape to the south of France necessary for all.
Catalans were closer to the Basque nationalists than to any other group in 
opposition to Franco. Basque nationalists, like Catalans, were fighting to maintain 
their identity and to enhance their autonomy. The Basque-Catalan tradition of 
solidarity is rich in symbolism. Such moments as the rescue of the refugees of the 
Basque government in the summer of 1937 were celebrated. The Basque nationalists 
moved to Catalonia on 5 February 1939, as Lluis Companys and J.A. Aguirre began 
their path towards exile. A few months later, the Basque exile, with its superior 
resources and better organisation, began collaboration with the Catalan exile, under the 
punitive attentions of the French authorities.
Catalans and Basques historically had a certain amount in common. Both were 
regions with distinctive ethnicity, language groups, cultural and social traits. Boasting 
individual judicial structures, both political cultures espoused liberal and democratic
171 PRO, File FO 371/22699, Merry del Val vs Irujo, ‘Spain and the Basques’, London, 04-12-1938.
172 Josd Antonio Aguirre i Lecube, was bom in Guecho in 1903. He became the most important figure 
of Basque nationalism. Li 1931, he proclaimed the Basque republic and became the leader of PNV.
In 1936, he stayed close to the republic. Aguirre was elected lehendakari deader of Basque 
government) in October 1937 and moved to Barcelona. In 1939 he moved to Paris. When World War 
II started, he was in the North of France, afterwards he went to Belgium and Germany and then to 
America. He was the President of the republic of Euzkadi between 1931-1936.
173 AT, Poblet, Graphic Archive, Several pamphlets and posters show slogans on Catalan-Basque 
solidarity; AT, Poblet, Box L6 and L7.
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principles. Moreover, both programmes were predicated on an idea of national 
freedom and the establishment of democracy and self-determination. The Basque- 
Catalan proposal perhaps also applied to the case of Galicia.174
Despite the obvious similarities between the two nationalist movements, 
important differences remained, which were reflected in the different approaches 
adopted by the two groups in their opposition to Franco. Basque nationalism was 
centered on the PNV, a homogenous force. Catalan nationalism, by contrast, was not 
represented by a single party. While a number of Catalans decided to support Franco, 
ensuring their stability, some tried to organise opposition to Franco, both from within 
Catalan territory, and then from exile. The Catalan opposition will be the focus of the 
following chapters.
1.6 CONCLUSION
The tension between the central state and Catalonia is centuries old. Between 
1875 and 1936, the intensity of the conflict between a centralist policy and the 
nationalist claims increased due to the repression of the regions exercised by the 
Restauracion of Canovas and by the development of the industrial revolution in 
Catalonia vis-a-vis the rest of the Spanish state, which remained predominantly 
agrarian. Furthermore, the colonial disaster of 1898 demonstrated the failure of 
Castilian state policy and gave succour to the separatist demands. The Renaixenga, a 
cultural movement of recovery in Catalonia, lent them weight. At the end of the XIX 
century, the Catalans started to formulate their political programmes into documents 
such as the Memorial de Greuges or the Bases de Manresa. Catalan nationalism began 
to be organised into political parties. For instance, the Lliga Regionalista (the main 
Catalan party of the first quarter of the XX century) was founded in 1901. Catalan 
nationalism took several steps towards autonomy in the first part of the XX century. 
The Catalan language and culture recovered ground. The Mancomunitat (1914-1925) 
and the Generalitat (1931-1939) both represented Catalan nationalism in an 
institutional form. The dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (1923-1930) to an extent
174 FPS, "Una Guerra actual..." (Londres), 1940; Carles Pi i Sunyer, Memdries de I'exili, Vol.I., 
(Barcelona, Curial, 1979), p.13; ANF, Archives Nationales de France, Fl-3808- Politique Espagne, 
Notes et informations dminent d'un rdseau basque rdpublicain en Espagne, 5-3-39; FPS, Box D5, 
Basque-Catalan declaration, London 1941.
arrested Catalan developments, but ground was quickly made up during the second 
republic, in which a statute securing concessions for the region was established. 
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya was bom in this period and became the main 
Catalan party. The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War once again saw an end to 
Catalan developments. Franco’s Rightist coalition won the Civil War in 1939 and 
established a dictatorship based on a single party, the Falange, in alliance with the 
church and the military and based on an economy of autarky. One of the Francoist 
regime’s salient characteristics was its machinery of terror and repression, directed 
particularly against regional claims. The establishment of Francoism would lead to the 
creation of anti-Francoist forces formed by the losing side of the Civil War. Franco 
faced internal opposition led by monarchists and the Falangists, who hoped to gain a 
share of power after the war. An external opposition to the regime was also formed by 
Republicans, Socialists, Communists, Galicians , Basques and Catalans. The focus of 
this thesis will be on the context and development of Catalan nationalism.
The proclamation of the statute had at least signalled a degree of sovereignty.
The Francoist regime tried to extirpate the institutional and cultural sediment of these 
advances. In doing so, it confronted a dual conflict in Catalonia, namely a class-based 
revolution and specifically Catalan aspirations. The fact that the Catalans fought on 
the losing side of the Civil War intensified the assault against them, aimed squarely at 
eliminating any perceived threats to the integrity and order of a unified Spanish entity.
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CHAPTER 2 - CATALAN OPPOSITION TO FRANCO FROM APRIL 1939 
TO JUNE 1940: THE FRENCH EXILE
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The exile is like a dimension of an unknown home; but once you know 
it, it cannot be denied. (...) And then the exile suddenly discovers that
17<whether he goes back or not, he will never stop being an exile/
After prevailing in the Civil War in April 1939, Franco established a dictatorship 
based on terror and persecution. It soon became evident that Franco would consolidate 
enduring absolute power and persecute those on the losing side trying to build any sort 
of opposition. This included Catalans, whose first exile led them to France, a move 
made easier by geographical proximity. France was, moreover, a democratic country, 
which would naturally, it was believed, welcome the Catalan refugees. However, as 
will be shown throughout this chapter, the French exile presented profound 
organisational difficulties and ultimately foundered with the German invasion of 
France in June 1940.
Circumstances at home and abroad would contribute to the failure of the French 
exile. First of all, the Catalans had no government, no institutional backbone in 
France. Secondly, a significant section of the Catalan bourgeoisie - particularly 
prominent members of the Lliga - stopped giving support to Catalan nationalism. 
Thirdly, the Catalans lacked sufficient funds. Fourthly, the Catalans were unable to 
find a replacement for the leadership of Lluis Companys; his loss led to recurrent 
leadership clashes. Fifthly, and more generally, the Catalans in exile were not 
themselves united, lacking cohesion and the capacity to develop relations with the 
Catalan opposition inside Spain and the rest of the exile. Last, those Catalans who 
moved to France found their situation precarious and wholly dominated by the 
question of their own survival.
175 Maria Zambrano’s recollections cited in J. Martin Casas, El exilio espanol, (Barcelona, Planeta, 
2002), pp. 19-20.
2.2 THE END OF THE CIVIL WAR - THE SITUATION IN CATALONIA
After the Civil War, uncertainty and confusion reigned in Catalonia. Three 
groups may be differentiated within Catalan society at this stage: those who stayed in 
Spain and supported Francoism, those who stayed in Catalonia, and worked secretly 
against the regime, and those who went into exile and organised the anti-Francoist 
fight beyond the borders of Spain. Leaving was a complicated business for Catalans, 
both in terms of how and when.
The reaction of Catalan society to Francoism merits close scrutiny. At the end of 
the Civil War, Catalonia was very much a traumatised and devastated society. The 
business class, the Catholic bourgeoisie and the Catalan Church alike shared the 
memories of a horrendous Civil War. Franco’s victory at least offered the restoration 
of a secure and stable regime that would guarantee their physical safety and economic 
future. Many among Catalonia’s elite became open advocates of Francoism.177 The 
fact that many former Catalans supported Francoism came as a harsh blow to those 
trying to organise Catalan opposition in the aftermath of the Civil War; it sapped their 
strength, created confusion and uncertainty, and substantially diminished room for 
manoeuvre, at a time when many of its leaders were being persecuted by the regime.
A number of Catalans did however manage to form an opposition to the 
Francoists. The more moderate Catalan republicans stayed in Spain after the Civil 
War; their lack of radicalism meant they were able to remain in the country and 
function secretly. The common use of aliases made it difficult to identify or control 
their activities. One of its main means of expression was the secret press. Those 
involved had different motivations: some were spurred by fear, some by conviction 
and some (of whom were mercenaries) by money. The more radical Catalans, 
meanwhile, had to go into exile to escape persecution. As may be shown, the split 
within the Catalan opposition, between those who stayed in Catalonia, and those who 
went into exile, generated additional organisational difficulties, due to rivalry among 
the several centres of power and a host of communication problems, and did nothing to
176 C. Pi i Sunyer, Vuit escrits de Vexili (1939-1941), (Barcelona, Fundacid Carles Pi i Sunyer d’estudis 
autondmics I locals, edicid de Francesc Vilanova, 1992) p. 14.
1771. Riera, Los catalanes de Franco, (Barcelona, Plaza y Jands, 1998) and J. M. Fontana Tarrats, Los 
catalanes en la guerra de Espana, (Madrid, Samaran, 1951); D. Arasa, Els Catalans de Churchill, 
(Barcelona, Curial, 1990); Guibemau, Nacionalisme Catala, p.71.
63
alleviate the lack of essential resources without which good infrastructure could not be 
built up.178
The main pre-Civil War parties of Catalan nationalism were the Lliga and Unio 
Democratica de Catalunya (UDC), on the right of the political spectrum, and Estat 
Catala and Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) on the left After the Civil War, 
many representative figures of Catalan nationalism, including many members of the 
Lliga, moved closer to Francoism. The Civil War caused a deep rift in Catalan society, 
as was inevitable given the intensity of class conflict. A number supported Francoism 
out of fatigue and weariness, or because in the new regime, they perceived a means of 
ensuring stability. Francesc Cambo was critical of the Francoists but supported them 
for reasons to do with the economic stability they promised. Cambo was in exile from 
1936 until his death in 1947, with the exception of a very brief trip to Madrid in 1940. 
At that stage, it seemed, a clear fascist orientation was not in evidence. In fact, a great 
part of the Catalan bourgeoisie sought accommodation with the new Francoist power, 
perceiving in Francoism an opportunity to bring to an end the republican rule over 
Catalonia that they perceived as having exposed them to the proletarian revolution.
The decision heavily compromised the members of the Lliga, and marked a turning 
point in its history. Cambo, by now a traitor in Catalan eyes, came to regret the 
decision, as Franco’s repressive policies became evident.179 In fact, the Lliga per se 
had ceased to exist by 1936, though Cambo would try to reconstruct it from 1945.180
The Lliga’s sympathy for Franco proved unforgivable for many among the 
Catalan nationalist rank and file and goes a long way to explaining why it lost 
legitimacy in the eyes of many Catalan nationalists.181 Despite Francoism’s promise of 
economic stability, Catalan support for the regime was by no means so unquestioning 
or automatic; Francoism was, after all, ideologically incompatible with Catalan
178 C. Pi i Sunyer, Reports 1939-42, (Barcelona, Fundacid Pi i Sunyer d’estudis autondmics I locals, 
edicid de Francesc Vilanova), p.38; E. Kedourie, Tales of nationalism, (London, Hutchinson, 1960), 
pp.39-45. C. Molinero & P.Ys&s, L'oposicid antifeixista a Catalunya (1939-1950), (Barcelona, La 
Magrana, 1981).
179 For an analysis of the last years of Cambd's political career, see B. Riquer i Permanyer, L 'ultim 
Cambo (1936-1947) La dreta catalanista davant la guerra civil i el franquisme, (Barcelona, Eumo 
Editorial, 1996).
180 Author's interview with Josep Benet, Barcelona, November 2001 ;Riquer i Permanyer, L'ultim 
Cambo, p.268.
181 Riera, Los catalanes de Franco.
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nationalism. The words of Francesc Cambo, speaking in 1943, capture something of 
the ambivalence felt by many Catalans in the period. The fault line would prove 
critical in determining the Lliga’s failure to maintain an existence under Franco: ‘I 
repudiate the regime and wish to see it transformed... but the important thing is the 
maintenance of internal order and the prevention of the outbreak of a further Civil War 
and right now the only person that can guarantee this is Franco.’182 Only a few 
members of the Lliga remained active, continuing to publish a clandestine version of 
the newspaper Veu de Catalunya.
The other important right-wing pre-Civil War party was Unio Democratica de
Catalunya (UDC), founded on 7 November 1931 as a Catalan social-Catholic
democratic party. At the end of the Civil War, the majority of its leaders went into
exile. The Francoist Law of Political Responsibilities banned the party, breaking it up
and persecuting its leaders. It was reorganised secretly in 1940 by Miquel Coll i
Alentom183 and Maurici Serrahima184. Those who stayed in Spain began to reorganise 
1in 1941. A member of UDC created a separate organisation called Joventut Catalana 
Democratica (JCD), the Catalan Youth Party, producing a range of Catalan 
propaganda on the secret presses, their leading publication being The Quadems de 
Sant Jordi}m
A third group of Catalan nationalists consisted of the remnants of Estat Catala 
(EC), a separatist movement founded by Francesc Macia on 18 July 1922.187 EC had 
been isolated from the Generalitat, and the PSUC had taken on the role of flag bearer 
for radical nationalism. The division would continue throughout the course of the
182 Cambd's letter in 1943 in Andrew Dowling, “The decline of Esquerra Republicana, the fall of the 
Lliga Regionalista and the emergence of Convergencia I Uni6, Approaches to the reconstitution of 
political Catalan nationalism 1939-1975”, (Southampton thesis) p.l. J. Pabdn, Cambo (1876-1947), 
(Barcelona, Alpha, 1999).
183 Miquel Coll i Alentom was a politician and a historian bom in Barcelona in 1904. He was an 
industrial engineer who entered UDC in 1932 where he held several significant posts.
184 Maurici Serrahima was a writer and a politician bom in Barcelona in 1902. He was a lawyer and a 
significant member of UDC. He worked as an anti-Francoist activist, making a mainly cultural 
contribution.
167 Author’s interview with Antdn Canellas, Barcelona, January 2002.
186 D. Diaz Esculies, L ’oposicid Catalana alfranquisme: el republicanisme liberal I la nova oposicio 
(1939-1960), (Barcelona, Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, 1996), pp.23-31. H. Raguer, La 
Unio Democratica de Catalunya I el seu temps (1931-1939), (Barcelona, Publicacions de TAbadia de 
Montserrat, 1976); APSG, 1946, Quadems de Sant Jordi (publicats per Joventut Catalana 
Democratica).
187 Author’s interview with Ant6n Canellas, Barcelona, January 2002.
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French exile. Some members of EC claimed absolute independence for Catalonia, 
whilst others did not. The divisions of EC in exile undoubtedly had the effect of 
exaggerating those among the residual resistance of EC in Catalonia. A fourth party, 
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), the majority party of the GeneralitaU was 
active in Catalonia, but still lacked consolidation. ERC published the Humanitat, 
though sporadically and always clandestinely. Under Francoism, the majority of the 
leaders of ERC went into exile. Those members of ERC that stayed in Spain tried to 
support the anti-Francoist platforms. Moreover, Catalan governmental institutions (in 
particular, the Generalitat and the Catalan Parliament) themselves disappeared soon 
after the Catalan exile began. The absence of such an institutional framework 
tremendously weakened the Catalan cause, which depended upon the achievement of 
Catalan institutions and rule.188
The pre-Civil War parties on both the right and the left of the spectrum, showed 
little sign of vitality after the war, lacking resources, ideological coherence and focus, 
and supporters. Their reorganisation took a long time. The UDC began in 1940. The 
EC was severely divided internally. Finally, the ERC remained in a state of disorder. 
The number of Catalans ready to defend Catalan regionalist claims after the Civil War 
had diminished, while major policy differences divided the parties.
23  EXODUS TO FRANCE
With the fall of Barcelona on 25 January 1939, and then that of all of Catalonia 
to Francoist forces, a huge number of Catalans fled to France. France was 
geographically and politically the obvious destination for those on the losing side of 
the Spanish Civil War: a democracy bordering Catalonia. The French authorities had 
recognised the Francoist government on 27 February 1939, but the government of 
Edouard Daladier, a member of the French Radicals, was in power and therefore
188Author’s interview with Ant6n Canellas, Barcelona, January 2002; E. Kedourie, Tales o f nationalism, 
(London, Hutchinson, 1960), pp.39-45. C. Molinero, &P. Ysks, L'oposicid antifeixista a Catalunya 
(1939-1950), (Barcelona, La Magrana, 1981); F. Vilanova, Repressio politico i coaccio econdmica. 
Les responsabilitats politiques de republicans i conservadors Catalans a la postguerra (1939-1942), 
(Barcelona, Publicacions de LAbadia de Montserrat, 1999); J.M. Sold I Sabatd, La repressio 
franquista a Catalunya (1938-1953), (Barcelona, Edicions 62,1985).
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allowed Spanish civil refugees, mainly women and children, in France, without 
hesitation.189
It was a rapid exodus. A great number passed through the streets of Puigcerda, 
Camprodo, Prats de Mollo, Damius, La Jonquera and Portbou. Those who abandoned 
their villages and their houses trecked to France where they received an appalling 
reception, often being sent to concentration camps. Within a few days, thousands of 
refugees had entered France, swelling its population by 500,000.190 The paths taken by 
the Catalan refugees are of some interest for the purposes of the present chapter. First 
of all, the exiles moved to the South of France, the closest and most practical option, 
making their way through the Pyrenees; Toulouse and Perpignan191 became two 
important destinations. Later, some moved to Paris, the nerve centre of Catalan 
activity until the German invasion. The great majority of Catalans who moved to 
France lacked material resources and would remain preoccupied with the question of 
their own survival. The dispersal of refugees throughout France made it more difficult 
to achieve unity and militated against making more effective decisions. 192 
Furthermore, settling in France thereafter, finding lodging and work was made all the 
more difficult by the lack of any kind of institutional support or framework for the 
organisation of a Catalan opposition. Some testimony from the archive of Poblet 
explains certain of these difficulties:
The numbers do not tally - some talk about 150,000 Catalans, some 
about 200,000 but the exact number matters little. The suffering and
189 Edouard Daladier was the head of the French government between 1938 and 1940. He was put in 
prison in 1940 by the Vichy government. For information on the policy taken by the French 
government towards the Catalan refugees, see Luis I. Rodriguez, ‘La proteccidn de los refugiados 
espanoles en Francia’, Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y tecnologia, Mdjico, Colegio de Mdjico, 
Secretarfa de relaciones exteriores, 2000, p. 13.
190 For information on the paths and number of Catalans exiled in 1939 see J. C. J. Aberasturi, De la 
derrota a la esperanza: politicas vascas durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial (1939-1947), (Bilbao, 
Insituto Vasco de administracidn publica, 1999, pp.175-176); F. Vilanova, Les ruptures de Vany 
1939, (Barcelona, Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, 2000), pp.95-97. The different sources 
about the Spanish exiles do not agree on its exact number. The numbers range from 250000 to 
500000 of total Spanish exiles, among which 100000 to 200000 were Catalans. It is calculated that 
around 3000 Spaniards moved to the UK in the 40's among which 20 per cent were Catalans. The 
Spanish exile to the USA was very small. Probably around 1000 Spaniards went to USA among which 
20 per cent of Spaniards whereas around 21 000 Spaniards were dispersed in Latin America. Again, 
around 20 per cent of these exiles were Catalans.
191 The activities of the Catalan delegation in Perpignan are well described in FPS, Box 9, Folder 288, 
letter from Ramon Frontera to Carles Pi i Sunyer, 21-08-1939.
192 FPS, Box 9, Folder 288, Letter from Ramon Frontera to Pi i Sunyer, Perpignan, 10-02-1939.
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fear of the many and the hope of a few are what are important. The 
exodus first and the dispersion afterwards followed on from the pain of 
defeat, without forgetting the cruel persecution of those that stayed in 
Spanish territory. Never in the history of Catalonia was an exodus so 
quick and large/193
Many Catalan refugees went to concentration camps in the South of France. There 
were five main camps: Argeles-sur-Mer, Saint Cyprien, Barcares, Arles-sur-Tech and 
Prats de Mollo. Unfortunately for the refugees, the camps were rapidly established and 
ill-prepared. There was hardly any food and a lot of cold in the winter due to the 
proximity of the Oriental Pyrenees. Moreover, the refugees had to sleep in the sand. 
Furthermore, there were contagious illnesses that were often lethal and many of the 
older refugees died because they could not handle the conditions. The French 
government feared the avalanches of refugees and left them in miserable and 
humiliating conditions. These concentration camps were kept by other refugees such 
as Senegalese because the French did not want to do it. Other camps were built in the 
low Pyrenees and the Midi: that of Bram and Aude, that of Agde, in Hdrault, with 
many Catalans, that of Sept-fonds, in Tam-et-Garonne. Gurs, in the Atlantic Pyrenees, 
was the bigger concentration camp in the South of France. Some other refugees were 
sent to the fortress of Colliure where they were treated as if they were criminals.194
Catalans collaborated with the Allies special operations in order to escape from 
Francoist persecution and cross the border towards France. However, the evasion and 
escape mechanisms put in place are also worth mentioning. There were smuggling 
networks at the frontier that were politicised or often bought by the refugees.195
Crucially, the Catalan government or Generalitat ceased to exist from 26 January 
1939, following the exile of Llufs Companys, president of the Generalitat. Companys 
fled to France at the end of the war to escape Francoist trial and execution. Alongside
193 AT, Poblet, C.459, ‘An exile with no return’; Aberasturi, De la derrota, pp. 175-177; M. C. 
Raffaneau-Boj, Los campos de concentration de los refugiados espaholes en Francia (1939-1945), 
(Barcelona, ediciones Omega, 1995, p.129); Martin Casas, El exilio espanol,, p.69.
194 P.Carvajal Urquijo and Martm Casas, El exilio espanol 1936-1978, pp.69-76.
195 M.C.Raffaneau-Boj, Los campos de concentration de los refugiados espaholes en Francia (1939- 
1945), (Barcelona, ediciones Omega, 1995); D.Arasa, Els Catalans de Churchill
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the loss of its figurehead, the Generalitat had already been weakened by pressure from 
the central republican government and by internal tensions between ERC and the Partit 
Socialists Unificat de Catalunya (PSUC)196, the Catalan Communists. ERC had tried 
in vain to maintain the Generalitat, but after the loss of Companys, and the splintering 
of Catalan groups in exile, the Generalitat disappeared having no solid foundation.
The loss of the Generalitat was a disaster for Catalan nationalism, removing at once its 
main symbol and the institution that represented it and gave it legitimacy. The 
displaced Catalans in France, lacking an institutional framework, attempted to 
reproduce the government of the Generalitat, but lacked the resources to do so. These 
Catalans in particular radicalised their views as a consequence of this failure.197
Even if the situation in France was very precarious, Catalans managed to create 
the Front Nacional de Catalunya (National Front of Catalonia or FNC), which marked 
the first serious attempt to unite the forces of Catalan nationalism. Formed in Paris in 
April 1940, it became the primary Catalan organisation and aimed to represent 
Catalans inside and outside Spain. Its founding members were Joan Comudella from 
EC198, Manuel Cruells, ex-militant of EC, Enric Pages, representative of the Federacio 
Nacional d’Estudiants de Catalunya (Catalan Student National Federation or FNEC)199
onnand of the Bloc Escolar Nacionalista (National Scholar Bloc or BEN) , Jaume
001Martmez Vendrell from the patriotic organisation Nosaltres Sols! and Llufs 
Companys and Josep Irla from ERC.202
The FNC started as a youth reaction to Francoist repression, and derived mainly 
from EC. The FNC united members from EC, Accio Catalana Republicana (Catalan
196 The Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (PSUC) was a Catalan political organisation founded on 
22 July 1936 from the merging of the Catalan Communists (PCC), the Catalan federation of the 
PSOE, Uni6 Socialista de Catalunya and Partit Proletari CataliL The Civil War and the Catalan 
political situation accelerated this process and Joan Comorera became its general secretary. Until the 
mid 1940s, the PSUC was Catalan and communist. Comorera was persecuted by the PCE and 
Moscow ostensibly because of his Catalan nationalism. For information on the PSUC political 
developments see M. Caminal I Badia, Joan Comorera, (Empuries, Empuries, 1994).
197 Aberasturi, De la derrota a la esperanza, p. 178.
198 Joan Comudella I Barber  ^was a politician and economist (Borges Blanques 1904, Barcelona 1985). 
He entered Estat Catala in 1936 and later on became its general secretary. In 1939, from the exile, he 
contributed to the formation of the FNC.
199 The FNEC was a Catalan youth movement
200 The BEN was a small Catalan independent group.
201 Nosaltres Sols was a political separatist Catalan group created in 1931. Some of its members had 
previously formed part of the EC.
202 AT, Poblet, Box 459, TJn exili sense retom'.
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Republican Action or ACR)203 and ERC on the left of the political spectrum; the party 
itself was leftist. The forces of the right, including the UDC and the Lliga, were 
excluded from the FNC, in part because they were by that stage virtually moribund and 
had got close to Francoism, and in part because their members were not in France and 
disagreed with FNC policy. The FNC was intended to be an organisation in which 
independent Catalan groups could participate while maintaining their autonomy.204 
The FNC was an extensive organisation for the standard of the times, claiming 
somewhere between 300 and 500 members. However, even if the FNC was the main 
Catalan organisation in France, Francoist repression severely targeted its members in 
Spain. An article in Ressorgiment summarises the foundation of the FNC:
The Front Nacional de Catalunya was founded grouping together 
elements from the old democrat Republican parties. It consisted of an 
energetic protest against Franco and an affirmation of Catalan 
nationalism. (...) The FNC was also in charge of helping the refugees 
from Spain to get to France/206 
The FNC did not renounce armed struggle as such, but focused rather on the 
development of secret services in support of the French resistance and the Allies; it 
was hoped that the Allies would see fit to return the favour by removing Franco once 
World War II was over. The services were established with the collaboration of the 
UK secret services and the Intelligence Service of the French State. In the main, they 
comprised military information operations.207 Solid propaganda mechanisms were 
fundamental in both conveying a positive image of Catalan nationalism within Spain 
and internationalising the Catalan cause. Thus, at the beginning of the 1940s, the 
FNC did not develop an anti-Francoist programme, but was rather devoted to helping
203 Accid Catalana Republicana (ACR) was a political party created in Barcelona in June 1922. It was 
liberal and nationalist It was Catalan but non-separatist and very culturally oriented. Jaume Bofill i 
Mates, Llufs Nicolau d'Olwer and Antoni Rovira i Virgili were some of its leaders.
204 A document found in the FPS summarised the policy of the FNC in 1941 .FPS, Ressorgiment, "Report 
sobre el Front Nacional de Catalunya", 1941; D. Diaz Esculies, El Front Nacional de Catalunya i 
Voposicio catalanista alfranquisme 1939-1947, (Barcelona, La Magrana, 1983).
205 Author’s interview with Josep Benet Barcelona, November 2001. Author's interview with Anton 
Canellas (Ombudsman of Catalonia), Barcelona, January 2002; Diaz Esculies, L ’oposicid catalanista 
alfranquisme, pp.23-31; A. Viladot i Presas, Nacionalisme i premsa clandestina, (Barcelona, Curial, 
1987), pp.57-58.
206 PS, Ressorgiment, Foundation of the Front Nacional de Catalunya, 1940.
201 A. Viladot i Presas, Nacionalisme i premsa clandestina, (Barcelona, Curial, 1987), pp.60-62; Diaz 
Esculies, L ’oposicid Catalana alfranquisme, pp.48-63.
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the Allies. The forms of opposition and activities undertaken by those Catalans in 
exile in France for the most part concerned the provision of information services, 
propaganda, the conduct of cultural activities, lobbying of the Allies and help to the 
refugees.
The FNC members returned across the border from France to Barcelona and 
settled there from 1942 onwards. However, its eventual policy aims coincided with 
those of the Consell Nacional de Catalunya - which sought to restructure Spain in a 
confederation of free states, breaking the constitutional pact of 1931 and asserting the 
right of self-determination.
In the cultural domain, Francoist repression against Catalan nationalism was efficient, 
significantly obstructing the development of Catalan culture in this period. Perhaps 
most visibly, Franco prohibited the use of the Catalan language, but the regime’s 
cultural repression targeted all Catalan institutions and traditions, and was highly 
effective.209 Resources were limited, but Catalans did their best in opposition to keep 
Catalan culture alive. Cultural activities were undertaken alongside political 
activities.210 Josep Maria Ainaud de Lasarte claims that Catalan groups were often 
playing a double game: the political and the cultural game, and the two struggles went 
together and could not be easily disentangled.211
An important organisation created by Catalan refugees in France was the 
National Catalan Council, made up of important intellectual personalities and 
promoted by leaders of ERC. Pompeu Fabra, Antoni Rovira i Virgili, Jaume Serra 
Hunter, Jaume Pi i Sunyer and Josep Pous i Pages led the council founded in 1940. 
Help for refugees mainly consisted in helping those wanting to leave Spain for France, 
or later on, for the UK or the Americas. Some Republican institutions would provide 
financial assistance.
On top of Francoist repression in Spain, lack of resources and lack of 
institutional structure in France, the Catalans also suffered from financial difficulties.
208 Dfez Esculies, L'oposicid catalanista alfranquisme, p.54
209 J. Benet, Catalunya sota el r^gim franquista: informe sobre la persecucid de la llengua i la cultura 
de Catalunya pel regim del general Franco, Voll, (Barcelona, Blume, 1978).
210 AT, Poblet, Box 1601, Letter to the president of the JARE, Paris, 17-08-1939.
211 Author’s interview with J. M. Ainaud de Lasarte, Barcelona, December 2000. Josep Maria Ainaud 
de Lasarte reorganised the Federacid Nacional d’Estudiants de Catalunya (FNEC) in the forties, a 
Catalan youth group.
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Severe financial constraints constituted one of the primary challenges for the Catalans 
in exile, curtailing their capacity to create solid opposition to Francoism. During the 
Civil War, the Generalitat had pledged a large part of its financial resources to the 
republican side, whose uncertain economic situation throughout the conflict had been 
far less certain than that of the Francoists. By the war’s end, it was clear that the 
Catalans would not get their money back, certainly not from a republican 
administration. Much of it had been spent, and there was no will to return what little 
remained. The Generalitat went into exile then without financial resources.212 
Another document found in Poblet summarises the limits of the financial situation: 
The perspective of the Generalitat was a difficult one. Many witnesses 
have confirmed that the central government of the republic demanded 
the handing of all financial resources of the Generalitat de Catalunya 
before going into exile promising economic help later on and promising 
that the Catalans would have a share in the administration of the 
republic. These promises were not accomplished later on. (...) Thus, 
the Generalitat faced a long exile without financial resources. (...) The 
Catalans hoped that with their commercial resources they would manage 
to obtain loans. However, when World War II started, these hopes were 
shattered and the Catalans found themselves without economic
✓213resources.
In something of a comer, the Catalans had to depend for a long time on Basque and 
republican financial help. Therefore, relations with the Basque nationalists became 
crucial for the Catalans, with financial aid now binding the two groups together, along 
with shared nationalist ideology. These flows are documented in the files of the 
government of Euzkadi.214
2.4 CATALAN EXTERNAL RELATIONS
The Catalan opposition, although in exile in France, tried to maintain its links 
with other opposition movements. Arguably, the most important relationship was that
212 C. Pi i Sunyer, Memories de I'exili, Vol.II, (Barcelona, Curial, 1978), pp.56,183-187.
213 AT, Poblet, Box 459, TJn exili sense retom'.
214 AT, Poblet, Box 491, Government of Euzkadi, Paris delegation, Paris, 27-08-1946.
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maintained with the Basque nationalist opposition. From 1936 to 1945, Basque 
nationalism was centred on the president of the Basque Nationalist Party (Partido 
Nacionalista Yasco or PNV) Jose Antonio Aguirre.215 In 1940, in exile, the new 
doctrine of the governmental programme of the Basque Nationalist Party asserted the 
uniqueness of the Basque personality and the right of self-determination. The Basque 
nationalists were the most cohesive movement of the anti-Francoist groups. Basque 
activity was centred on two axes: collaboration with the allies, and help for Basque 
prisoners. The Basque nationalists wished to distance themselves from the 
republicans, whose weakness allowed the Basque nationalists to function 
independently in exile. As a result of this independence, Basque nationalists believed 
that they could obtain their statute of autonomy and even independence with the help 
of the democratic powers and Aguirre sought the protection of France from Francoist 
repression.216
The PNV, like the Catalans, created social institutions in exile. Exiled Basque 
nationalists were also keen to establish strong networks of communication with the 
French authorities. The Basque nationalists also created secret services, which were 
key organisations within the PNV. Operations were aimed at obtaining information 
that would be helpful to the Allies, as well as to making the Basque nationalist cause 
internationally known.217
The PNV also created instruments of propaganda in the south of France, in order 
to publicise their cause. Propaganda was designed to push the necessity of an Allied 
intervention against Franco, as well as underlining the importance of the Basque 
problem. The Basque nationalists created the International League of Basque Friends 
(Ligue Internationale des Amis Basques) to provide a substitute for the Basque
215 Josd Antonio Aguirre i Lecube was bom in Guecho (Basque country) in 1903. He became the most 
important figure of Basque nationalism. In 1931, he proclaimed the Basque republic and became the 
leader of the PNV. In 1936, he stayed close to the republic. Aguirre was elected lehendakari (leader 
of Basque government) in October 1937 and moved to Barcelona. In 1939 he moved to Paris. When 
World War II started, he was in the North of France. Afterwards, he went to Belgium and Germany, 
then to America.
216 F. Letamendia, Historia de Euzkadi, El nacionalismo vasco y ETA, 3 vols. (Paris, Ruedo Ibdrico, 
1975); J. Juaristi, El bucle melancolico. Historias de nacionalistas vascos, (Madrid, Espasa, 1997);
F. Garcia de Cortdzar and J.P. Fusi Aizpurua, Politica, nacionalidad e iglesia en el Pais Vasco, (San 
Sebastiin, Txertoa, 1988).
217 Aberasturi, De la derrota, p.80.
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consulate in France218 and nominally to propose political solutions and represent the 
Basque nationalists at an international level, though it also took cultural issues in hand.
Those Basque nationalists in exile also faced severe financial conditions, even if 
their situation was less parlous than that of the Catalans. Like the Catalans, the PNV 
turned to Republican financial resources. Frictions between the PNV and the 
Republicans necessarily disrupted this flow of funds.
Basque nationalists and Catalan nationalists allied to promote their regionalist 
aims; both were eager to reach an agreement. From 1939 onwards, the political paths 
of Catalan and Basque nationalists converged. Where the Catalan autonomous 
government had ceased to exist after the fall of Barcelona, however, the Basque 
government had maintained its internal coherence and had continued to operate in 
French exile, until the German occupation forbade all political activity. The most 
substantial link between the two movements was the financial help given by the 
Basque nationalists to the Catalans, but there were many similarities between Catalan 
and Basque nationalism, in terms of situation, objectives and strategy, which led them 
to find common cause against Francoism. They would act together for common 
convenience and mutual affection and sympathy.219
The Catalans and Basque nationalists shared their information services in order 
to get close to the French government and lobby for the anti-Francoist cause. Both 
Catalan and Basque nationalists relied on the help of the Western powers (USA, UK 
and France, especially the latter two)220 to further their cause, and both groups offered 
their services to the Allies in fighting fascism, hoping for some post-war recompense, 
however naively.221 Since the Basques had the advantage of having a governmental 
structure, which the Catalans did not, the Catalans used the Basque government as a 
point of reference and support. Finally, Catalans and Basque nationalists shared the 
common project of Galeuzka (an abbreviation for the aspirations of Galicia, Euzkadi 
and Catalonia).
218 AT, Artea, EBB153-10, Euzko Deya, Paris, 31-03-1947, "Reunion Annuelle de la Ligue 
Intemationalde des amis Basques'. This document summarises the activities of this group.
219 Aberasturi, De la derrota, p. 118; Pi i Sunyer, Reports 1939-1942,, p.31.
220 AN, Artea, PNV 237-6,’El hecho nacional vasco’, Partido Nacionalista Vasco, copia del escrito 
elevado a su excelencia el Sr. Presidente del Gobiemo de Euzkadi, 27-03-1940.
221 A. Segura I Mas, ‘Artea, Un arxiu que documenta, tot sol, la solidaritat basco-catalana’ in Avui, 04- 
07-1999.
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An intense Catalan-Basque relationship persisted throughout the history of the 
anti-Francoist opposition. In line with this, the Galeuzka project tried to unite Galician 
nationalists, Basque nationalists and Catalans in the struggle to achieve self- 
determination for their regions. However, the Basque nationalists and their aim of 
self-determination made consensus among the three regions more difficult; the pact 
ultimately foundered. The project should not be confused with the wider history of 
Catalan-Basque solidarity but should be considered a serious attempt at formalising 
relations between the regions claiming self-determination. Galician nationalism was 
less strong: the Galician nationalist party had not managed to create a solid foundation 
of support, and Francoist repression in Galicia was particularly severe.222
Relations with left-wing opposition groups also needed to be maintained. The 
most important group within the Republican side were the Socialists, followed by the 
Communists who would eventually become the most important group.
The Catalans were eager to enter pacts with the Republicans as long as the 
Republicans would accept two conditions: that they maintain the right of Catalan self- 
determination and that they would accept the previous pact with the Basque 
nationalists, which was considered a priority. The Catalans believed that the only way 
to ally with the Left was by agreeing on a federal political structure for Spain. In any 
case, if the Allies prevailed in the war, it seemed likely that the republican government 
in Spain would be restored. However, the main obstacle to alliance with the 
republicans was their near-total internal division. As is indicated in the following 
chapters, such projects to unify republican and Catalan forces were never effectively
223put m practice.
The main form of collaboration in this period between Catalans and Republicans 
was financial. Two Republican institutions were created to help Spanish refugees.
The Servicio de Evacuacion de Refugiados Espanoles (Evacuation Service of Spanish
222 For information on Galeuzka see also Aberasturi, De la derrota , p. 176; Galeuzka is the contraction 
of three names (Galicia, Euzkadi and Catalonia) and was the name of the pact established in 1923 
between representatives of these three regions. In 1934 this pact was ratified by the regions involved. 
Catalan-Basque solidarity became more solid as a result of the co-operation during the Civil War; 
when the Basque country fell, its government moved to Barcelona (1937-1939). The pact of Galeuzka 
was ratified in exile, in Mexico and in Argentina.
223 Pi i Sunyer, Reports 1939-1942,, p.99; C. Pi i Sunyer, Memories de I’exili, Vol.l, (Barcelona, Curial, 
1979, p. 139).
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Refugees or SERE), and the Junta de Auxilio a los Republicanos Espanoles (JARE). 
The SERE was created in Paris by the republican forces led by the last republican 
prime minister, the Socialist Juan Negrrn,224 in March 1939. Its mission was to 
organise an exile in the Americas for the Spanish refugees in France after the Francoist 
occupation of Catalonia. The SERE used sources from French, Belgian and Swiss 
banks. The Communists also participated in the SERE.225 In August 1939, Indalecio 
Prieto,226 from Mexico, started the JARE, with the intention of helping refugees and 
organising emigration to Mexcio and Chile. Prieto’s organisation was financed by 
treasures shipped to Mexico by Negrrn for the benefit of SERE.227 Negrrn had 
organised a strategy to send economic resources to Mexico. He acquired the vessel 
Giralda -  renamed Vita -  that had been owned by Alfonso XHI, and which 
accumulated gold, silver, and the reserves of the Bank of Spain.228 The Vita sailed 
from France but arrived in Mexico too early for Negrrn’s agents to receive it. Prieto 
managed to get hold of the cargo, thus starting his group, embedding within it a 
conflict between it and SERE, as well as exacerbating the state of internal crisis in the 
Socialist party. 229
On the one hand, there were, broadly speaking, the Communists and supporters 
of the Negrrn government, and, on the other, the anti-Communist elements of the 
republic organised around Prieto in Mexico.230 There was an intense personal rivalry 
between the two leaders, dating back to April 1938 when Negrrn removed Prieto from 
his government. This hostility spilled over into the leadership of the republicans in 
exile, both in France and in Mexico. Left wing activity and decision-making were 
never effectively co-ordinated due partly to this underlying competition.
224 Juan Negrrn was bom in Las Palmas in 1889. He was appointed Prime Minister of the republic on 
the 17 May 1937. In October 1937, he moved the government to Barcelona. In March 1939, he went 
into exile.
225 Aberasturi, De la derrota, p. 196; (Consejo National de Ciencia y tecnologfa, Luis I. Rodriguez, La 
proteccidn de los refugiados espanoles en Francia, (Mdjico, Colegio de Mdjico, Secretaria de 
relaciones exteriores, 2000), p. 13.
226 Indalecio Prieto was bom in Oviedo in 1883. A politician and journalist, he was minister of the 
republican government during the Civil War (1936-1937) with Largo Caballero and minister of 
defence in 1937-1938 under Negrfn. After the end of the Civil War, he went into exile in Mexico. A. 
Del Rosal, El oro del banco de Espana y la historia del Vita, (Barcelona, Grijalbo, 1977).
227 Pi i Sunyer, Memories de Vexili VoLL,, p.90.
228 A. del Rosal, El oro del banco de Espana y la historia del Vita, (Barcelona, Grijalbo, 1977).
229 Martin Casas, El exilio Espahol (1936-1978),, pp.97-99
230 Martin Casas, El exilio espahol (1936-1978), ,p.99
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The PCE functioned in both the exile and within Spain. The divisions between 
the PCE and the PSUC were precisely over Catalan aspirations. The Partit Socialista 
Unificat de Catalunya (PSUC) was always communist. 231 The PCE claimed that the 
defeat in the Civil War had been the fault of the PSOE. Consequently, the PCE’s 
project of national union was rejected. A minority led by Negrrn was in favour of a 
continued collaboration with the Communists whilst the majority turned towards the 
Allies in the quest to overthrow the dictatorship.
Relations between the French exile and the Catalans remaining in Spain also had 
to be maintained. Those Catalans staying in Catalan territory were of a more moderate 
bent and perhaps had less to fear from the Francoist persecution. Throughout the 
period, the Civil War was never far from the mind. A large slice of the Catalonian 
population was mainly concerned with its own survival. The capacity for political 
organisation was very weak. All the main leaders of Catalan nationalism had to flee 
the country and, consequently, those remaining in Spain found themselves without 
institutions, financing, and effective leaders to represent them.232
The lack of an institutional framework de-legitimised the work of the Catalan 
leaders in exile. It is important to consider to what extent the Catalans inside Spain 
considered those in exile to represent their interests. In fact, co-ordination between 
Catalans in exile and those in Catalonia failed. There was a lack of mutual support and 
understanding, a propensity to clashes of leadership, and multiple nuclei of power and 
centres of decision-making. Those in exile attempted to reproduce the institutions and 
ideology of Catalan nationalism, as practised in Spain. Poor communications put paid 
to any real connection between the two groups and cost the legitimacy of those in exile 
in France. This signal lack of co-ordination between the first exile and those inside 
Spain further weakened Catalan opposition.
After a complicated and lengthy process of hesitation and prevarication, the Axis 
accepted Franco’s declaration of neutrality since they thought that Spain, given its 
precarious situation after the Civil War, might prove more of a hindrance than a help. 
The Axis powers did not wish Spain to enter the conflict, nor sought any political
231 M. Caminal, Joan Comorera, Vol.3, (Barcelona, Empuries, 1985).
232 F. Vilanova, A Is dos costats de la frontera, relacions poUtiques entre exili interior a la postguerra, 
1939-1948, (Barcelona, Biblioteca Serra d’Or, Publications de 1’ Abadia de Montserrat, 2001).
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change in Spain.233 The Allies were pleased with Spanish neutrality for strategic 
reasons; they did not want a third fascist opponent, while the British in particular were 
eager to safeguard the zone of Gibraltar, where they had strategic and economic 
interests. Overall, Franco and the Falange were deeply disappointed not to enter 
World War n. The anti-Francoists were pleased not to enter the conflict since they 
could clearly see that their country was not ready to fight another war at that point.234
2.5 THE IMPACT OF THE BEGINNING OF WWII ON CATALAN 
NATIONALISM
At this point, the analytical spotlight must fall on the beginning of World War n,
9 ^ 5an event that largely confirmed the geographical dislocation of the Catalans. It is 
important to take into account the role of Spain in World War n, the stance of the 
international powers vis-a-vis Spain, and how this affected the political fortunes of 
Catalan nationalism. This international dimension was not lost on Pi i Sunyer, who 
commented: ‘Catalonia is part of Europe and the European problems immediately have 
an effect in Catalonia.’236
At the outbreak of World War n, Franco’s heart lay with the Axis Powers, as his 
words showed: ‘I will always be a loyal follower of your cause. I consider, as you do,
939that the destiny of history has united you, the Duce and me in an indissoluble way.’ 
Mussolini’s indicated a comparable bond at the beginning of World War n, when he 
said: ‘I consider the Italo-Spanish friendship as a permanent and secure guide of Italian 
foreign policy, and as one of the main basis of the new political order that Europe will 
have at the end of the war.’238 Naturally, Franco felt close to Hitler when World War II 
started but he put a brake on his tendency due to his own internal survival and Spain’s 
economic and military incapacity of Spain at the time. The Falange supported Hitler
233 Fracassi to Ciano, Madrid, 06-09-1942,1 document! diplomatici italiani, IX serie, 1939-1943, Volum 
IX.
234 AMAE, Papiers 1940, Bureau d’dtude J. Chauvel, Informations sur l’Espagne, 28-07-1943.
235 R. Espinar Gallego, El impacto de la Segunda Guerra Mundial en Europa y en Espana, (Madrid, 
Asamblea de Madrid, 1986).
236 FPS, London, 1939, C. Pi i Sunyer, IMds val tenir rad que guanyar'.
237 APSG, letter from Franco to Hitler, 26-11-1941; MAEE, dossier R2198, report 33, Sunday Dispatch, 
05-11-1944.
238 II capo del govemo, Mussolini al capo dello stato spagnolo, Franco, Roma, 1 ottobre, 1942, IX serie, 
1939-1943, Volum XI; MAEE, dossier R2198, report 33, Sunday Dispatch, 05-11-1944.
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until the end of World War II while the military, on the other side, only believed in an 
Axis victory until the autumn of 1940. Franco obviously adapted his decision 
according to the developments of the war. Franco had the temptation to enter the war 
on the Axis side until 1941. The relations between Hider and Franco were very good 
and grateful mainly due to the help given by the Germans during the Civil War and 
were only worsened due to the arrogance of the Fiihrer.239 When World War II started, 
Franco officially announced the strictest neutrality. In the spring of 1940, Franco 
believed in a quick German victory, and at that time, the strategic importance of Spain 
made the Germans want to get Spain on their side of the war. The British wanted to 
make sure Spain would stay out of the war. Thus, in 1940 Franco would have entered 
World War II on the side of the Allies but he did not do it because he did not trade the 
right conditions with Hitler. When Franco switched from neutrality to non- 
belligerence, he was making a pro-Axis move. Franco wanted to enter the war close to 
its end. Franco accepted that Spain was not ready to undertake another war, but was 
also under international pressure to take a formal stance vis-a-vis the conflict.240
Catalans were happy for Spain to remain neutral, in the light of the devastation 
wrought by the Civil War. The Catalan opposition associated the prospect of an Allied 
victory with a future overthrow of Franco; it was believed that the Western powers 
would not allow a fascist state in Spain to stand once Hitler and Mussolini had fallen. 
From the beginning, therefore, they fought alongside and in cooperation with the 
Allies, in the main through their secret services 241
As World War II began, the Catalan exile in France was still trying hard to 
organise itself. The German invasion of France in June 1940, however, stifled its 
development. The Vichy regime242, a dictatorship that banned political parties and
239 P.Preston, La politica de la venganza, (Barcelona, Penmula, 1997), pp. 107-108
240 For information on Spain’s decision to remain neutral see P. Preston Franco, (London, Harper 
Collins, 1993) p.533. G. Ciano, Diario, Maggio 1940, pp.291-293; Spanish ambassador in Rome to 
the Foreign Minister, 05-09-1939,1 document! diplomatici italiani, IX serie, 1939-1943, volum IX; 
AMAE, Guerre 1939-1945, Vichy, P.2420, Valence, 17-05-1941. For analysis of the influence of 
World War II on Spain, see J.L. Delgado editor., El primer franquismo, Espana durante la Segunda 
Guerra Mondial, (Madrid, S.XXI de Espana, editores, 1989) and R. Espinar Gallego, El impacto de 
la Segunda Guerra Mondial en Europa y en Espana, (Madrid, Asamblea de Madrid, 1986).
241Delgado., El primer franquismo, Espana durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial, ; Pi i Sunyer, Reports 
1939-1942, p.20.
242 For an explanation of the German invasion of France, see AT, Poblet, C459, Document 'An exile 
with no return'.
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unions, was installed by Marechal Petain,243 who declared himself head of the French 
government after the French defeat to the Germans in 1940 244 France signed an 
armistice with the Germans on 22 June in which it was divided into two parts: one 
occupied by the Germans and the other governed from Vichy.245 In the next chapter, 
the consequences of the German invasion of France for the exiled Catalan and Basque 
nationalists are explained. Facing a German invasion of France, a majority of the 
Catalans there had to flee the country to seek a new refuge or go back to Spain. Those 
remaining in France had fewer resources and faced even greater organisational 
obstacles. Some of them joined the French resistance fighting the Nazi invasion.246
2.6 CONCLUSION
The course of the Catalan exile to France, particularly the failure of political 
organisation, has been described in this chapter. Organising Catalan opposition to 
Franco was a Herculean task, made difficult by a combination of factors: the country 
was devastated both morally and economically after the Civil War, still fresh in the 
memory; fear of a new period of disorder, or another war, suppressed the appetite for 
renewed conflict or disorder; and with Catalonia now in the grip of severe Francoist 
repression, Catalan opposition, lacking in resources, was rather concerned with its own 
survival.
Wider Catalan society was divided between supporters of Francoism and anti- 
Francoist elements working secretly in Spain or in exile. This already apparent lack of 
unity was one of the chief reasons for the failure of Catalan opposition in the forties. 
The key parties of the period preceding the Civil War were weakened and had to 
reorganise. None emerged as a clear representative of Catalan nationalism. Some of 
the older Catalan parties, such as the Lliga, lost legitimacy, with some of their
243 Marshal Pdtain was a French statesman bom in 1856. In 1939, he was ambassador in Francoist 
Spain. In 1940, he became president of the Council of government, assumed in Vichy the functions of 
head of state and after meeting Hitler he founded a totalitarian state.
244 AT, Poblet, Box 459, TJn exili sense retom'; F. Vilanova, Les ruptures de Vany 39, (Barcelona, 
Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, 2000, p. 101).
245 AT, Poblet, Box 459, Document 'An exile with no return'; M.C. Raffaneau-Boj, Los campos de 
concentracidn de los refugiados espanoles en Francia (1939-1945), (Barcelona, Omega, 1995), p.227.
246 L. Sudrez, Espana, Franco y la Segunda Guerra Mundial, (Madrid, Actas ED., 1997), p. 200.
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members deciding to support Francoism. Not having a cohesive party to rally around 
caused uncertainty and lack of unity among Catalans.
A massive Catalan exodus to France through the Pyrenees took place. The 
French government allowed entry to what it regarded as legitimate refugees. Their 
situation in France, though, remained precarious, lacking an institutional framework, 
an adequate resource base, and being dependent on Basque and the Republican 
financial support.
The Catalan exiles in France suffered from communication problems, 
enormously diminishing their chances of achieving solidarity. The exiles spread first 
to the South of France, and then to Paris. No clear focal point emerged, with factions 
in Toulouse, Perpignan, and the capital. These scattered nuclei of power diminished 
Catalan strength. Communication with those more moderate Catalans who had chosen 
to remain in Catalonia proved difficult; disagreements soon arose between the two 
groups.
No clear Catalan leader emerged in this period. Lluis Companys, last president 
of the Generalitat and main figure of Catalan nationalism, was a refugee, and could no 
longer play an active role in politics, persecuted as he was by Francoist forces. 
Moreover, once Companys went into exile, the Generalitat had ceased to exist, leaving 
the movement without legitimate institutions of representation. Companys’ 
subsequent arrest by the Gestapo created a tremendous vacuum in Catalan nationalism 
that would take years to fill.
The most serious attempt to unite the forces in France was the creation of the 
FNC, which aimed to bring together the parties of the left. Its leaders were drawn 
from different parties, setting the scene for future leadership clashes, which, for a time, 
divided an already weak opposition further. The FNC was finally fused into a 
hegemonic and unified bloc, only to see its development stymied by the German 
invasion of France in June 1940. FNC activity focused on propaganda, information 
and a secret services network in order to provide support to the Allies. The Catalans in 
France also tried to develop cultural institutions in order to support their political 
demands and tried to establish institutions to provide assistance to those trying to 
escape Francoist persecution.
Relations between the Catalans and other groups in opposition to Franco failed to 
develop into a united front. The Catalans sought cooperation with others, particularly
the Basque nationalists, with whom they shared a historical plight. There was a 
comparable willingness to ally with the left wing opposition. Planned alliances, 
however, failed to get off the ground, due, in part, to differences in policy and in part to 
internal divisions. Communication among the anti-Francoist groups was ineffectual, 
hampered by a lack of resources and blighted by misunderstandings between the 
leaders. The opposition groups failed to present a united front. 247
The main form of collaboration between the Catalans and the Basque nationalists 
and Republicans was financial. The Catalans had suffered tremendous financial 
constraints since donating substantial resources to the republican side in the Civil War. 
In exile, they were dependent on the help of the Basque nationalists and of the SERE 
and the JARE. A final problem was the division and the lack of communication 
between Catalans based in France and those based in Catalonia.
247 H. Heine, La oposicidn; J. Tusell, Javier, La oposicion democratica al franquismo, (1939-1962), 
(Barcelona, Espejo de Espana, Planeta, 1977).
CHAPTER 3 - CATALAN OPPOSITION TO FRANCO FROM JULY 1940 TO 
AUGUST 1942: THE BRITISH EXILE
3.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides an account of the exodus of Catalans to the UK after the 
German invasion of France in 1940, and the rise and fall of the Consell Nacional de 
Catalunya (National Council of Catalonia or CNC), the principal Catalan organisation 
of the time. The period from July 1940 to August 1942 saw the UK become the centre 
for Catalan exiles. From Britain, though struggling to overcome communication 
problems and internal division, the CNC worked towards a goal of unity among the 
Catalans, gradually improving relations with the Basque nationalists and left wing 
groups. However, recurrent crises of leadership among the Catalans soon shattered 
any dreams of unification. Not accepting the British-based leadership, the members of 
ERC in France instead rallied support for Josep Ma, by default acting president of the 
Generalitat, de-legitimising Carles Pi i Sunyer’s claim to authority in London, and 
leading to the loss of legitimacy of the CNC in 1942. The developments of World War 
n, of course, provide the backdrop to developments within the Catalan opposition, and 
are described as such.
3.2 THE IMPACT OF THE GERMAN OCCUPATION OF FRANCE ON THE 
FRENCH EXILE
The German invasion of France had obvious consequences for the Catalans 
exiled there, who had been attempting to organise opposition from France since the 
end of the Civil War. Coming at a point in time when those exiled to France had 
adjusted to their situation and had begun to organise themselves more effectively, the 
invasion dealt them a severe blow. A number of the Catalans exiled in France were 
made prisoners or sent to concentration camps, while some joined the French 
resistance forces; this applied to Catalans in occupied and non-occupied France. Lluis 
Companys, for example, was arrested and sent to Barcelona.248
248 FPS, Xa tragedia dels refugiats a Franga', Ressorgiment, Buenos Aires, 06-1941; PS, Ressorgiment,
‘ News from Spanish exiled in France’, Buenos Aires, 1941.
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Apart from the survival problems for the Catalan refugees in France, further 
obstacles to their organisation were posed by Spanish police and Falangist agents 
operating within France. The persecution and censorship of the Francoist apparatus in 
France would only worsen when Francoist police would collaborate with the German 
Police. This German-Francoist police collaboration would obviously enlarge 
tremendously the capacity of manoeuvre of Francoist persecution, and enabled, for 
example, the capture of Companys and Aguirre by the Gestapo. When Companys was 
arrested in occupied France by the Gestapo, he was deported to Spain (first to Madrid, 
and then to Barcelona) by the Vichy government249 where he would be judged by a 
court martial. He was eventually executed by firing squad at 6.30am on 15 October 
1940 at the Castle of Montjui'ch. ‘His last words were “For my Catalonia!” 250 
Two unpublished letters were found in Enrique Varela’s personal archive, 
handwritten by president Companys just before he was condemned and sent to his 
death. Extracts from the Companys letters reveal that he showed great courage:
249 The Vichy regime was a fascist dictatorship that banned political parties and unions. It was installed 
by Marshal Pdtain and governed from 1940 to 1944 in the non-occupied zone of France.
250 AT, Poblet, Box 445, ‘L’execution du president de la Generalitat, Llufs Companys’ p.3.
'You know how much my wife worries me. I ask you to reassure her 
about my health and situation. It should be easy to find out if she is in 
Boulez-les-Pins or in Yuarry. (...) Please, do tell her that I now feel 
very well, in the Casde of Montjufch in a small room with a bed and a 
cupboard, toilet and shower and quite a lot of light I also have a little 
sitting room. I spend my days writing, reading and I receive excellent 
treatment. My brother visits me and takes care of me. No more could 
be expected in my case and I feel fine, I take care of myself and the 
hours go by without even my realising. Tell her to relax and take care of 
herself, her health is my life. Tell her to maintain serenity and health.
(...) Please, tell her to inform me of whatever news she has about our 
son, without lying to me. (...) I have no hope of finding him alive and 
have accepted the will of God in this case. Therefore, she can tell me 
the truth. (...) I only ask her to overcome her sad thoughts, take care of 
herself and to cheer up since this is how I want it and I repeat that I feel 
ok.'251
The memory of my children, the tragedy of my home...But this is mine 
and only mine and I keep it in my heart. Afterwards the rest... The 
prison of the Baule, the Sante of Paris, Second division, the condemned 
cell, eight days and en route.. .The streets, the life, freedom... I watch 
all those that pass, each one with its bit of freedom, with its bit of life.
That old man, that young man, a couple... Having been able to come 
here with my wife. Freedom. (...) But the car moves on quickly 
towards the prison. I feel very confused. That is it! Let’s go then 
towards that destiny!'252
After his death, Lluis Companys became a symbol and a hero for Catalan nationalism.
Yet his loss created a power vacuum that would take years to fill. The death of
251AV, C£diz, Secretaria particular del general Varela, Reserved sources, Lluis Companys, Letter of 
Companys to his wife sent through Urraca, from the Spanish Embassy in Paris, 08-10-1940.
252 H. Raguer, ‘El ultimo adids de Companys 1940’ in La Vanguardia, 23-05-1999.
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Companys decapitated Catalan nationalism and was one more example of Francoist 
cruelty.
Following the execution of Companys, in application of article 44 of the internal 
Statute, Josep Irla253, president of the parliament of Catalonia became - automatically 
and with full rights - interim President of the Generalitat.254 Irla stressed the necessity 
of collaborating with the Allies, with the Basque nationalists and other anti-Francoist 
opposition, on the basis that an alliance between these groups could end Francoist 
domination. On the other hand, Irla did not desire an alliance with the Communists. 
Instead, he wished to form a committee, in exile, that would unite all the Catalans in 
opposition.256 Other leaders challenged Irla’s presidency, since he had not been 
formally endowed with presidential power, and, from the outset, divisions arose 
amongst the Catalan leadership. This would prove a major obstacle to organising 
cohesive opposition to Franco. After Companys’s arrest, the leadership of the Catalans 
became vulnerable to clashes.
A majority of the Catalans residing in France decided to leave the country when 
the German forces invaded, their situation having become extremely precarious.
Whilst a contingent returned to Spain, many left France for Latin America (mainly 
Mexico and Argentina), as described in the next chapter, and many Communists went 
to Russia.257 Flight from the French mainland was unavoidable. The majority of 
exiled Catalans, though, moved to the UK, geographically the nearest country where 
they could expect to be accepted. For the political leadership, the most urgent concern
253 Josep Irla i Bosch was a politician. He was bom in Sant Feliu de Gufxols 1874 and died in Proven^a 
in 1958. In 1938, he was elected president of the Catalan Parliament, and again in 1940. He was 
elected president of the Generalitat in exile in France after the murder of Lluis Companys. He formed 
a govemment-in-exile formed by various Catalan politicians (1945-1948) and maintained the 
presidency until 1954 when he was succeeded by Josep Tarradellas.
254 AT, Poblet, Box 459, Document ‘An exile with no return’.
255 AT, Poblet, Box 460, Box 463, Box 467. These boxes include the letters of Irla and other political 
figures of the period such as Companys, Tarradellas and Pi i Sunyer. From them, we can derive Irla's 
ideology and policy.
256 Pere Bosch I Gimpera’s letter to Carles Pi i Sunyer, Oxford, 10-04-1940 in Viure el primer exili: 
Cartes britaniques de Pere Bosch I Gimpera 1939-1940, Quadems de I ‘arxiu Pi i Sunyer n.2, 
(Barcelona, Fundacid Carles Pi i Sunyer d’estudis autondmics I locals, 1993), p.61.
257 For information on the number of Catalans that left France after the German invasion in 1940, see 
M.C. Raffaneau-Boj, Los campos de concentracion de los rejugiados espanoles en Francia (1939- 
1945), (Barcelona, Omega, 1995), p.188; J.L. Delgado editor, El primer franquismo, Espana durante 
la Segunda Guerra Mundial, (Madrid, s.XXI de Espana, editores, 1989); R.Espinar Gallego, El 
impacto de la Segunda Guerra Mundial en Europa y en Espana, (Madrid, Asamblea de Madrid,
1986).
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was that its influence, direction, and even existence were directly threatened. The 
exodus left the UK as the last country in Europe where Catalan hopes for organisation 
held out, and duly became the centre for the Catalan exile.
33  THE IMPACT OF WWII ON THE BRITISH EXILE
World War II formed the backdrop to the Catalan exile in the UK.258 The 
Spanish had always been close to the Italians, reinforcing the fear that Spain would 
sooner or later enter a pact with the Axis powers. Such fears were not unwarranted.
A document from the Italian foreign office indicates their foundation: ‘Spain does not 
forget the generous help lent by Italy when it had to fight strongly for its own 
existence, and from that moment onwards its support to the Axis was irrevocably 
fixed.’259
Hitler rejected Franco’s services in the summer 1940 because he thought they 
were useless and the attempts that Franco would integrate to the Axis in the autumn 
1940 failed because Hitler did not want to pay a high price for it. Franco was always 
close to Hitler but more concerned about his survival than about Hitler’s. In 1941, 
Mussolini tried to convince Franco to join the Axis but Franco realised that Spain 
lacked resources and the economic strength to do so. Franco was even more careful to 
enter World War II when he realised it would last a long time. Franco became 
enthusiastic about the Axis again in June 1941 with the German invasion of Russia.
258 The Soviet Union joined the Allies on being invaded, coming as a tough blow to Hitler. In 
December 1941, Japan joined the Axis in World War II. If we take into account the inclusion of Japan 
on the Axis side, it is clear that World War II had achieved a global dimension. Paul Kennedy stated: 
“Hitler’s fateful decision to invade Russia in 1941 changed the entire dimensions of the conflict. The 
Russian counterattacks confirmed that the Germans were vulnerable. The Grand Alliance was 
superior in material terms. A bipolar world was just about to come.” P. Kennedy, The Rise and fall of 
the great powers, (London, Fontana press, 1988), p.442; Note. For the developments of World War II 
and the consequences for the Catalan opposition, see H. Heine, La oposicidn politica al franquismo, 
(Barcelona, Grijalbo, 1983), p.42. C. Pi i Sunyer, Reports 1939-1942, (Barcelona, Fundacid Carles Pi 
i Sunyer d'estudis autondmics i locals, edition per Francesc Vilanova, 1993), p.78.
259 AE, I documenti diplomatici italiani, IX serie, 1939-1943, Volum IX, L'incarato d'affari a Madrid, 
Fracassi, al ministro deli esteri, Ciano, Madrid, 08-09-1942. In another document, Italians also 
reiterate their faith in Spanish-Italians bonds of sympathy and co-operation. AE, IX Serie, 1939-1943, 
Volum IX, D capo dil govemo, Mussolini, al capo dello stato Spagnolo, Franco, Roma, 01-09-1942.
"I consider the Italo-Spanish friendship as a permanent directive of the Italian policy and as one of the 
essential bases of the new political order that Europe will have at the end of the war." L'ambasciattore 
in Spagna, Viola, al ministro degh esteri, Ciano, San Sebastiano, 29 Giugno 1939,1 documenti 
diplomatici italiani, IX Serie, 1939-1943, Volum IX; At this stage, Franco also asserted his sympathy 
for Hitler’s cause. APSG, letter from Franco to Hitler, 22-09-1940.
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Spanish neutrality in World War II was the fruit that Germany did not want or could 
not afford. From October 1944, Spain said they had always been close to the Axis as 
an anti-Soviet strategy.
A very significant milestone in terms of the Allies’ stance towards the 
international situation was the signing of the Atlantic Charter between 9 and 12 August 
1941, approved by the USSR and 14 other countries following a meeting between 
Winston Churchill, the British prime minister, and Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the 
American president. It marked a significant moment in the development of the 
international situation, with its implications for the Spanish situation in turn.261 It was 
based on the defence of the principles of self-determination and democracy.262 The 
Adantic Charter summarised the policy pillars of the Allies concerning the 
international situation. It stated that once World War II was over, the Allies would 
guarantee the free determination of all people, the territorial security and the access of 
all the states to international economic co-operation. The Atlantic Charter declared 
that the victorious countries would re-establish freedom in the cases where it had been 
taken away by fascism, even promising economic collaboration in these very cases.263 
Roosevelt sought ideological justification for the official entrance of the USA into 
World War n, which would come in December 1941. The Atlantic Charter was the 
first official document of the Allies explaining their war against Germany. The 
signing of the Atlantic Charter rekindled the hopes of the anti-Francoist opposition that 
help would come from abroad. The declaration was followed by inaction, however.264
3.4 EXODUS TO BRITAIN
After the German invasion of France, the Catalans chose to move to the UK as it 
was, next to France, the last democratic country in Europe that would welcome
260 AN, Artea, Euzko Deya, Ta carta del Atldntico y sus consecuencias para el pueblo vasco', 1946.
261 AT, Poblet, Box L7, M. Serra Moret, Ta carta de l'Atl&ntic'.
262 Aberasturi, De la derrota, p.699.
263 A document found in the Basque Nationalist Archive of Artea summarised the principles of the 
Atlantic Charter. AN, Artea, Euzko Deya, Paris, 30-04-1946. “The victorious countries declared in 
the Charter of the Atlantic as aims of the war the respect of the freedom of the liberated countries, and 
the re-establishment of this freedom in the cases where it had been taken away by fascism and also an 
economic collaboration for the improvement of their social well-being.”
264 AN, Artea, Euzko Deya, Paris, 30-04-1946.
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them.265 Moreover, some Catalans were already established in the UK, having sought 
refuge in earlier years from the Civil War. Some Catalan children had even been sent 
there in 1937. The presence eased the arrival of the newcomers, the main bulk of 
whom arrived after June 1940. Once again, they fled with few resources at their 
disposal. Their priorities were to establish contacts with the British authorities, to 
create a residence for intellectuals and writers in the UK, and to produce propaganda 
for the Catalan cause.267 Those Catalans already settled in the UK were predominantly 
intellectual and did not wield any real political power.
The Catalans organised several cultural activities in London, including the 
formation of the Casal Catala268 , which became the main meeting place of Catalan 
intellectuals in the UK.269 Cultural activity was important to ground the political goal 
of maintaining the Catalan language - which had been banned by Franco, and to 
promote and publicise the Catalan case around Europe 270 The following quote from a 
Catalan settled in the UK attests to the cultural significance of the Casal Catala of 
London:
265 It is very difficult to give an estimate of the number of Catalans who went into exile in Britain from 
France since there is no precise historical record. Having read several authors on the matter, my 
estimate would be that around 50,000 Catalans went to exile from France to Britain.
266 pi i Sunyer, Memdries de Vexili, Vol.I, pp.91-94;F. Vilanova, Les ruptures de I'any 39, p.35.
267 An example of an intellectual who settled in the UK and was trying to make anti-Francoist 
propaganda was Salvador de Madariaga. The following quote illustrates very clearly his anti- 
Francoist opinions. “General, please, leave. (...) Today you are talking about the neutrality of Spain. 
But Spain has never been neutral. Spain as a nation has always supported the Allies and Spain as a 
State, the Falange, has always been together with the Nazis and fascism. (...) At the beginning of 
August, the Blue Division reached Russia. On the 14 February 1942, you declared in front of an 
audience of military personnel that Germany was defending western civilisation. (...) General, please, 
leave! You have already compromised for too many the interests of the Spaniards!!! (...) The man 
who killed Companys, Zugazagoitia, Cruz Salido and many others cannot be in charge of the unity of 
Spain. You have oppressed Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque country. (...) Please, do at least one 
action in your life that the Spaniards would appreciate. General, please, leave!”AN, Artea, Salvador 
de Madariaga, 'General, Mdrchese usted!' London, 11-1944.
268 AN, Artea, PNV 82-5, 'En el Casal Catala, Didlogo con el senor Madariaga', 07-09-1942. One of the 
functions of the Casal Catala was to promote die intellectuals that were fighting against Francoism.
269 Amongst other things, the Casal Catala in London was a platform used to define and expand die 
Catalan ideological principles as the following quote shows: “The acceptance of the personality of 
Catalonia entails the acceptance of the principle of self-determination understood as the legitimate 
right of any human collective to decide for itself on its own destiny.” FPS, Box A2, TJna idea 
Nacional', Conference given in the Casal Catalk in London, 14-06-1942; FPS, Boxl6, Folder 565, 
letter from Wilfrid Roberts to Carles Pi i Sunyer, 17-03-1941. The letter shows several projects of 
development of Catalan culture in the UK.
270 Pi i Sunyer, Memdries de Vexili de Carles Pi i Sunyer, Vol. /, pp. 140-141. As Pi i Sunyer indicates, 
around 10.000 to 15.000 Catalans moved to die UK during this period.
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Together with the functions of help, we had to relate those of cultural 
character, for us even more important, since they implied the possible 
maintenance of the Catalan culture in exile. (...) Our aim was to show 
the British public opinion the demonstration of the spirit, the culture and 
the art of Catalonia. (...) Another group of acts that mobilised an 
enormous number of people was a series of conferences that were given 
in the Casal Catalh, about Catalan culture/271 
Carles Pi i Sunyer272, Pere Bosch i Gimpera273, Josep Trueta274 and Josep Maria 
Batista i Roca 275 were the main Catalan figures in the UK. When Carles Pi i Sunyer 
arrived in the UK, he found he had the support of Pere Bosch i Gimpera and Josep 
Maria Batista I Roca.276 Both had been living in the UK prior to the outbreak of World 
WarH.277
Bosch i Gimpera was mainly an academic.278 He represented the example of an 
intellectual who played a part in politics. He was a professor and the dean of a 
University. He was a left-wing moderate Catalan from Accio Catalana Republicana, 
who believed in the wider educational value of politics and concerned himself 
extensively with the principles and pursuit of justice. Whilst he was involved in
271 FPS, Box 20, Folder 681, letters from J. Ventura I Sureda to Carles Pi i Sunyer, 14-03-1942.
272 Carles Pi i Sunyer was bom in Barcelona in 1888 and died in 1971. He was an engineer, counsellor 
of the Catalan government during the Civil War, and Mayor of Barcelona (1934 and 1936-1937) and 
minister of the republican government (1933). He joined the exodus to France in February 1939. His 
political activity was carried on between London and Paris. He spent the last sixteen years of his life 
in Venezuela. Pi i Sunyer considered that the republic did not exist, and that Catalonia and Euzkadi 
had to be formed in the European framework. He was a federalist. Pi i Sunyer escaped to France in 
1939, sent by Companys to act as the main representative of Catalan politics in the UK.
273 Pere Bosch i Gimpera was bom in Barcelona in 1891. He was a historian who led the Universitat 
Autdnoma de Barcelona (1933-1939) and justice counsellor of the Generalitat (1937-1939). He went 
into exile to the UK in 1939 where he was a teacher in Oxford and then went into exile to Mexico in 
1941.
274 Josep Trueta was bom in Barcelona in 1897 and died inl977. He was doctor of medicine in 1921. In 
1939, he went into exile to the UK, where he formed part of the CNC from its constitution in 1940.
He became Doctor Honoris Causa in Oxford.
275 Josep Maria Batista i Roca was bom in Barcelona in 1895. He was a historian and a politician. He 
was justice advisor during the Civil War. He was exiled to the UK in 1939. He was a teacher of 
history in Cambridge and secretary of the CNC.
276 FPS, Box3, Folder 100, letter from Bosch i Gimpera to Pi i Sunyer, 03-09-1939; FPS, Box 5, Folder 
369, correspondence between Batista i Roca and Pi i Sunyer. The experience and contacts of Bosch i 
Gimpera and Batista i Roca in the UK proved very useful for Pi i Sunyer who had just landed in the 
British Islands.
277 PRO, FO 371/24527, Batista i Roca, London, 02-05-1940.
278 F. Vilanova, "El futur d"Europa: les reflexions federalistes de Carles Pi i Sunyer al Londres de la 
Segona Guerra Mundial", p.6.
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politics (1937-1940), he felt far from the populism of ERC; on the other hand, he 
supported Pi i Sunyer who was also affiliated to ERC.279
Josep Maria Batista i Roca came from the tradition of radical nationalism.
Batista i Roca represented the sort of radical nationalism associated with for example, 
Estat Catala, but without having any concrete political affiliation. As was the case 
with Josep Trueta, Batista i Roca rejected the Catalan republicanism of ERC 281 As 
was also the case with Trueta, Batista i Roca was anti-Communist but even more 
radical in his ideology. Batista i Roca believed in the Pai'sos Catalans and in the 
Western Union. He was anti-Communist and anti-federal. Trueta was a more 
conservative Catalan. His Catalan nationalism oscillated between the politics of Accio 
Catalana and the more leftist segments of the Lliga. He was ideologically conservative 
and rejected the left-wing populism of ERC and its allies and the ideology of 
Companys. It could be argued that Pi i Sunyer was in a sense following the lines of the 
Labour party in the UK, whereas Trueta’s politics rather resembled those of the 
Conservative Party. He was a Catalan Republican, a federalist and a social 
democrat.282 He represented a Catalan left-wing republicanism that was dominant 
between 1931 and 1936, and was supported by a section of the middle classes, liberal 
professionals and popular Catalan segments of society.283 Pi i Sunyer defended 
federalism, social progress and believed in the institutionalisation of Catalan culture.284
279 Bosch i Gimpera i Pi i Sunyer, Cartes de Bosch i Gimpera i Carles Pi i Sunyer, (Barcelona, Fundacid 
Pi i Sunyer, 2004); AT, Poblet, Box G3, T)es de Londres-Com una veu que ens airibds de lluny". 
Article that summarised Pi i Sunyer "s ideology in the UK; AT, Poblet, Box G3, "Els Catalans a 
l'exili". Article by Pi i Sunyer that summarised the situation of the Catalans in exile, particularly, in 
the UK.
280 F. Vilanova, "El futur d"Europa: les reflexions federalistes de Carles Pi i Sunyer al Londres de la 
Segona Guerra Mundial", p.7.
281 PRO FO 371/31266A, 10-02-1942, letter from Batista i Roca to Lord Wedgwood (House of Lords) in 
which Batista i Roca defended the Catalan cause.
282 AT, Poblet, Box E4, Carles Pi i Sunyer, Ta imatge de Catalunya" and AT, Poblet, Box E4, Carles Pi i 
Sunyer, T a significacio del moment".
283 Pi i Sunyer explained his policy and ideological principles to Aguirre in the following documents. 
FPS, Box 1, Folder 12, letter from C. Pi i Sunyer to J.A. Aguirre, London, 28-10-1941; “This letter 
sets the principle of self- determination as the main condition for the peace of the Catalan people.”
AT, Poblet, Box G3, letter from C. Pi i Sunyer to Diego Martinez Barrio, London, 18 August 1941; 
“The establishment of a peninsular democratic regime has to be mainly supported on Euzkadi and 
Catalonia and can not be viable without the recognition of their personality and their rights, mainly 
their right to self-determination. Both Catalonia and Euzkadi through history have been nationalists 
with their own ethnic unity, own language, own social structure, judicial structure and an autonomous 
culture.” FPS, Box A2, Carles Pi i Sunyer"s writings, "Una guerra actual..." (Londres), 1940.
284 Author’s interview with Francesc Vilanova, Barcelona, January 2001.
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His arrival in 1939 formalised relations between the Catalans and the British.285 The 
main Catalan leaders in the UK shared some ideas: the defence of the national rights of 
Catalonia, freedom and democracy, and the re-establishment of a republic.286
Pi i Sunyer and Batista i Roca formed the Consell Nacional de Catalunya 
(Catalan National Council or CNC) on 25 July 1940 in London, which became the 
main Catalan organisation in the UK in this period.287 The CNC would later on try to 
unite all Catalans. Batista i Roca explained the formation of the CNC:
The Catalan delegation in London has the honour of informing His 
Majesty’s government that the leadership of Catalan affairs has been 
reconstituted as the Catalan National Council. Since the French 
collapse, the members of the Catalan government resident in France 
who along with those residents in Great Britain were responsible for the 
conduct of Catalan affairs find themselves no longer free to carry on 
their duties. These duties have therefore fallen wholly upon the 
Catalans resident in Great Britain, as the only Catalans in Europe who 
find themselves in a free country and as representatives of Catalans all 
over the world/288
Carles Pi i Sunyer became president of the CNC by a majority decision of its members. 
He described his appointment in the following way: ‘It was proposed that I should 
preside over the CNC and the other members would be Bosch i Gimpera, Batista I 
Roca, Josep Trueta, Ramon Perera and Fermi Verges. The proposal was approved by 
the majority.’289
Pi i Sunyer arrived in London in April 1939, sent by Companys to act as the 
main representative of Catalan politics in the UK. His mission was to create a
285 Carles Pi i Sunyer, Viure el primer exili: Cartes britaniques de Pere Bosch i Gimpera (1939-1940), 
(Barcelona, Fundacid Carles Pi i Sunyer d'estudis autondmics i locals, 1998), pp.7-11; Aberasturi, De 
la derrota, pp.313-314; Pi i Sunyer, Memdries de I 'exili, Vol.1,, pp.8-9.
286 F. Vilanova, "El futur dTuropa: les reflexions federalistes de Carles Pi i Sunyer al Londres de la 
Segona Guerra Mundial", p.5.
287 FPS, Box D5, "Declaracid oficial del Consell Nacional de Londres", London, 01-07-1941; For 
information on the main representatives of the CNC see also FPS, Box D5, "Consell Nacional de 
Catalunya".
288 PRO, File FO 371/24527, Batista I Roca"s document on the formation of the CNC, London, 05-09- 
1940.
289 Pi i Sunyer, Memdries de l'exili, Vol.1., pp-44-45. Ramon Perera was a democratic Socialist from 
the Socialist Union of Catalonia. Fermi Verges was a member of ERC. FPS, Box 15, Folder 500, 
letters between Carles Pi i Sunyer and Ramon Perera.
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delegation of the presidency of the Generalitat in the UK with two objectives: in 
political terms, to monitor the evolution of international affairs, to establish contacts 
with British civil servants, and to try to play such few cards as the Catalan exile could 
muster in the future of Europe; and on cultural grounds, to strive to create a stable 
focus of writers, intellectuals and Catalan artists in the British Isles. Pi i Sunyer 
appeared to have the support of many of his Catalan peers.
Confusion over the succession of the ERC’s Josep Irla, however, after 
Companys’s death, led to a major clash of leadership among Catalans. Many Catalans 
followed the policy of Pi i Sunyer, even though Josep Irla was the de facto president of 
the Generalitat after Companys. This leadership clash was an obstacle for the 
development of Catalan nationalism.290
CNC policy was based on defence of the interests of the Catalan people;291 Pi i 
Sunyer was against the policy of ERC, namely the policy that defended the recovery of 
the republican legality and the second republic.292 Pi i Sunyer would radicalise its 
manifesto. ERC followed the Catalan statute, whereas the most radical wing of the 
leaders of the CNC would seek complete independence for Catalonia. Pi i Sunyer 
claimed total independence for Catalonia.293 The CNC emphasised democracy and 
liberalism, reasserting the Catalan right of self-determination and attempting to 
maintain the Catalan democratic tradition.294 Pi i Sunyer’s letter to Diego Martmez 
Barrio , the Republican politician, in 1941 summarised his ideology. The letter had
290 FPS, Box 20, Folder 666, letter from Josep Trueta to Carles Pi i Sunyer, 05-08-1940; Ta Guerra des 
de Londres' in C. Pi i Sunyer, Articles per al ministeri d'informacid britanic (1940-1941), 
(Barcelona, Fundacid Carles Pi i Sunyer d'estudis autondmics i locals, edicid a cura de F. Vilanova, 
1996), p.12; F. Vilanova, Les ruptures de Vany 39, p.40; Author’s interview with Josep Benet, 
November 2001, Barcelona.
291 FPS, Box D5, Consell Nacional de Londres, London, 08-1940.
292 F. Vilanova, T1 futur dTuropa: les reflexions federalistes de Carles Pi i Sunyer al Londres de la 
Segona Guerra Mundial', p. 13
293 Pi i Sunyer, Reports 1939-1942,, p.26; FPS, Box 1, Folder 12, letter from C. Pi i Sunyer to J.A. 
Aguirre, London, 28-10-1941; Poblet, Box G3, letter from C. Pi i Sunyer to Diego Martmez Barrio, 
London, 18 August 1941; Pi i Sunyer, Memdries de l'exili, Vol.1, p.172; FPS; Box D5, Consell 
Nacional Catalk, 'Declaracid', autumn 1943; FPS, Box A2, Carles Pi i Sunyer's writings, "Una guerra 
actual..." (Londres), 1940.
294 FPS, Box A2, TJna idea Nacional', Conference given in the Casal Catal& in London, 14-06-1942; Pi 
i Sunyer, Reports 1939-1942,, pp.91-94.
295 Diego Martinez Barrio was bom in Sevilla in 1883 and died in Paris in 1962. He was a politician. 
Originally, he was the political partner of Alejandro Lerroux but later on he founded the party Unidn 
Republicana with which he participated in the elections of February 1936. He was in charge of the 
presidency of the Generalitat in 1936. In 1945, he became president of the republic in exile.
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an enormous impact in the political circles of the exile. In this letter, published in 
Mexico, Pi i Sunyer introduced the political project that he would defend, on 
institutional grounds, through the CNC in London, based on the non-automatic 
acceptance of the republican regime in 1932, the overcoming of the legal framework, 
defined by the constitution of 1931 and the statute of 1932, the design of a new 
peninsular reality, formed by a federal structure and by the exercise of the right of self- 
determination in Catalonia.296
Pi i Sunyer added content to this political programme. He gave an important 
nationalist speech at the CNC, based on a federalist vision of Europe.297 The doctrine 
of federalism was advocated by Pi i Sunyer and was formed largely in 1941; it was 
closely associated with a concept of Europeanism. Pi i Sunyer claimed: ‘Catalonia is 
Europe and the main problems affecting Catalonia are the European ones.’298 Pi i 
Sunyer went so far as to endorse the idea of an Iberian confederation wherein the 
sovereignty of Catalonia, Galicia and Euzkadi would be fully recognised:299 ‘The 
creation of a Confederation of Hispanic Nations would totally ensure the establishment 
of a democratic regime and would shape the ideal for which many generations of 
Catalans have fought.’300
The CNC was considered a delegation of the Generalitat in the UK, and, with the 
collapse of organisation in France, was the most important organisation of Catalan 
nationalism of this period. Two things were clear from the beginning of the CNC.
First of all, the organisation was temporarily to assume the leadership of the Catalan 
exiles due to the incapacity of those in France. The CNC explicitly stated that it was a 
provisional substitute for the legitimate authorities; it never expected to replace them 
but was simply acting in the interim while the legitimate democratic institutions 
remained paralysed:
296 FS, letter from Pi i Sunyer to Martmez Barrio, 1941; AT, Poblet, Box G3.
297C. Pi i Sunyer, Vuit escrits de l'exili (1939-1941), (Barcelona, Fundacid Carles Pi i Sunyer d'estudis 
autondmics i locals, edition de Francesc Vilanova, 1992), p.l 1. F. Vilanova I Vila-Abadal, 'EY futur 
d'Europa: les reflexions federalistes de Carles Pi i Sunyer al Londres de la Segona Guerra Mundial', 
(Barcelona, Fundacid Carles Pi i Sunyer, 2000).
298 FPS, Box 1, Folder 5, Pi i Sunyer's letter.
299 Pi i Sunyer, Memdries de l'exili, Vol.1. ; FPS, Box A2, Pi i Sunyer's document of Europeanism, 'Mds 
val tenir rad que guanyar' (Londres), 1939-1940.
300 FPS, Box D5, Projecte del CNC referent al Consell Assessor', summer 1944.
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Trom its constitution onwards, the CNC declared that its main purpose was to 
create a provisional organisation, but representative of the Catalan personality 
and that would be a link for all the Catalans around the world. The CNC never 
wanted to substitute the legitimate institutions that our people democratically 
give, and that represent the political continuity of the national will/301 
Secondly, the CNC was intended to ensure constitutional continuity. This continuity 
was embodied in the presence of two ex-members of the Generalitat, Pi i Sunyer and 
Bosch i Gimpera. Both of them were well connected in the UK.302
The CNC wished to maintain the Catalan democratic tradition, as has been 
described. It was to become an umbrella body which encompassed and co-ordinated 
the efforts of all Catalans, helping those in France to leave the country, overseeing the 
Catalans in America, and becoming a core organisation for them, and aiding the Allies 
in their war effort.303 The CNC also helped some Catalans to leave France for the 
UK, and sought help from British political leaders for the Basque, Catalan and 
republican exiles there, in order to save them from being killed or persecuted by the 
Gestapo. A letter from the Catalan Committee in the UK in August of 1940 indicates 
that securing safe passage for the refugees in France figured among its objectives:
‘We fully support the Catalans suffering Francoist repression. (...) One of the 
missions to be accomplished by the CNC is the following: it will allow the exit from 
France to as many Catalans as possible.’304
The CNC obtained considerable support from the Catalan comunitats 
(communities) in Latin America, a federation of Catalan entities located in each of the 
countries with a Catalan presence. The comunitats in Latin America enjoyed 
independence in their activity but ultimately reported to the CNC. Relations between 
the UK and Latin American contingents are discussed in the next chapter.
The existence of the CNC made sense as long as hope persisted that an Allied 
victory in World War II would entail the overthrow of Franco. The CNC was truly
301 FPS, Box D5, Declaracid del Consell Nacional en donar-se per dissolt", 1945.
302 F.Vilanova, Les ruptures de Vany 39, pp.37-39.
303 FPS, Box D5, 'Bases per a una organitzacid dels Catalans pel mdn', CNC's report, signed by C. Pi i 
Sunyer and Batista i Roca, London, 01-07-1941; C. Pi i Sunyer, Memdries de l'exili, Vol.1. , pp.66- 
68.
304 FPS, Box D 5,01-08-1940, letter from the Catalan Committee in the UK.
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committed in offering unconditional support to the Allied powers, as Batista i Roca 
stated in 1940: ‘You may rest assured that whatever the conditions in the peninsula and 
the Mediterranean might be, the Catalans will continue to be emphatically in sympathy 
with the Allies and their cause.’305
Catalans showed a particular admiration for the British, who they believed would 
help them enormously in their fight against Franco.306 A document found in the British 
Foreign Archives claims: ‘The Catalans and Basques peoples, through their London 
delegations, have been privileged to confirm the bonds of sympathy and friendship by 
which they have always felt themselves united to Great Britain, particularly now, in 
time of war.’307
Overall, the period 1940-1942 was the CNC’s most successful. However, even 
at this stage, the CNC faced a number of key problems. Communication was difficult 
and resources were extremely tight.308 Moreover, internal leadership clashes, clashes 
between the nuclei of power and the provisional status of the organisation posed 
serious problems for its legitimacy.309 Communication problems, mainly affecting 
communications with America, resulted from the large distances involved, and the 
organisation of the spokesmen of the CNC. Ultimately, these proved difficult issues 
to resolve. The problem was ameliorated through the sending of letters, though this 
was a very slow process. 310 Another fundamental problem afflicting the CNC was 
internal problems of leadership. As many Catalan leaders had been persecuted or were 
in exile, it was very difficult to give legitimacy to surrogate figures to represent the 
CNC in other countries. Catalan leaders were spread around the world and were often 
isolated from one another. There were also ideological differences, not only between 
those in France and those in the UK, but also among the CNC leaders in the UK. The 
unity of the CNC was based on a vision of a future federal and democratic Spain. 
However, these were confusing concepts. Pi i Sunyer and Batista i Roca did not get 
along and were ultimately fighting for the Catalan lead in British territory. Batista i
305 PRO FILE 371/24527, Batista I Roca, London, 02-05-1940.
306 Pi i Sunyer, Reports 1939-1942, ,  p.81; F.Vilanova, Les ruptures de I'any 39, p.40
307 PRO, FO 371/24527, Lord Halifax document, Madrid, 01-05-1940.
308 FPS, Box A2, ‘On Catalan identity’, London.
309 FPS, Box A2, Una idea Nacional- Conferencia donada al Casal Catalzi de Londres el 14 de juny de 
1942’.
310 F.Vilanova, Les ruptures de I'any 39, pp.42-43.
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Roca claimed that he had been in the UK for a longer time whereas Pi i Sunyer 
claimed that he was the delegate of Companys and had more popular support. Batista i 
Roca was more radical in his Catalan ideology than Pi i Sunyer And the ideological 
differences between them affected the cohesion of the CNC for the worse, both in 
Europe and in the comunitats in America. The credibility of the CNC became much 
more fragile.311
Apart from the personal clashes between Catalans in France and those settled in 
the UK, it has to be pointed out that those Catalans were also affected by the historical 
circumstances of France and the UK, which determined their capacity to organise. For 
instance, France was invaded by the Germans whereas the UK was not.
The FNC worked in France and Catalonia. It was a left wing platform which 
faced enormous Francoist repression. The FNC sought for Catalan self-determination 
and the creation of a confederation of states.
Thus, in addition, there were clear differences between those Catalans in the UK 
and those in France; the latter did not accept the leadership of the British group. The 
German occupation of France and the exodus to the UK added another nucleus of 
Catalan power, in addition to Spain and France. The three would fight for pre­
eminence. There was also inconsistency of policy aims among the Catalans. Whilst 
the FNC was united around the figure of Companys and the Generalitat, the CNC was 
based on the rejection of the republican constitution of 1931 and on the rejection of the 
statute of 1932 (accepted by the Generalitat), which claimed total independence for 
Catalonia. Evidently, the failure of the French exile had encouraged a certain 
radicalisation of the view of the CNC since the consensual and statutory policy of the 
FNC in France had evidently come to nothing. It might also be argued that the CNC 
radicalised because it seemed that a new post-World War II Europe would make 
anything possible within the framework of a federal constitution.
The political differences between the FNC and the CNC were essentially the 
same differences that separated the European left "in arms "(with its idea of a new 
egalitarian social Europe) from the (largely) Anglo-American preference for a much 
more conservative World War II "settlement". By this reckoning, of course, the FNC
311 F.Vilanova, Les ruptures de I'any 3 9 , p.47.
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was far more "radical' than the CNC. Indeed the CNC's rejection of the 1931 
Republican constitution and the 1932 Catalan statute was precisely because of the 
CNC's underlying conservatism.
At a meeting of all the leaders of the ERC in Nunes in 1941, Josep Irla, Joan 
Sauret312 and Miquel Santalo313 discussed how the power of the UK-based CNC might 
be neutralised. The agreed strategy was to send Santalo to Mexico, endowing him 
with the powers of president Irla; Pi i Sunyer lost legitimacy since the CNC of the UK 
was formed on the grounds that Irla was not able to exercise his power. The leadership 
of the Catalan opposition could not agree who should represent the movement, in 
terms of place or person, tremendously diminishing its legitimacy and effectiveness. 
The Communists also tried to neutralise the power of the CNC314, firstly through the 
letters of Joan Comorera, the main Communist leader, and afterwards in 1941, through 
a long document in which the CNC’s policy was presented as more or less amounting 
to fascism.315
A final problem haunting Catalan nationalism in the UK was the financial 
question. The evacuation from France to the UK was organised by the SERE and the 
JARE, the two Republican financial organisations that had organised the French exile 
in the first place. Catalan diplomacy with both institutions was crucial due to the 
rivalry between them and because financial help from both was a fundamental 
necessity. The SERE gave much needed aid in paying the refugee boats from Europe 
to North America as did the JARE, through its Catalan president, Lluis Nicolau 
d’Olwer.316 Notwithstanding the Republican help, the Catalans never fully resolved 
their financial problems.
312 Joan Sauret was bom in Balaguer in 1899. He was a politician and a journalist He was part of the 
board of ERC and went into exile to France.
313 Miquel Santald was bom in Vilaur in 1887. He was a politician, and a counsellor to the Generalitat 
(1933-1934). In 1938, he became a member of die board of ERC and went into exile in 1939.
314 FPS, Box D5, Dbjeccions que el comitfe central del PSUC fa al document adregat al govern angles 
per l'anomenat CNC'.
315 F.Vilanova, Les ruptures de I'any 39, p.45.
316 FPS, Box 14, Folder 443, letter from Salvador Mitj& to Carles Pi i Sunyer that illustrates the help 
obtained by Catalans from the JARE in the UK.
317 Pi i Sunyer, Memdries de l'exili, Vol.1.,, pp.24-25.
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3.5 CATALAN EXTERNAL RELATIONS
In the UK, the Catalans maintained the closest relations with the Basque 
nationalists. With the Nazi occupation of France, some Basques nationalists went back 
to the Basque country. The Germans persecuted those who stayed in France, and some 
were sent to concentration camps such as Gurs. Only a very few Basques were 
tempted to co-operate with the Nazis. Some Basques stayed in France to join the 
resistance, whilst some went to Latin America and the USA, and some to the UK. 
Basque government institutions were closed down, along with the newspaper Euzko- 
Naia. Thus, the Francoist censorship attacked the Basque nationalists as much as they 
did the Catalans. The PNV created secret networks of information for the Allies, 
participated in various anti-Nazi activities and joined with the French resistance. 
Though German forces captured Jose Antonio Aguirre, the main leader of Basque 
nationalism, he managed to escape. On 27 August 1941, the Aguirre family arrived in 
Rio de Janeiro.
The centre of Basque nationalism in this period shifted from France to the UK, as 
was the case with the Catalans. Similarly, by the time of the arrival of refugees in the 
UK, a small Basque community had already been established there. Like the Catalans, 
the Basques asked for help from British political leaders to help save those Basques 
trapped in occupied France. Jose Ignacio de Lizaso318, the chief of the Basque 
delegation in London, who claimed independence for Euzkadi319, asked for help from 
the British authorities, informing them of the danger to the Basques in France:
‘I have therefore to ask you if you would consider the possibility evacuating 
these men from France and granting them permission either to reside in 
England or to enter British territory on their way to one of the South American 
Republics, which admit Basques without difficulty.’320
318 Josd Ignacio de Lizaso was a leader of the PNV settled in London who formed part of the Basque 
nationalist delegation in the UK; he worked very close to Manuel de Irujo and had a close relationship 
with Pi i Sunyer and Bosch i Gimpera.
319 PRO FO 371/31266A, letter from J.K. Roberts to Williams about military organisation. Lizaso 
mentioned as main Basque nationalist leader with which the British dealt
320 PRO, File FO 371/ 24527, letter Lizaso to Halifax on exile in the UK, London, 19-06-1940.
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So the Basques, like the Catalans, sought protection and help from the Allies. The 
Basques signed an agreement with Charles De Gaulle321 (leader of the French 
resistance against the Nazis), the Franco-Basque pact322, by which De Gaulle would 
recognise the Basque government and committed help to free those Basques 
imprisoned in France. The pact was intended to instigate collaboration between the 
two countries and facilitate co-operation on information, press and propaganda.323
The Basque nationalists created the Consejo Nacional Vasco (Basque National 
Council or BNC) on 11 July 1940 in London324, under the leadership of Manuel de 
Irujo (minister of the republic and nationalist deputy) who was the principal PNV 
leader in the UK. Irujo fought for an independent Basque country. He was a 
member of the PNV and part of the most radical and pro-independent wing of the 
party. Once in London, he did not hesitate to impose his policy on the party. Pi i 
Sunyer, also from London, protested a similar policy.328 The main purpose of the BNC 
was to maintain the policy pursued by the Basque government, which was to support 
the cause of democracy, alongside the Allied powers329 and to achieve the Basque 
national aspiration of freedom through independence.330 The BNC was a temporary 
measure until Aguirre resumed his functions.331
Another objective of the BNC was to widen the networks of the Basque secret 
services and put them at the service of the UK and France, in effect, to offer their help
321 Charles De Gaulle was bom in Lille in 1890. He was a military and a French statesman. He 
organised a movement against Pdtain, to free France from the German invasion in 1940 from the UK  
He marched into Paris victoriously in 1944.
322 PRO F0371/26943, Major Younger to Mr. Loxley, London, 27-11-1941. The document includes a 
summary of the Franco-Basque pact which was drawn up on 17-05-1941.
323 PRO, FO, Escarra, De Gaulle and Basque delegation, Political organisation, London, 15-03-1941.
324 PRO FO 371/24527, London, 18-07-1940, Formation of the Basque national council.
325 Manuel de Irujo was bom in Estella in 1891. He was a Basque nationalist politician and leader of the 
PNV. Irujo had served in NegrnTs first Republican wartime cabinet as minister of Justice.
326 FPS, Boxl 1, Folder 351, London, 29-06-1940, letter from Irujo to Pi i Sunyer explaining some of the 
contacts made between the Catalans and the Basque nationalists in the UK.
327 Beltza, El nacionalismo vasco en el exilio-1937-1960, (San Sebastian, Thertoa, 1977) p.309; FPS,
Box 11, Folder 351, letter from Irujo to C. Pi i Sunyer, London, 29-06-1940.
328 H. Heine, La oposicion antifranquista, (Barcelona, Grijalbo, 1983), ch.6.
329 AN, Artea, EBB 117-2,21-11-1942, Excelsior, Josd Antonio Aguirre, Las democracias saldrdn 
victoriosas'.
330 For an explanation of the policy aims of the BNC, see PRO File FO 371/26943, Lizaso to Eden, 
London. “The Basque National council aims at attaining the full national liberty of the government 
established in Gemika in Oct.36 and recognition of it by all nations.”
331 PRO, FILE FO 371-26943, London, Major Younger to Mr. Loxley, summary of Lizaso to Aguirre of 
the activities of the Basque delegation, 27-11-1941.
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to the Allies much as the Catalans had done. The Basque delegation in the UK 
claimed:
‘The Basque government is anxious to assist Great Britain and France in 
every way in their fight to free Europe. We have already offered the 
services of our nationals outside the Peninsula to the British and French 
governments and are gratified to see that these services are already 
being used in certain directions. We feel that one of our most useful 
functions would be to provide a full service of political and military 
information from the Peninsula. (...) The service has now been fully 
organised.’332
The Basque nationalists, like the Catalan nationalists, believed that the Allies 
would provide support to their cause:
‘The BNC acclaim the great charter of freedom, peace and democratic 
solidarity formulated by the president of USA and the British prime minister, 
as an expression of their countries future policy and offer all the support within 
the power of the Basque people to bring about the victory which is essential to 
the full realization of this policy. It is their firm belief that the two great 
democracies and their allies, when rebuilding the world after the final 
destruction of the Nazi tyranny, will respect the national right of the Basque 
people to choose the form of government under which they will live, and will 
restore to them their sovereign rights and self-government.’333 
The BNC was also in charge of assistance for Basque exiles. Like its Catalan 
counterpart, the BNC faced a number of problems in its organisation. There were 
leadership clashes in the UK. Irujo was the leader of Basque nationalism in London, 
but Ortuzar, another Basque nationalist leader settled in the UK, remained closest to 
the Foreign Office; the two men disagreed over the leadership of the movement in the 
UK. The leadership clashes between Ortuzar, Irujo and Lizaso are comparable to the 
leadership clashes between Pi i Sunyer, Batista i Roca and Bosch i Gimpera in the UK.
332 PRO File FO 930-148, Basque delegation offering its services to the British exile to UK, London, 13- 
09-1939.
333 PRO File FO 371/26943, Lizaso to Eden, London, 21-08-1941; Artea, EBB 122-6, note presented by 
J. I. de Lizaso, Delegate of the Basques in London to His Excellency Viscount Halifax, 18-07-1940; 
PRO, Yorkshire Post, 'Basque political organisation', Leeds, 22-04-1941.
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Communication problems were similar in both Basque and Catalan cases, and the fight 
for political leadership between groups is also comparable. Furthermore, as was the 
case for the Catalans, the leadership of the British-based Basques was not accepted by 
those in France. The Basque natioanlists wanted to maintain cordial relations with the 
Catalan nationalists and the Republicans, but were sceptical of whether the left forces 
of opposition would accept the sovereignty of the Basque country as a fundamental 
condition of their claims.334
With the defeat of France, the dispersion of many Basque nationalist leaders, and 
the loss of Aguirre, the Basque nationalists were demoralised; their administrative 
machinery and political framework had been completely destroyed. Though starting 
from a stronger position than the Catalans -  with a single, unified party and clear 
leadership, and having managed, at first, to keep alive their governmental institutions -  
Francoist repression had gradually taken its toll. Intense political crisis followed 
among the Basque nationalists, just as it had among the Catalans.336
The Basques and Catalans in exile in the UK had similar experiences. The BNC 
and the CNC were similar in many ways.337 Both were established by leaders acting 
instead of the heads of their respective governments: Irujo and Pi i Sunyer338 replaced
' J 'J Q
Aguirre and Companys. The UK served as the base of operations for both camps, 
which collaborated to help exiles and prisoners.340 Both tried to collaborate with the 
Allies, to maintain democratic institutions, cultural activity and regionalist aspirations,
334 PRO, File FO 371/26943, Major Younger to Mr. Loxley, 27-11-1941.
335 AN, Artea, EBB 26-2.
336 The following letter explained the difficult situation of Basques in France and expressed the desire of 
obtaining help from the British in order to help the Basque refugees let in French territory. PRO, File 
FO 371724527,19-06-1940, London, letter Lizaso to Halifax and in PRO, FILE CAB 118/16, letter 
from Lizaso to Attlee, London, 15-11-1939; PRO FO 371/26943, letter Lizaso to Eden, 29-01-1941.
337 hi order to follow up on the contacts between the CNC and the BNC in the UK, see PRO FILE FO 
371/26943,27/11/1941, London, major younger to Mr. Loxley, Summary of Lizaso to Aguirre of the 
activities of the Basque delegation .“Soon after the constitution of the Basque delegation the Catalans 
also set up a national council in London and the Basques maintained close relations with the Catalans 
on the grounds that both parties were seeking the same recognition from the British government”; 
FPS, Box D5, Batista i Roca, 1941, Declaracid conjunta del CNC i del BNC'.
338 FPS, Box 11, Folder 351, letters between Manuel de Irujo and Carles Pi i Sunyer.
339 One example of die common declaration of Basques and Catalans in the UK can be found in FPS, 
Box D5, Declaration of J. A. Aguirre and C. Pi i Sunyer, London, 1942.
340 It has to be noted, however, that the relations between Pi i Sunyer and Aguirre were quite fluent 
judging from the correspondence between them compiled in FPS, Box 1, Folder 12. Both were 
leaders of their respective regionalist movement for a period and shared their projects and ideologies 
even if their leadership was contested by other Catalan and Basque nationalist leaders.
102
and both organisations had a provisional nature.341 The common declaration by 
Aguirre and Pi i Sunyer stated:
The CNC and the BNC, representing the continuity of the governments 
of their respective countries, reaffirm the friendship between their 
peoples, and their intention to maintain and strengthen the co-operation 
already established between the two governments, and with this 
objective they make the following joint declarations: both countries, 
interpreting the feelings of their countries, reiterate their faith in 
democracy; they are confident in the victory of Great Britain and her 
Allies and are ready to give all the co-operation in their power towards 
this end/342
Catalans and Basques met once a week in the Basque delegation of the UK to 
discuss policy.343 The Basques in the UK were in a better position regarding the British 
since they had more personal contact with them and had been there longer. Relations 
with the Foreign Office were maintained by Lizaso and Batista i Roca.344 The Catalans 
claimed:
I t  is equally convenient to organise the alliance between the Basque 
nationalists and the Catalans. The Basque nationalists and Catalans 
have defined national characteristics, a democratic state, a common 
ideal of the freedom of their respective countries, and a sincere 
friendship. The alliance between Basque nationalists and Catalans has a 
long history/345
Both Basque nationalists and Catalan nationalists were conscious of the usefulness of 
joint action in this period, sharing claims to self-determination and rejection of the
341 FPS, Box D5, Declaration of J. A. Aguirre and C. Pi i Sunyer, London, 1942; S. de Pablo, L. 
Mees, J. A. Rodriguez Ranz, El pendulo patriotico, Historia del Partido Nacionalista Vasco, II, 
1936-1975, (Barcelona, Crftica, 2000), p.l 17; C. Pi i Sunyer, Reports 1939-1942, p.40.
342 PRO, File 371/26943, Lizaso to Eden, Joint declaration of Basque and Catalan councils by the 
Basque and Catalan delegates, document signed by Irujo and Lizaso and Sunyer and Batista I Roca, 
London, 18-01-1941.
343 AT, Poblet, Box G3, Declaracid conjunta del CNC i el BNC lliurada als ambaixadors i ministres de 
les republiques americanes, acreditats a Londres.
344 FPS, Box 12, Folder 387, letter from Carles Pi i Sunyer to Lizaso, London, 12-02-1940. The letter 
shows that Lizaso and Pi i Sunyer kept close contacts in the UK.
345 FPS, Box D5, 'Normes per a l'actuacid catalana'.
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statutes of autonomy. The Basques and Catalan delegates in London commonly 
claimed:
The Basque and Catalan national councils as free and faithful 
interpreters of their respective people deny the right of General Franco 
to speak for them. The Catalans and Basques are firstly men and 
democrats and secondly Basque nationalists and Catalan nationalists.
Their main concern is freedom. These people are determined to stand 
by the fundamental principle of universal freedom, diametrically 
opposed to dictatorial seizure/346 
The CNC and the BNC produced a common manifesto, which they presented to 
the British government, claiming the right to self-determination and emphasising their 
common fight for democracy with the Allies. The common manifesto was a clear 
reflection of the common aims of the Catalans and Basque nationalists.347 Below 
follows a fragment of this common declaration:
The common objective is threefold: obtaining national freedom in 
agreement with the right to self-determination, the transformation of the 
present Unitarian State in a community of free people, with equality of 
rights in order to solve in common the affairs of common interest and 
the establishment of a democratic regime in each of its countries and in 
the confederation. (...) The declaration invites the Galicians and the 
Spanish democrats to get together with the pact and a common 
adherence to the democratic principles of the Spanish democrats/
For all that the Catalans and Basque nationalists collaborated on joint statements,349 the 
alliance would yield little benefit in political terms. Rather, aware how closely
346 PRO, File FO 371-24527, London, Lizaso and Roca, Note of the Basque and Catalan delegates in 
London to his Excellency Halifax, secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 28-09-1940; C. Pi i Sunyer, 
Memories de I'exili, Vol.I, pp. 191-192.
347 Aberasturi, De la derrota , p.314; FPS, Box D5, London, 10-01-1941; Poblet, Box C367, Tara 
informacidn de vascos desorientados'; PRO FILE FO 371/24527, Note of the Basque and Catalan 
delegates in London to his Excellency Halifax, secretary of state for foreign affairs, London, 28-09- 
1940; FPS, Box A2, Document signed by Irujo and Lizaso and Sunyer and Batista I Roca.
348 FPS, Box D5, Proposta de bases per a un pacte Catalk-Basc sotmesa al CNC.
349 FPS, Box D5, T)eclaraci6 conjunta dels Cornells Nacionals C&tala i Base', London, 10-01-1941. 
“Both the Catalan and Basque Council, interpreting the feelings of their people, reiterate their faith in 
democracy. They fully believe in the victory of the UK and its Allies, and are ready to give co­
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Catalan aims matched their own, the Basque nationalists were disposed to provide 
financial support.
Furthermore, in 1940, the Catalans presented a proposal for creating a council 
between Galicia, Catalonia and the Basque country. Known as Galeuzka, it consisted 
of three Galician members, three Basques, and three Catalans, and attempted to find a 
policy to unite the three cultures in a common action against totalitarian rule. The 
creation of Galeuzka constituted a step forward in relations between the three groups. 
The agreement was intended to be compatible with the national sovereignty of each 
area. The co-ordination had to be perfect in order to present a solid front against the 
Republicans. Galeuzka prepared a programme of peninsular action with the aim of 
creating an Iberian confederation. Galeuzka would grind to a halt however due to 
internal divisions amongst the Catalans and in the absence of an organisation to 
represent Galician claims. Galeuzka is discussed further in the following chapters.350
In addition to relations with the Basque nationalists, the Catalans in the UK also 
sought relations with the left wing opposition to Franco. In principal, the Catalans 
were eager to enter a pact with the left of the anti-Francoist opposition so long as the 
democrats could accept their aim of self-determination. No such acceptance was 
forthcoming from the left wing side, precluding any real collaboration.351 Overall, the 
Spanish Left in opposition to Franco was deeply divided. In 1940, a Socialist group 
started to reorganise in Mexico around Indalecio Prieto , who founded the Cultural 
Centre of Pablo Iglesias. The Socialists themselves did not accept Catalan demands 
for independence, and this gready restricted the possibility of an alliance with them.
operation as long as it depends on them. (...) Both Consells are anxious to cooperate in the 
establishment and consolidation of a normal regime in the territories of the present Spanish state. “
350F. Letamendia, Francisco, Historia de Euzkadi, El nacionalismo vasco y ETA, 3 vols., (Paris, Ruedo 
Ibdrico, 1975).
351 FPS, D5, Declaration of Batista I Roca, member of the CNC where he exercises the functions of 
General Secretary of Foreign Relations, 09-1941.
352 Indalecio Prieto was bom in Oviedo in 1883. He was a politician and an Asturian journalist. He was 
finance minister until autumn 1931. Thereafter (until 1933) he was minister of Public Works. He also 
was a minister under Largo Caballero and Negrfn. Negrin went into exile from the centre-south zone 
in March 1939. Prieto went into exile in Mexico where he led the JARE.
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The republicans were concentrated around Juan Negrrn,353 whose followers 
constituted a large group based in the UK, and which supported the SERE. Among 
the republicans, those based in the UK were usually closer to the Catalans. Continuing 
to consider itself head of the republic, Negrm’s group was eager to enter a pact with 
the Catalans, but under conditions that Catalans thought unacceptable: Catalan self- 
determination was not recognised.354 The republicans wanted to restore the 1931 
republican constitution and the autonomy statutes written the same year, whereas the 
Catalans and Basque nationalists wanted to obtain greater autonomy, if not aspiring to 
full sovereignty.355 Bosch i Gimpera summarised the position of the republicans 
towards the regionalist statutes of autonomy in his letter to Carles Pi i Sunyer in 1941: 
‘All republicans coincide in the necessity of re-establishing the constitution of 1931. 
Within this constitution the Statutes of autonomy are recognised and it could become a 
federalist regime.’356
The contacts between Catalans and republicans tended to consist in either 
maintaining a discreet diplomatic distance, an intellectual rapport or a personal rapport. 
No concrete action in common, no clear definition of a common policy or project, was 
to emerge. Pi i Sunyer’s letter to Martinez Barrio summarised the contacts with the 
Left:
The republicans are numerous but they are dispersed, have no direction 
and they have to fight in unfavourable and difficult conditions. (...)
Among the republicans residing in the UK, there were some 
personalities that had a political significance through their intellectual 
value. Salvador de Madariaga, who, even if he lived in Oxford, usually 
came to London. (...)With the group of republicans with whom we had
353 Juan Negrm was bom in Las Palmas in 1889. He was a doctor and a politician. He was Prime 
Minister in 1937 and moved the republican government to Barcelona. He went into exile in March 
1939 and created the SERE.
354 For information on the lack of acceptance of the nationalist claims by the left-wing opposition, see 
PRO, File 371/26943, Major Younger to Mr. Loxley, 27-11-1941. “Lizaso says that the Basques 
maintain friendly relations with the Catalans and republicans. He does not think that the Basques will 
get support from any of these groups since die Spaniards are not prepared to accept the disruption of 
Spanish unity, which is signified by the Basque nationalist claims.” The attempts at a rapprochement 
between the Catalans and the left-wing opposition to Franco are also developed in Pi i Sunyer, 
Memdries de I'exili, Vol. I, , pp.11-12.
355 FPS, Box 3, Folder 100, letter from Pere Bosch I Gimpera to C. Pi i Sunyer, Mexico, 07-09-1941.
356 FPS, Box 13, Folder 419, letter from C. Pi i Sunyer to Don Diego Martinez Barrio, Mexico D.F., 06- 
06-1941.
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the strongest relations, maybe because we felt a great personal affinity, 
were those who constituted a delegation of the JARE. (...) It is a very 
interesting fact that in general the republicans in London were the ones 
that were most understanding to our ideas, more open to new political
✓357perspectives.
Relations between republicans and Catalans at the institutional level were practically 
non-existent; only a few personal relations were established in the UK. Pi i Sunyer 
stated:
I t  is on Spain that the possible coexistence of Spain and Catalonia 
depends. (...) Quite a large group of Spanish republicans had been 
constituted in Mexico, with branches in other American countries. (...)
They said they represented the first movement of unity of Spanish 
republicans in Mexico when joining its movement and it was therefore 
necessary to fix our position in respect to this development of the 
republican politics/358 
On the far left of the political spectrum, the Catalan Communists never accepted 
the primacy of the CNC. The General Secretary of the PSUC, Joan Comorera359, 
wrote letters opposing the CNC.360 The PSUC opposed the CNC but relations never 
degenerated into violence.361 Throughout the 1930’s, the CNT had been divided into 
purists and those prepared to co-operate with other groups: divisions only accentuated 
by the war. The division was extremely complex but many exiled leaders in France 
adopted a purist position while a majority of militants in the interior believed that the 
Civil War was not over and a wide anti-fascist front was necessary. After the Civil 
War, the POUM vanished and its members joined other groups such as the Moviment 
Socialista de Catalunya at the end of the 1940’s.
357 Pi i Sunyer, Memories de I 'exili, Vol.1. Salvador de Madariaga was a Spanish politician and 
diplomat living in Oxford.
358 Letter of Carles Pi i Sunyer to Diego Martinez Barrio, 02-06-1941 in Pi i Sunyer, Memories de 
I'exili, Vol.1, pp.80-83.
359 Joan Comorera was bom in Cervera in 1895. He collaborated in the creation of the PSUC. He 
became its general secretary. He was exiled to France, moving then to Moscow and then to Mexico. 
Comorera died in a Francoist gaol (Burgos) in 1958.
360 FPS, Box 15, Folder 492, letters between the PSUC and Carles Pi i Sunyer; FPS, Box 6, Folder 192, 
letters between Carles Pi i Sunyer and Joan Comorera.
361 C. Pi i Sunyer, Vuit escrits de I'exili (1939-1941), (Barcelona, Fundacid Carles Pi i Sunyer d'estudis 
autonomies i locals, 1992), p.73; F. Vilanova, Les ruptures de Vany 39, p.45.
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The relations between exiles in the UK and those in France also need to be taken 
into consideration. Pi i Sunyer claimed that the UK had taken the lead in the Catalan 
movement, simply because, after the invasion of France, those on British territory were 
in a better position to work for Catalan interests.362 Carles Pi i Sunyer wrote to Josep 
Andreu Abello363, another Catalan politician, in 1940:
In  our policy, in our acts, we never forgot nor were we indifferent towards the 
Catalans in France. They were our friends and we knew that amongst them 
there were representatives of our institutions. However, we were also aware 
that whilst France was occupied by the Nazis, it was our role to fight for 
Catalan aspirations/364 
This was not the whole picture and belied underlying competition across the exile 
about how power should be shared. The CNC in London had nominally replaced the 
FNC of Paris. This was done out of necessity but created internal problems amongst 
the Catalan exiles that severely limited the effectiveness of the CNC. Moreover, the 
personalities of Catalan leaders made co-operation difficult. The primacy of the CNC 
over the other nuclei of Catalan power was not always accepted. In the following 
chapter, an account is made of how the Catalans in France organised a strategy to seize 
the power of the CNC, precipitating a crisis in 1942.
Communications between the Catalans in the UK and those in Spain also needed 
to be improved. One of very few ways of addressing this was to deploy secret agents, 
such as Jaume Ribas365. Ribas worked for the British secret services and filtered 
information to the Catalan opposition about the course of events in Spain. Overall, 
communication between the exiles and those inside Spain remained extremely poor.
Pi i Sunyer explained the difficulties arising from the division of the Catalans in exile 
and those in Spain:
362 Pi i Sunyer, Memories de I'exili de Carles Pi i Sunyer, Vol.1., p.71.
363 FPS, Box 2, Folder 31, letters between Pi i Sunyer and Josep Andreu Abelld.
364 APS, letter from Carles Pi i Sunyer to Josep Andreu Abelld, London 11-10-1940.
365 Jaume Ribas was a member of the FNC and worked as agent of the British secret services for which 
he did several secret trips during World War n. He got married to Carolina Pi i Sunyer (daughter of 
Carles Pi i Sunyer) and after World War n, they went to live to Mexico. Since Ribas was a secret 
agent, he tried to leave as little information as possible. However, for information on his life, see 
D.Arasa, Els Catalans de Churchill and Pi i Sunyer, Memories de Carles Pi i Sunyer.
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"Catalonia is divided into two pieces: the Catalonia submitted to the 
cruel repression and that of the persecution against its own spirit, that in 
exile, thrown to the adventure of an uncertain future. (...) However, in 
both of them the Catalan feeling grows stronger and the will of men who 
want to recover Catalonia grows bigger/366 
Finally, relations between the exile in the UK and the Catalan comunitats in America 
need to be considered. In theory, the CNC represented the voice of the Catalan 
comunitats in America. Communication between the UK and American based 
Catalans is also discussed in the next chapter.
3.6 CONCLUSION
This chapter has dealt with the history of the Consell Nacional de Catalunya 
(CNC), from its formation, and throughout its most successful period, from 1940 to 
1942, during which it provided the main instrument of Catalan opposition to Franco. 
The German invasion of France in 1940 shattered the hopes of the Catalan 
organisation based there, and indicated the extent to which the fortunes of the 
movement would be affected by the developments of World War n. By default, the 
UK became the centre for the Catalan exile. The Catalans gave their full support to the 
Allies, in the belief that they would in turn be helped to depose the Francoist regime 
once conflict was over.
The formation of the CNC in London had promised to unite and integrate all 
Catalan groups, including those in America. Its leadership was exercised by three 
external factors: the precarious and seemingly hopeless situation of the French exile; 
the uncertainty of the situation in Spain; and the lack of co-operation of the leadership 
in Mexico, which was to create competition and disunity with the leaders in the UK.
Internally, the CNC also faced ideological and leadership problems. The ERC 
disputed leadership of the Catalan cause with the CNC. In France, for instance, the 
ERC leadership did not accept the lead of the CNC in the UK The Catalans were 
deeply shocked by the capture and assassination of Companys. He was a symbol of 
the authority and office of the Generalitat or the presidency even if he was no longer
366 Poblet, AT, Box E4, Carles Pi i Sunyer, 'La significacid del moment'.
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active in politics. Josep Ma made a claim to succeed him, but this was not formally 
recognised and lacked legitimacy. Moreover, Carles Pi i Sunyer’s leadership in the 
CNC could last only as long as Irla remained unable to exercise his power. His 
ideology was utopian and somewhat vague; his notions of federalism and Europeanism 
lacked a solid foundation.
In contrast, the CNC in London maintained good relations with the Basque 
nationalists, with whom they identified on the basis of shared history and political 
aspirations. Together with the Galicians, the Catalonians created Galeuzka with the 
Basque nationalists, but the project never produced concrete political action. The 
Catalans were similarly eager to make common cause with the left-wing parties, but 
the Left was divided and did not always accept the condition of self-determination 
stipulated. The Communists, for instance, never accepted the authority of the CNC. 
Neither was it acceptable in France, where the members of ERC instead decided to 
send Santalo to Mexico, having invested him with the powers of President Irla. Carles 
Pi i Sunyer’s legitimacy waned, and with it, the fortunes of the CNC. To make matters 
worse, lacking the resource base to establish effective networks, the Catalan Diaspora 
would remain persistently troubled by communication problems.
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CHAPTER 4 - THE CATALAN OPPOSITION TO FRANCO FROM JULY 
1940 TO AUGUST 1942: THE ATLANTIC EXILE
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The mother is reading to the daughter the last letter from the father: Oh 
God, when will we be able to reunite again? When will this separation 
of thousands of families be over? This separation is the end of all these 
families that will never be reunited again/
Despite the size of the population in exile, effective Catalan opposition failed to 
emerge on the American continent. Communication problems and sheer geographical 
distance from the European centres proved difficult to overcome. Moreover, 
leadership clashes among Catalans also divided the American exile. The failure of the 
American exile -  both in the USA and in Latin America -  to contribute to effective 
opposition, between July 1940 and August 1942, is described in this chapter.
After France had fallen into Nazi hands, a great number of Catalans had sought 
refuge in the UK. Some, however, chose to cross the Atlantic, reaching the USA and 
several countries in Latin America. The Atlantic exile represented having to start from 
scratch. The Catalans found themselves without resources, without an infrastructure, 
and - with poor communications links with their European brethren - in need of a co­
ordinating organisation between Europe and America. Conflicts of leadership and 
problems of organisation would prevent its emerging.
The failure of Germany’s Russian campaign and the entry into the war of the 
USA on the 8 December 1941 seemed to mark an improvement in the Allied side’s 
fortunes. The events at Pearl Harbour marked the fact, if not the moment that the 
conflict had acquired a truly global dimension. German and Japanese expansionism, at 
first winning substantial territorial assets, brought with it the equally substantial 
liabilities of defence. The Soviet counter-offensive seemed to show that the German 
expansion was over; the British mainland was intact, at least territorially. From 1942
367 F. Viadiu, Entre el torb i la Gestapo, (Barcelona, Dalmau, 2000), p.82.
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to 1943, the course of World War II began to look as though it might turn in favour of 
the Allies; the Axis powers began to look vulnerable.
4.2 CATALAN OPPOSITION IN THE UNITED STATES
With the threat of the German expansion in Europe looming large, a group of 
Catalans relocated to the USA. The USA government, having entered World War II 
on the side of the Allies, made an attractive ally. A Catalan centre in New York 
would better represent Catalan aspirations to the USA administration. The fact that 
the USA government itself was pursuing a policy of blocking further alliances with the 
Axis powers, it was believed, would make anti-Francoists welcome in the USA.
The Catalan group in the USA was relatively small in terms of number, but 
effective.370 The Catalan Centre of New York was presided over by Josep Maria 
Fontanals371. A national delegation was also created. The Casal Catal& of New York 
represented the Catalan colony in the USA372 and 80,000 Catalans throughout Latin 
America. Fontanals wanted the USA delegation to work as liaison between the 
Catalans of Latin America and the CNC in London. The Catalan community in the 
USA fully upheld the policy of the CNC of London. Among its leaders in New York 
were Ventura Sureda, Josep Camer Ribalta, and Josep Guibemau. The machinery of 
representation, the organisation of the exile, its facilitation and institutions were mainly 
subsidised by the JARE and the SERE.373 Concerning the Atlantic exile, the JARE 
played arguably a more important role since it was based in Mexico. Fontanals 
explained the Catalan USA delegation’s policy lines and hopes:
"Josep Fontanals, president of Casal Catala in letters to President 
Roosevelt has expressed the desire of the Catalan people to go on record
368 P. Kennedy, The rise and fall of the great powers, (London, Fontana Press, 1988), p.447; J. Martinez 
Vendrell, Una vida per Catalunya, Memdries 1939-1946, (Barcelona, Pdrtic, 1991), p. 151.
3«59 pps g QX ^ polder 9, Santiago de Chile, 23-08-1941; C. Pi i Sunyer, Memdries de I'exili de Carles 
Pi i Sunyer, Vol.1, (Barcelona, Curial, 1979), pp.67-71.
370 Again, providing an estimate of the Catalan exiles in the USA is very difficult since no historian has 
given a concrete figure. My estimate would be that around 3,000 to 5,000 Catalans moved to the USA 
in the forties.
371 Josep Maria Fontanals was a Catalan who lived in the USA, in New York. He was one of the main 
leaders of the Catalan centre of New York. FPS, Box 9, Folder 277, letters between Carles Pi i Sunyer 
and Josep Maria Fontanals.
372 FPS, Box 5, Folder 158, letters between Carles Pi i Sunyer and the Catalan delegation in the USA.
373 C. Pi i Sunyer, Memdries de I'exili de Carles Pi i Sunyer, Vol.1, (Barcelona, Curial, 1979), pp.67-71.
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as being “opposed to the present Spanish regime” and as repudiating 
“any affiliation with any policies which are or may be in opposition to 
American ideals.” (.. .)Fontanals has expressed the hope that in the post­
war settlement the autonomy of Catalonia will be given 
consideration/374
In parallel to the Catalan move to the USA, the Basques also tried to setde there. The 
Basques seemed to have a more solid basis in the USA, though in the event, history 
would not favour either cause. The arrival of J.A. Aguirre in America consolidated an 
already close relationship between Basque nationalists and the North American 
services. Aguirre flew to the USA, to be followed by other leading personalities of 
Basque nationalism. The Basque government actively encouraged migration to the 
USA from 1940 onwards, shifting the political centre of Basque nationalism from 
Europe to America. Aguirre organised several meetings of the Basque government in 
New York. He sought self-government and a pact with the Catalans.375
Basque nationalists were reasonably optimistic about the development of World 
War II throughout the period. From 1940, the USA launched an anti-Axis campaign 
that favoured Basque interests. Aguirre calculated that the end of World War II would 
bring with it the chance of independence.376 The pillars of Aguirre’s policy in the USA 
were twofold: establishment and development of relations with the government of the 
USA, and collaboration of Basque intelligence with the American Secret Services (the 
CIA) through the Basque Information Service. Aguirre entered a pact with Americans 
and British because he believed the Allies would remove Franco from power.377 
Aguirre’s Christmas message of 1941, delivered from the USA, significantly called the 
Basque nationalits to arms, and not just metaphorically:
374 PRO, File FO 371/31248, Washington chancery to central department, Sumner Welles to R. 
Campbell, Washington, 11-05-1942.
375 AT, Poblet, Box 360, 'Acuerdos adoptados en el Consejo celebrado en Nueva York', 'New York 
Batzarean artutako erabakiyak', 03-1945.
376 Aberasturi, De la derrota, p.363
377 Aberasturi, De la derrota p.491.
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‘Let’s try to recover the land of our parents and our language, our laws 
and our freedom. The Basque government remains in place. It is the 
legitimate government of the Basques because it interprets the feelings 
of an invincible race. This is why our unity and strength are today 
invincible. The Basque position was expressed in 1939 when World 
War II started. (...) We should go on with our task of liberation. (...) I 
am very proud of being the president of a country that has gone on 
fighting among the most awful confusion.’378 
This particular speech was remarkable since it may be considered the moment that 
Basque nationalism shifted towards a more violent nationalism, whereas Catalan 
nationalism did not.
Aguirre organised several meetings of the Basque government in New York.379 
Though disposed to enter pacts with the Catalans in the USA, he remained cautious, 
unsure whether to approach Carles Pi i Sunyer, the leader of the CNC, or Irla, the 
president of the Generalitat in exile. This was one consequence of a lack of internal
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umty among Catalans. Undeterred, Aguirre increasingly pursued an alliance with 
the Catalans and later, with the Galicians, through the Galeuzka project. It would form 
the basis of independent action by the nationalists and include acceptance of the right 
of self-determination. Aguirre came to see Galeuzka as the way to push Catalan- 
Basque interests, rather than any other forms of alliance or pacts. The question and 
nature of the relationship between the declaration of Galeuzka and other Catalan- 
Basque political pacts, notwithstanding the comparable circumstances in which they 
were conceived, was not resolved however; relations between Catalans and Basque 
nationalists were complicated.381 It must be acknowledged though, that, overall, the 
Catalan group in the USA achieved a symbolic significance without ever managing to 
carry real political weight since the number of Catalans settled there was not very 
large. The main aim of the Catalan representation in the USA was conceived in terms 
of its capacity to lobby for the Catalan cause close to the heart of the USA government.
378 Poblet, AT, New York, 22-12-1941, Aguirre’s message to the Basques in Christmas 1941.
379 AN, Artea, EBB122-6,01-1941, document from Aguirre, Basque delegation, 30 Fifth Avenue, New 
York.
380 C. Pi i Sunyer, Memdries de I'exili, Vol.1, pp. 189-190.
381 C. Pi i Sunyer, Memdries de I'exili, Vol.1, p. 197.
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43  CATALAN OPPOSITION IN LATIN AMERICA
The period 1940-1942 saw a much larger movement of Catalans to Latin 
America. Latin America (in the main, Mexico and Argentina) was attractive for a 
number of reasons. Above all, there seemed to be a cultural as well as a linguistic 
affinity between the Latin countries. Perceived commonalities promised an easier 
transition. There was no specific distinction between those Catalan exiles from France 
that chose to go to the UK and those that moved to the Americas. Rather, all seemed 
to depend on particular circumstances, the infrastructure available and the practical 
possibilities of moving and finding a way to survive elsewhere.382 Resettlement in 
Latin America in the period was made somewhat easier as governments shifted to a 
policy of anti-Francoism in response to the entry of the USA into World War II on the 
Allied side. The door was opened to incoming exiles.
In Latin America, the Catalans organised themselves in so-called comunitats 
(communities). Each of them was locally administered and had wide freedom of 
initiative to act, but each was to be considered part of a national organisation. The 
creation of the comunitats may be characterised as a sort of federation of Catalan 
entities within each American country in which there were Catalan exiles. The 
comunitats answered to central Catalan bodies, attempted to liaise with each other, and 
ultimately depended on the CNC of London, closely following Pi i Sunyer and the 
CNC policy lines. An article in the magazine Nova Catalunya published in Cuba in 
1944 claimed that the CNC was the first point of reference for the comunitats in 
America: ‘The mission of the CNC is to bring everyone together, without distinction 
and to help the respective ambassadors and consulates that affect the collectives and to 
give them support in everything that has a national sense.’383 The comunitats were 
active and appeared united, as the comunitat in Mexico claimed: ‘Our group was 
constituted in order to work from exile to overthrow the oppressive Francoist regime.
(...) In this task, we are persisting in order to free Catalonia. We need the unity of all 
the anti-Francoist Catalans.’384
382 Author’s interview with Ant6n Canellas, Barcelona, January 2002.
383 PS, Tes comunitats catalanes d'Am&rica', Nova Catalunya, Cuba, 1944.
384 FPS, Box 1, Folder 6, letter from the Catalan community in Mexico to Carles Pi i Sunyer, 1942.
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Carles Pi i Sunyer’s own account of the creation of the comunitats in Latin 
America and their relationship to the CNC in London is on record:
"We decided to create the CNC. (...) Once our position was fixed, the 
comunitats presented their loyalty to our project. From then on, we 
worked together with the comunitats because we shared the loyalty to 
Catalonia. Little by little, the organisation took its own form and 
identity. Taking into account the advice of the Catalans in the 
Comunitats, on the 14 June 1942,1 gave a speech in the Casal Catala in 
London, reasserting the existence of the CNC, and expecting to 
constitute an organisation that would represent Catalan unity around the 
world, including the activity of the Comunitats and forming a common 
organisation. The organisation would be unique in the idea and in its 
purpose, with a decentralised structure, a functional aim, active and 
efficient."385
The relationship was then one of mutual support. CNC spokesmen in Latin America 
worked as representatives of the London body and tried to co-ordinate action across 
the ocean. 386 Some of the main figures of the CNC in Latin America were Josep 
Tomas i Piera387, Salvador Armendares, and later, Bosch i Gimpera.388 Carles Pi i 
Sunyer explained how the CNC counted on the support of the comunitats:
W e created the CNC counting on the support of all the Catalan 
comunitats constituted in the Latin American Republics. The CNC counts 
therefore on the support of the Catalans in exile but also with the support 
of the Catalans in Spain that are today suffering tremendous 
repression.
385 C.Pi i Sunyer, Reports 1939-1942, p. 145.
386 Poblet, Box C16, Consell National Catalk de Londres; Pi i Sunyer's letter to Diego Martinez Barrio, 
London, 02-06-1941, in Vuit escrits de I'exili (1939-1941), (Barcelona, Fundati6 Carles Pi i Sunyer 
d'estudis autondmics I locals, 1992).
387 FPS, Box 20, Folder 652, letters between Josep Tom&s i Piera and Carles Pi i Sunyer.
388 APS, Box 5, Folder 160, letter from Catalonia Grop.N.R. to Carles Pi i Sunyer, 01-02-1943.
389 FPS, Box 3, Folder 100, letter from C. Pi i Sunyer to Bosch I Gimpera, London, 10-03-1942.
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Mexico was by some margin the biggest Catalan community in Latin America, but 
there was a significant presence in Chile, Argentina, Cuba, Venezuela and Colombia. 
Host governments often welcomed the Catalans, following the apparent prescriptions 
of the USA. Whilst Chile and Argentina390 also had large communities of Catalans, in
O Q 1
general, migration quotas were often fixed. The migration was organised by the 
JARE and the SERE who gave the money to pay for the ships that crossed from 
Europe to America full of Catalan refugees. Catalans moved where they were able to 
go, where their entry was allowed, and where they could find work.392
Catalan ideology in Latin America was based squarely on the fight against 
Francoism. Catalans claimed their right of self-determination and the necessity of 
unity amongst Catalans for the cause, as the Catalan comunitat in Mexico 
maintained.393
'We know that you’ll make every effort to diminish the sufferings of our 
people contributing to the national unity of all Catalans, under the 
guidance of the government of the Generalitat, and to maintain the best 
relations with the Basques and the other Hispanic people since this unity 
will decide the freedom of Catalonia and the rest of Spain and the re­
establishment of the republican and statutory legality.'394 
Chile responded positively to the demands for refuge made by the Catalans. The 
Chilean government set quotas for the number of Catalan exiles it would allow to cross 
its borders. The majority of those moving to Chile were intellectuals and 
professionals. Their centre was Santiago de Chile, where the Agrupacid Patriotica
390 FPS, Box 6, Fdlder 203, letters between Carles Pi i unyer and Josep Escol& i Mars£, president de la 
Comunitat Catalana de la Republica Argentina; AT, Poblet, Box C l601, 'Carta dels amics de Buenos 
Aires'.
391 AT, Poblet, Box LI, 'Activitats de la delegacid Catalana a Chile'; AT, Poblet, Box G3; FPS, Box 11, 
Folder 341, letters between Carles Pi i Sunyer and Josep Maria Imbert (representative of the Catalan 
delegation in Chile).
392 For an overview of the exile in Mexico, see M. Alvira, coordinadora, El exilio espaftol en Mejico 
1939-1982, (Mdjico D.F., Fondo de cultura Econdmica, 1982).
393 PS, Mexico, Casal catald, de Mexico, 1943; FPS, 1942, Jaume Aiguader's letter to Pi i Sunyer, 
Mexico, 11-05-1942; FPS, Folder 6, Agrupacid Amics de Catalunya's letter to Carles Pi i Sunyer, 
Mdxico, 1943; FPS, Box 17, Folder 595, letter from Pi i Sunyer to Sr.D.E. Salazar Chapela.
394 FPS, Box 1, Folder 6, letter from Agrupacid Catalana in Buenos Aires to C. Pi i Sunyer, Buenos 
Aires, 15- 01-1942; FPS Box 14, Folder 461,letter between Carles Pi i Sunyer in London and Hipdlit 
Nadal i Mallol in Buenos Aires, 13-02-1942 that illustrates the support of the Catalans in Argentina to 
Pi i Sunyer in London.
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Catalana was created, accountable to the CNC of London. Its president was Joaquim 
Sabate, with Joan Oliver as its secretary.395 The mission of the comunitat and its 
accountability to London, was explicitly stated by the Catalans in Chile: ‘The main 
reason to reorganise the Agrupacid Patriotica Catalana has been to give an efficient 
and definite unity to the Catalan collective, following the inspirations and orientations 
from the CNC, established in London.’396
Like their Chilean counterparts, the Catalan delegation in Argentina also 
followed the lead of the CNC in London and was reluctant to accept Josep Irla’s 
challenge of its legitimacy. Also, in common with Chile, the migration was to be 
controlled, since it swelled the number of migrants that had already been established 
there in the years preceding the Civil War. The centre of Catalan organisation in 
Argentina was Buenos Aires. Its principal leaders were Hipolit Nadal i Maillol and 
Pere Mas i Perera.397 In November 1939, the Argentinean government formally 
decided to allow the entry of Spanish citizens into the country. In Argentina, there 
were Catalan centres in Buenos Aires, Mendoza and Rosario, the Lliga of Nostra 
Senyora de Montserrat and periodical publications such as Ressorgiment. In the view 
of the British embassy in Buenos Aires:398 ‘The Catalan comunitat is a central 
committee on which all local societies are represented and its object is to promote 
solidarity among all Catalans.’399
Cuba became another place of refuge for Catalans. Its main centre was 
Havana400, where Catalans fully subscribed to the leadership of the CNC in London.401 
Another centre in Santiago de Cuba402 was more independent and radical.403 A
395 APS, Box 5, Folder 168, letter from Catalan centre of Chile to Carles Pi i Sunyer, Santiago de Chile, 
23-03-1942; C. Pi i Sunyer, Memdries de I'exili de Caries Pi i Sunyer, Vol.L, (Barcelona, Curial, 
1979), pp.67-71; FPS, Box 1, Folder 9, Carles Pi i Sunyer- Agrupacid patridtica Catalana to Pi i 
Sunyer, Santiago de Chile, 02-05-1941; FPS, Box 1, Folder 9, letter from C. Pi i Sunyer in London to 
Agrupacid patridtica a Chile, 15-07-1941.
396 AT, Poblet, Box G3, "Els Catalans a Xile, reorganitzacid de l"agrupacid patridtica".
397 FPS, Box 13, Folder 423, letters between Pere Mas i Perera and Carles Pi i Sunyer.
398 C. Pi i Sunyer, Memdries de I'exili de Carles Pi i Sunyer, Vol.L, (Barcelona, Curial, 1979), pp.67-71; 
APS, Nova Catalunya, "Les comunitats catalanes d"Ambrica", 03-1944.
399 PRO, File FO 371/26943, British embassy to Foreign Office, Buenos Aires, 25-04-1941.
400 FPS, Box 3, Folder 75, letters between Carles Pi i Sunyer and Viceng Bemades (Catalan 
representative in Havana); FPS, Box 5, Folder 163, letters between Carles Pi i Sunyer and Centre 
Catalk de 1 "Havana.
401 FPS, Box D5, "A proposit del CNC", 09-1942, Santiago de Cuba; FPS, Box 5, Folder 160, letters 
between Carles Pi i Sunyer and Catalunya Grop.N.R. from Santiago de Cuba.
402 AT, Poblet, Box G3,05-08-1941, "Els Catalans de Santiago de Cuba".
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representative from the Catalan centre of Havana wrote a letter to Pi i Sunyer claiming 
the following:
‘The Catalan centre of Havana has given its full support to the CNC of 
London for two main reasons. First, in order to strengthen solidarity 
amongst the patriotic elements of America and secondly because it truly 
believes that the task of the CNC of London will work in favour of the 
interests of Catalonia.’404 
Venezuela405 and Colombia406 were two other Latin American countries that 
welcomed Catalans, though in the event, a far lesser number of Catalans settled in 
those countries than in the case of Mexico.
The Mexico comunitats were the biggest, the most active, and the best organised 
in Latin America.407 Depending on the number of Catalans settled in each Latin 
American country, there was a single or several Catalan comunitats in that country. In 
October 1940, after the German occupation of France, the Mexican government led by 
Lazaro Cardenas408 agreed to accept an unlimited number of Spanish refugees. An 
agreement with the government of Vichy enabled the passage from Europe to Latin 
America, financed by the Spanish Republicans.409 The Mexican president claimed: 
‘Mexico is ready to welcome all Spanish refugees resident in France. If the French
403 C. Pi i Sunyer, Memdries de I'exili de Carles Pi i Sunyer, Vol.L, (Barcelona, Curial, 1979), pp.67-71. 
The author travelled to Havana searching for documentary evidence of the Catalan exile in Cuba in the 
1940s. Unfortunately, these and other documents proved not to be accessible since Fidel Castro’s 
closure of the Spanish Institute in Havana, at the beginning of 2003, in protest against the 
unconditional support given to the Bush administration by the Aznar government in the Iraq crisis.
404 APS, Box 5, Folder 163, letter from Center CataD de 1 Havana to Carles Pi i Sunyer, La Havana, 28-
07-1941.
405 PRO, File FO 371/24524,20-01-1940, Foreign Office report summarising the Catalan exile to 
Venezuela.
406 FPS, Box 20, Folder 663, letters between Carles Pi i Sunyer and Antoni Trias i Pujol (main Catalan 
representative in Bogotd).
407 FPS, Box 18, Folder 613, letters between Mexico delegation and Carles Pi i Sunyer; AT, Poblet, C24, 
T>eclaraci6 Comunitat Catalana de Mexic'.
408 Ldzaro Cardenas was bom in Mexico in 1895. He was a politician. He was president of the republic 
of Mexico from 1934 to 1940. During the Spanish Civil War, he upheld the cause of the republic and 
welcomed republican refugees.
409AN, PNV 26-1 Mexican delegation's letter from France, letter from Luis I. Rodriguez to Andres de 
Bereziartua, Vichy, October 1940; Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y tecnologfa, Luis I. Rodriguez, La 
proteccion de los refugiados espanoles en Francia, (M£jico, Colegio de Mdjico, Secretarfa de 
relaciones exteriores, 2000), p.13 ; A. Alted Virgil, Ta historia olvidada’, El Pais Semanal, 12-01- 
2003; J. Martin Casas, El exilio espanol, (Barcelona, Planeta, 2002), pp.81,225.
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government accepts our idea, from that moment all Spanish refugees will be under 
Mexican protection.’410
The Catalan comunitats in Mexico supported the policy of the CNC of 
London.411 Tomas i Piera was president of the main Mexican comunitat. Amongst 
other publications, the group published El Poble Catala. The Catalan group of Mexico 
had a significant impact in Catalan nationalism in large part due to its having a clearly 
articulated programme and because it was a large and well organised group. Indeed, 
Catalan nationalism badly needed more of its representative bodies to act with the 
effectiveness shown by the Mexico group. Below follows a fragment of the 
declaration of principles of the Mexico Catalan comunitat:
‘The Comunitat of Mexico claimed the right of Catalonia to the free 
exercise of its national sovereignty, the defence of a new peninsular 
organisation based on the union of the nations that integrate the present 
Spanish state. (...) The comunitat proposed the creation of a 
Confederation of nations, the maintenance of a democratic regime as a 
system of government, the necessity of making the Catalan case known 
outside Catalonia. This movement needs to be co-ordinated with those 
inside Spain and needs to establish a pact of government that would 
reaffirm the common action of the Catalan nationalists, Basque 
nationalists and Galician nationalists.’412 
Overall, the main contribution of the Catalans in Latin America was to provide support 
to the CNC, legitimising and widening the scope of its power, and to develop the 
international profile of the cause.
4.4 CATALAN RELATIONS WITH OTHER GROUPS IN OPPOSITION IN 
LATIN AMERICA
The Catalans in Latin America were advised to nurture and maintain good 
relations with the left-wing parties. This stopped short of concrete alliances however,
410 PRO, 'Catalan and Spanish refugees' in Manchester Guardian, UK, 24-04-1941.
411 FPS, Box 3, Folder 100, letter from C. Pi i Sunyer to Pere Bosch I Gimpera, London, 05-06-1941; C. 
Pi i Sunyer, Memdries de I'exili de Carles Pi i Sunyer, Vol.1., (Barcelona, Curial, 1979), pp.67-71.
412 AT, Poblet, T>eclaraci6 Comunitat Catalana de Mexic', 11-1945.
such as could be entered into with the Basque nationalists. The Chilean comunitat 
explained Catalan relations with other groups:
'We want to ask you urgently about the attitude that we should take 
towards the Spanish Republicans and the Communists. (...) In Chile, as 
everywhere, the Spanish republicans are divided into two groups: the 
first group are Negrinists and want to recognise the old government of 
Negrm of the Republican institutions as they were formed at the 
moment of the fall of the republic. The second one is formed by the 
followers of Prieto opposed to the arguments of the first group and 
together with the CNT, the enemies of the Communists. Both groups 
try to obtain our alliance and our unity. (...) We have not been allied 
with any of them but only with the Basque nationalists with whom we 
have formed the Basque- Catalan committee and we agree on all 
national questions. We would like to know what the position adopted 
by the CNC towards the Communists and Republicans will be.'413 
Relations had to be established and maintained with the left-wing groups in Latin 
America. The three most pre-eminent left-wing leaders to flee to Latin America were 
the Socialists Indalecio Prieto, Juan Negrm and the Republican Diego Martmez Barrio. 
Martinez Barrio arrived in Mexico in 1939 and was an important figure among 
Spanish Republicans. He was part of Union Republicana, a small party enjoying good 
relations with both the JARE and the SERE. Declaring himself de facto president of 
the republic, he tried to reconstitute the republican government and accepted 
constitutional legality. 414 Martmez Barrio sought an agreement with the nationalists 
and tried in vain to obtain British support. He managed to unite the majority of the 
republican movement on the American continent, as well as the small nuclei of those 
exiled in Britain. Socialists and Republicans did not manage to agree since they were 
competing for the leadership of the left-wing opposition to Franco.
Both Prieto and Negrm were from the PSOE and each attracted a following. 
Negrm hoped to restore the republic of 1931 and organised a meeting of the Cortes in
413 FPS, Box 1, Folder 9, letter from Agrupacio catalana de Chile to C. Pi i Sunyer in London, 25-09- 
1941.
414 PRO File FO 371/39744, Letter Lizaso to Aguirre, Basque relations with the left, London, 10-12- 
1944.
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Mexico, in 1940, which constituted the first serious attempt at a restoration of the 
republic. Indalecio Prieto, the other Socialist leader, led the JARE, which was in 
charge of the effort to assist the Spanish refugees. Taking a moderate stance, he 
favoured the constitutional plebiscite and supported the monarchists. Restoration of 
the republic was not in line with Prieto’s aims, and proved a source of tension with his 
rival, Negrm.415 Any merger of the Socialist and Republican groups was out of the 
question. Prieto, in fact, managed to boycott the first meeting of the Cortes in Mexico. 
Prieto founded the cultural centre of Pablo Iglesias in Mexico. The Socialists did not 
accept the demands for independence made by the nationalists. Thus, socialism 
suffered then from the leadership clashes between Prieto and Negrm.
Other leftist groups were also divided. Both the CNT (the anarchist trade union) 
and the UGT (the Socialist trade union), in particular, were internally tom. It is 
conceivable that Catalan nationalism could have exploited the union platform, 
particularly the CNT, which had a strong basis in Catalonia. Since the labour 
movement in Catalonia had been very strong at the beginning of the XX century, 
Catalan nationalism after the Civil War could have tried to ally with it as an instrument 
of popular mobilisation to back up the intellectual and political Catalan elite. Even 
more so, it could have provided the basis of street and armed action that Catalan 
nationalism lacked during the 1940s. Even if the UGT and the CNT were not 
primarily based on Catalan policy, both unions were not contrary to regionalist 
demands and the union among all groups would have strengthened their possibilities of 
organising. The two unions were greatly weakened after the Civil War however and 
could not provide the foundation required.
On the anti-Francoist spectrum, the Spanish left-wing parties in exile in Latin 
America mostly divided between pro-Communists and anti-Communists. The 
Republicans, the PSOE branch led by Prieto, the CNT, the Basque nationalists and the 
Catalans were anti-Communist. On the other hand, the PCE, the PSUC and the PSOE 
led by Negrm were pro-Communist. Since the Catalans were anti-Communist, the 
relations between these two groups were practically non-existent. Overall, both 
Republicans and Socialists (the non-Communist left-wing leaders) were ready to deal
415 Aberasturi, De la derrota, p.645.
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with Catalans (mainly Martmez Barrio and Prieto) and did provide enormous financial 
support. However, their internal divisions greatly constrained any possibilities of a 
deeper pact.
Like Catalans, many Basques found themselves in exile in Latin America. With 
the occupation of France, the Basques fled to the UK or to America. After first visiting 
the USA, Aguirre landed in Argentina in 1941.416 The moment Aguirre landed in Latin 
America417, Irujo’s power in the UK lost legitimacy since Aguirre was the president of 
the Basques and Irujo’s position to an extent only made sense as long as the president 
could not exercise his powers.418 Aguirre’s arrival in Latin America had then a 
comparable though different effect to that of Santalo in the Catalan case. The 
legitimacy of both the CNC and the BNC would be called into question.
Aguirre strengthened his political and administrative contacts with the Latin 
American authorities. His primary aims were to establish Basque communities, to 
promulgate nationalist ideas and to build up effective information and propaganda 
systems in the Basque cause. Aguirre succeeded in reorganising the communities in 
those countries he visited 419
In Latin America, as elsewhere, the Catalans sought union with the better 
resourced, and more unified Basques. Furthermore, Aguirre’s arrival on American soil 
heralded and initiated a substantial development in Catalano-Basque relations. 420 A 
document found in Poblet gave an account of Catalans and Basque relations in Latin 
America: ‘The Catalan and Basques act together in various American Republics, 
sometimes by spontaneous decision and sometimes by the intelligent action of the 
organisations that represent both collectives.’421
416 AN, Artea, EBB 122-6,11-07-1941, Buenos Aires, letter from Elias de Etxeberria to Aguirre.
417 AN, Artea, PNV 24-5, 'Viaje del presidente Aguirre a Sudamdrica'.
418 AN, Artea, EBB117-2, Euzko Deya, 01-03-1943, Mexico, 'Manifiesto del presidente Aguirre'; AN, 
Artea, EBB 117-2,21-11-1941, letter from Aguirre to Patxo Belausteguigotia, one of the main 
representatives of the Basques in Mexico.
419 PRO File FO 371/26943, Mr. Stephenson to Eden about Aguirre, Uruguay, 1941; Beltza, p.318
420 FPS, Box 1, Folder 9, letter from C. Pi i Sunyer from London to Carles Sabatd in Chile.
421 FPS, Box D5, Doc.Amer.3, Normative for the Catalan activities.
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Also, GaleuzJca was attempted in Latin America. The aim of the project was to 
organise a federal country, to achieve sovereignty for Catalonia, the Basque country 
and Galicia. A fragment of the declaration of Galeuzka written in Argentina is 
presented below:
The Basque, Catalan and Galician people want to converge on a 
common action in favour of the re-establishment of the national 
sovereignty supported in a federal system that would make it long 
lasting and stable. (...) A Directorate will try to organise this movement 
that will be called Galeuzka. (.. .)The Directorate will also proclaim its 
support to the basic following principles: sovereignty of each peninsular 
nation, compatible with a federation; democratic and republican form of 
government; effective external policy. (...) The organisations Partido 
Nacionalista Vasco, Solidaridad de Trabajadores Vascos, Partido 
Galleguista, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, Estat Catala, Partit 
Socialista Catala, Comunitat Catalana and Union de Catalanes 
Independientes declare that they entered a pact on the following basis: 
they will oppose any attempt at monarchical restoration, anti-popular or 
anti-democratic; they declare that Euzkadi, Galicia and Catalonia are 
three independent nations; they ask for a Republican and democratic 
regime based on the respect and the freedom of the human being and are 
inspired in the principles of social justice. (...) In order to accomplish 
all these premises, they constitute an organisation denominated 
Galeuzka, comprising the Basque, Catalan and Galician 
representations.A22
Many of the projects of Galeuzka were written (mainly in the form of manifestos) in 
the 1940s both in Europe and in America. The projects invariably failed to get off the 
ground.
422 FPS, Box D5, Buenos Aires, ‘Manifest de G aleu zka1941.
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4.5 PROBLEMS OF ORGANISATION IN LATIN AMERICA
The organisation of the comunitats in Latin America suffered from a number of 
problems. First of all, communication between Europe and America remained 
problematic. Travel between the two continents proved very difficult to organise. Pi i 
Sunyer explained the difficulty for Catalans trying to leave France for America:423 
1 am also worried these days about the situation of the Catalans in 
France. (...) Many of them want to go to America but as the 
communications are more difficult here and journeys infrequent, this 
has produced a state of restlessness. It is a pity because the Spanish 
exiled in France had now managed to achieve a pretty stable situation 
and now they have to go through another period of suffering/424 
Second, any efforts at organisation or co-ordination were subject to the vagaries and 
uncertainties of World War II and to the threat of Nazi expansionism.425 The new 
arrivals to the Americas had to be integrated with, and accommodated by those 
comunitats established in earlier years 426 The overall effect was for the comunitats, 
step by step, to adopt individual stances, and to take on quite separate personalities. 
Dependence on the doctrine of the CNC in London was reduced.427 The turmoil of 
successive waves of immigration called for constant readjustment of settled 
populations, now having to accommodate those arriving, as they had before, without 
infrastructure, resources, and having to begin a new life from scratch. An active 
political culture was hard to develop and even harder to assimilate. Geographic
A/yo
distance and poor communications made the situation all the worse. Carles Pi i 
Sunyer explained the difficulty of structuring the comunitats: the geographical 
distance between the comunitats, the slow communications, the lack of resources and 
the small amount of time that some of the members could dedicate to the cause since 
they had to work to earn their living 429
423 FPS, Ta tragedia dels refugiats a Franca', Buenos Aires, Ressorgiment, 06-1941.
424 FPS, Box 18, Folder 628, letter from Carles Pi i Sunyer to Joan Sold I Pla, London, 17-01-1940.
425 C. Pi i Sunyer, Memories de I'exili de Pi i Sunyer, Vol. 1, p.l 15.
426 FPS, Box 3, Folder 100, letter from Pi i Sunyer to Bosch I Gimpera, 23-11-1940.
427 C. Pi i Sunyer, Memories de I'exili de Carles Pi i Sunyer, Vol.l (Barcelona, Curial, 1979), pp.41-42.
428 C. Pi i Sunyer, Memories de I'exili de Carles Pi i Sunyer, Vol.l, p. 107.
429 Pi i Sunyer, Reports 1939-1942, p.145.
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The financial situation of the Catalans remained precarious, dependent in part, on 
Republican resources, namely the JARE and the SERE. 430 The principal aim of the 
JARE was to facilitate the passage of those wanting to get to America, but soon 
communications became more difficult and were even interrupted.431 Carles Pi i 
Sunyer gave an explanation of the economic position to the Chilean comunitat: 
'Concerning the economic situation of the CNC, the situation is as 
follows. After the collapse of France, we presented the problem of the 
Catalan administration to the JARE. A part of these resources was 
dedicated to the assistance of the refugees and a part to the development 
of Catalan culture. (...) However, the JARE did not agree with all our 
demands and this is why we renewed our claims.'432 
The Catalans tried to extract as much money as possible from the JARE, as Pi i Sunyer 
claimed: ‘I have exposed clearly the problem of the Catalan finance agreement with 
the JARE. I am hoping that you will intervene on our side in order to help the Catalans 
get more resources from the JARE.’433 The financial difficulty was never resolved.
4.6 SANTALO'S ARRIVAL IN MEXICO
Severe problems were posed by the arrival of Miquel Santalo in Mexico. Until 
then, Carles Pi i Sunyer, leader of the CNC, had acted as the most prominent figure of 
Catalan nationalism434, since Josep Irla435, the de facto president of Catalonia, was not 
able to exercise his power from Vichy, France. However, Josep Tarradellas (leader of 
the ERC) initiated strategies from France to neutralise the CNC’s power. In February 
1941, the leaders of the ERC met in Nimes: Tarradellas, Ma (already president of the 
Generalitat after the execution of Companys), Joan Sauret and Miquel Santalo were
430 C. Pi i Sunyer, Memories de I'exili, Vol.1, pp.100-101.
431 PRO, File FO 371/39744, Letter Lizaso to Aguirre, London, 10-12-1944.
432 FPS, Box 1, Folder 9, letter from C. Pi i Sunyer in London to Agrapacid patridtica in Chile, 15-07-
1941.
433 APS, letter from Carles Pi i Sunyer to Josep Andreu Abelld, London, 03-10-1940.
434 From the appointment of Santald onwards, the relations between Santald and Pi i Sunyer were very 
significant for the developments of Catalan nationalism. A good summary of these relations can be 
obtained through the analysis of the correspondence between these two leaders. FPS, Box 17, Folder 
603.
435 Josep Irla assumed the position of President of Catalonia as, upon Lluis Companys’ death, Joan 
Casanovas, next in line to succeed Companys also perished. For more information of Josep Ida's 
presidency see Martinez Yendrell, Una vida per Catalunya, pp.343-345.
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present. Santalo was a member of the board committees of ERC. A discussion took 
place concerning the primacy of the CNC in London, and a way of curbing its 
influence. It was agreed that Santald be sent to Mexico, with a document from Irla 
authorising him to create a delegation of the presidency of the Generalitat on 
American land. With Santalo’s arrival in Central America in 1941, the legitimacy of 
the CNC in London was critically undermined, since its premise was the fact that Irla 
could not exercise his powers. Carles Pi i Sunyer’s leadership was compromised, and 
the Catalan comunitats in Latin America quickly divided according to whom they 
pledged their allegiance. Carles Pi i Sunyer summarised the moment: ‘On the 27 the 
October, I received the following cable from Santald: I have just arrived in Mexico. 
President Irla has allocated me to the responsibility of his delegation for Catalonia and 
France for the union of Catalans naming the CNC.’436
A leadership struggle ensued. Those Catalans in exile in Latin America were 
divided after Santalo’s arrival, compromising their level of organisation. A 
constitutionalist minority, led by Santald, led the moderate sectors of ERC, defending 
republican legality and the statute of autonomy overtly contrary to the policy 
advocated by Carles Pi i Sunyer. Pi iSunyer’s CNC upheld radical nationalism. For 
the CNC, Catalonia was outside the republic and could eventually achieve self- 
determination. Pi i Sunyer explained the division among Catalans: ‘The chasm 
produced has divided our members in two fronts of opinion, one defending the legalist 
formula of Santald and the other giving its support to the CNC of London.’437 
Miquel Santalo’s arrival then, at least as had been in part intended, posed 
enormous problems to Carles Pi i Sunyer. Internally, he ceded his grip on the 
leadership of Catalan nationalism, and externally, he lost legitimacy in the eyes of 
many Catalans. Santalo’s delegation in Mexico requested the collaboration of the 
followers of the CNC, specifically Carles Pi i Sunyer, who was asked to form part of 
Santalo’s Consell.
After considering the proposal, Pi i Sunyer decided to reject the offer to 
participate in Santalo’s Consell, on the grounds that the project was against CNC
436 C. Pi i Sunyer, Memories de I'exili, Vol.L, p. 109-111.
437 Poblet, Box C16, The Consell Nacional de Londres.
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policy and against the will of the majority of Catalans. The decision was immediately 
communicated to the comunitats:
'After a few months of uncertainty, and having got to Mexico, Miquel 
Santalo with a presidential delegation, I received some news from him 
where he asked me if I wanted to take part in a Consell. He said who 
the constituent members would be. However, I thought that this project 
did not cover all of the Consell Nacional and I refused his offer. I 
thought the project was not good enough to be accepted by the majority 
of the Catalans. I also had to announce my decision to the members of 
the Comunitats since I wanted to avoid confusion.'438 
Once again, Catalan internal divisions and leadership clashes did not allow for the 
organisation of cohesive, solid opposition.
4.7 CONCLUSION
The Catalan community in the USA from 1940 to 1942 was small, but effective, 
hoping to act as a bridge between those in Europe, particularly the UK, and those in 
Latin America, and working alongside the American government in accordance with 
the policy of the CNC in London. The USA government had joined the Allies in 
World War n, and welcomed the Catalans. It was the Basques though, and their 
representative Aguirre in particular, who managed to get close to the American 
government, on the back of a larger and better-organised community of Basques in the 
USA.
Catalans spread throughout many countries in Latin America during 1940 and 
1942, organising in comunitats that were often accountable to the CNC of London. 
Communication problems between Europe and Latin America, and leadership 
divisions among Catalans weakened substantially their structure and activity. In 
consequence, they would become more and more independent of voice and in action. 
Resources, particularly finance, were hard to come by, and it proved too onerous to 
develop new infrastructure from scratch.
438 C. Pi i Sunyer, Reports 1939-1942, (Barcelona, Fundaci6 d'estudis auton6mics i locals, edicid de 
Francesc Vilanova, 1993), p.147.
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Nonetheless, perhaps the single greatest impediment to establishing effective 
opposition in Latin America arrived in the form of Santalo, invested with Irla’s 
presidential powers, and protesting a rival claim to the leadership of the movement. 
The resulting clashes of leadership between Santalo and Pi i Sunyer affected the 
capacity of Catalan nationalism to organise itself in all spheres. The comunitats did 
not know whether to answer to the CNC in London or to Santalo in Mexico. Disunity 
cost Catalan nationalism legitimacy, damaging its perceived power to bargain with 
other groups in opposition, the image it presented to the international community, as 
well as its power to implement new policies. The problem of leadership created 
confusion amongst Catalans around the world.
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CHAPTER 5-CATALAN OPPOSm ON TO FRANCO FROM AUGUST 1942 
TO OCTOBER 1944: THE CRISIS OF CATALAN NATIONALISM IN 
EUROPE AND AMERICA
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The two years between August 1942 and August 1944 was a period of confusion, 
disorder and scant activity for Catalan nationalism as a whole. Though the odds on an 
Allied victory seemed to be shortening, it was thought to be a positive factor for the 
anti-Francoist opposition, all the more so for the Catalan opposition, who had given 
them their full support and were hoping to be assisted once the war was over. It was 
not obvious how, or even whether the Allies would intervene in the struggle against the 
Francoist regime.
On 8 November 1942, the Allies had disembarked in the North of Africa. 
Mussolini left his position on 25 July 1943, and on 8 September 1943, Italy 
capitulated. At this point, Franco shifted to a policy of rapprochement towards the 
Allies. Once an Allied victory appeared likely, Franco began to present himself to the 
international community as the only hope against Communism, emphasising the 
catholic and monarchical elements of his programme and playing down its more 
authoritarian ones. The central objective was to remain in power. In this, he was 
helped by the awful memory of the Civil War, which exerted an enormous influence 
on international support for Francoism, since the dictatorship at least promised 
stability. Given the situation, Catalans became less enthusiastic about their chances of 
overthrowing Franco.439
439 The consequences of the fall of Mussolini in 1943 on Spanish politics are very well explained in P. 
Preston, Franco, chapter XIX, Watching the tide turn'. See also J. Tusell, Javier, La dictadura de 
Franco, (Madrid, Alianza, 1988); J.L. Delgado editor., El primer franquismo, Espafia durante la 
Segunda Guerra Mundial, (Madrid, s.XXI de Espafia, editores, 1989); R. Espinar Gallego, El 
impacto de la Segunda Guerra Mundial en Europa y en Espafia, (Madrid, Asamblea de Madrid,
1986); PS, Catalunya, El poble catala, Mexico, 1944.
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5.2 DISSOLUTION OF CNC OF LONDON, FAILURE OF SANTALO’S 
CONSELL IN MEXICO AND RECONSTITUTION OF CONSELL OF 
LONDON
From 1940 to 1942, the centres of the Catalan exile, in terms of political 
importance, had been the UK and the comunitats in Latin America. After 1942, 
Catalan opposition would be principally led by a reconstituted Consell of London and 
by the Front Nacional in France, Spain and the UK. It is important to distinguish 
between the Consell Nacional de Catalunya of London (CNC) between 1940 and 1943, 
Santalo’s Consell in Mexico between 1941 and 1944, and the reconstituted Consell of 
London between 1944 and 1945.
In September 1942, once the members of the CNC in the UK had been informed 
of Santalo’s assumption of power in Mexico, Carles Pi i Sunyer resigned as president 
of the CNC. A great number of Catalans was unhappy at Santalo’s appointment, 
considering it contrary to the interests of Catalonia. And though Pi i Sunyer would 
number among Santalo’s most prominent critics, he accepted Santolo’s legitimacy and 
therefore stepped down from his post. The CNC ceased to exist by the beginning of 
1943.440 The members of the CNC of London explained the dissolution in 1943:
In  the year 1942, the President of the Catalan Parliament, Josep Irla i 
Bosch, considering himself virtual president of Catalonia- once the 
fascists had killed the president Llufs Companys- delegated his 
presidential functions in Josep Santalo in order for him to form a 
government in Mexico and it was this way that the division in the 
Catalan family started. (...) The case is that Pi i Sunyer presented his 
dismissal of his charge to the Catalan entities of America. The Catalan 
comunitats of America asked Pi i Sunyer to stay in his charge and not 
resign. (...) But Carles Pi i Sunyer sent a letter to the Catalans in 
America by which he insisted on his dismissal. So by 1943, the CNC of 
London was non-existent."441
440 F.Vilanova, Les ruptures de I'any 39, p.45; Pi i Sunyer, Reports 1939-1942, p. 146.
441 Poblet, Box C l6, The Consell Nacional de Londres.
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Pi i Sunyer’s resignation, in September 1942, and the dissolution of the CNC of the 
UK in 1943 was not the end of the question of Catalan leadership since many 
comunitats of Latin America did not approve of Santalo’s delegation, and continued to
. 4 4 9support Pi l Sunyer.
A Catalan representative in Colombia indicated that some comunitats did not 
even go so far as agreeing with the power of the interim president, Josep Irla. In the 
words of Joan Sole i Pla:
"We declare our loyalty to the CNC of London. (...) Irla does not 
deserve to any compassion, since he was nominated suddenly as interim 
President of the Catalan Parliament. (...) When we received the order 
to abandon Barcelona and reunite the Catalan Parliament without time 
to think about it, Irla stopped acting as President and became a refugee 
just like any other. He did not realise the difficulties of the moment and 
that everybody, but even more so himself, needed to show energy, 
serenity and patriotism all of which he seemed to ignore."443 
Furthermore, the comunitat of Mexico continued to support Pi i Sunyer, leading to the 
severing of relations between the comunitat Catalana in Mexico and the ERC in 
France:
442 APS, Box 13, Folder 423, letter from Pere Mas I Perera to Carles Pi i Sunyer, Avellaneda, 19-12- 
1943 ; FPS, Box 1, Folder 5, letter from Jaume Aiguader I Mir6 to Carles Pi i Sunyer, London, 09-03-
1942.
443 FPS, Box 18, folder 628, letter from Joan Sold P1& from Colombia to C. Pi i Sunyer in London.
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'ERC gave its support to the president of the Generalitat as a legitimate 
representative of Catalonia. (...) A few months before the occupation of 
Paris by the Germans, the constitution of the comunitat Catalana was 
initiated in Mexico following the example of other nuclei residing in 
Argentina, Chile and Colombia. (...)When the provisional Council of 
London restarted relations with the legitimate representation of 
Catalonia, the president, Carles Pi i Sunyer, presented his resignation 
under the name of the so-called council. (...) The Catalan comunitat of 
Mexico has become the voice of these changes, asking the president of 
the provisional council if he would stay in place in order to implement 
his personal policy. (...) The comunitat of Mexico directly approached 
the president that was resigning instead of approaching the president of 
Catalonia. (...) Therefore, the incompatibility between ERC and the 
comunitat of Mexico was declared by the party.'444 
Catalans were split throughout the Americas, and Europe.
Due to the clash of leadership between Santalo and Pi i Sunyer, the CNC had 
ceased operation for eighteen months since its dissolution, thus immobilising the 
Catalan opposition movement. No organisation had managed to substitute adequately 
for the functions of the CNC of London.445 Pi i Sunyer himself commented: ‘The 
reality is that the CNC before represented an element of unity and since it suffered the 
crisis it has not been possible to substitute it by an efficient element.’446
Santalo failed to reorganise the Catalan comunitats in America. Attempts to 
reconstitute the Consell by Santalo after 1943 also came to nothing. Santalo tried to 
reconstitute a similar institution to that of the CNC of London in Mexico between 1941 
and 1943, but his Consell in Mexico was always bound to fail as it could not count on 
the support of the leaders of the CNC of London or the Catalan comunitats in Latin 
America. Even if Santalo had sought to exercise power formally handed to him by
444 A2RE, Sbert 1.1, letter of Senyor Secretari inter! del Comit& Organitzador del Secretariat de 
Relacions Militants dTsquerra Republicana de Catalunya afectes a Comunitats Catalanes, Mexico 
D.F., 31-01-1943.
445 F. Vilanova, Les ruptures de I 'any 39, p.49; C. Pi i Sunyer, Memdries del primer exili, VoLl., 
p.151.
446 FPS, 1943, Carta de Pi i Sunyer a Aiguader, Londres, 20-04-1943.
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Irla, the legitimacy of his leadership was not accepted and his support as such was 
limited to the members of ERC in France. He did not manage to implement his 
policy.447 Bosch i Gimpera accounted for Santalo’s failure: ‘I believe that Santalo is to 
blame for the Catalan organisational failure in Latin America. Santalo has not known 
how to solve the problem. (...) On the other hand I have also regretted your silence a 
lot since each one has interpreted your silence it its own way.’448 By 1943, it was clear 
that the delegation of Santalo had failed in the main due to a lack of support from the 
Catalans in Mexico, still looking to Pi i Sunyer’s CNC of London for leadership. Had 
Santalo succeeded in integrating Pi i Sunyer into his delegation, things might have 
been different, but Pi i Sunyer had rejected his offer.
The failure of Santalo’s Consell (1941-1943) left an institutional vacuum. Bosch 
i Gimpera explained to Pi i Sunyer that calls for the Consell of London to be 
reconstituted had gone up in 1943: ‘In London, the elements of the Casal Catala asked 
that we should reconstitute the Consell. The same demand came from everywhere in 
America- Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, New York.’449
Thus, in 1944, Pi i Sunyer attempted to reconstitute the Consell after achieving 
the support of the Catalan opposition based in Catalonia 450 Hopes that the new 
Consell was to become once again the leading representative institution of Catalan 
nationalism were renewed.451 That Catalonia as yet had no organisation to represent its 
interest provided the principal motivation for the reconstitution of the Consell.452 The 
new Consell claimed:453 ‘The task of recovering of Catalonia is complicated and tough 
but it does not exceed our abilities and strengths. (...) Catalans, it is now time to 
regain Catalonia.’454
447 PRO File FO 371-39744, London, 1944, Lizaso.
448 APS, Box 3, letter 100, letter from Bosch I Gimpera to Carles Pi i Sunyer, Mexico, 27-02-1944.
449 APS, Box 3, folder 100, letter from Bosch I Gimpera to Carles Pi i Sunyer, Mexico, 30-11-1943.
450 For information on the reconstitution of the Consell of London, see FPS, Box D5, Declaracid CNC, 
1943; FPS, Box D5, Declaracid del Consell Nacional de Catalunya, Ramon Perera and Fermi Verges, 
20-08-1944 and FPS, Box 19, Folder 645B, letters between Josep Tarradellas and Carles Pi i Sunyer, 
London, 21-11-1944
451 FPS, Box D5, Declaration Autumn 1943.
452 AT, Poblet, Box C6, London, 10-04-1944.
453 C. Pi i Sunyer, Memories del primer exili, Vol.l, pp.145-156; Vilanova, Les ruptures de I'any 39, 
p.50.
454 FPS, Box D5, Declaracid del Consell Nacional de Catalunya, Ramon Perera and Fermi Verges, 20-
08-1944.
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The new Consell declared its restructuring on the 24 August 1944 in London 
(Declaracio del Consell Nacional de Catalunya) rejecting Santalo’s political 
project.455 The new Consell would take into account the old policy but radicalised its 
message, making an overt defence of the right of self-determination and the concept of 
a federal structure in Spain 456 Its final aim was the structuring of a federation of the 
Pai'sos Catalans. The idea of a federation of nations went so far as to propose a project 
for the creation of an Iberian Community of Nations 457 Some elements of the 1944 
Declaration had already been present in 1940, but the international situation had 
changed considerably. The new Consell broke with the policy of the Generalitat. The 
reconstituted Consell was also trying to maintain relations with the Catalans in the 
USA, as Pi i Sunyer claimed:
I t  is now more important than ever that there is a Catalan representation 
both in London and the USA. (...) The Catalan comunitats of America 
support the Consell Nacional Catala. (...) The Basque government is 
willing to collaborate with us. (...) All the comunitats in America have 
to act in co-ordination with the Consell of London/458 
Immediately after the constitution of the new Consell, its members sought the approval 
of the Catalan comunitat of Mexico, asking it to inform the other comunitats of the 
Americas.
Pi i Sunyer was again a prominent figure in the new Consell of 1944 although he 
would be overtaken by the more radical wing of Catalans in the UK. Pi i Sunyer found 
himself in some difficulty as to which line to take. His natural sympathies lay in 
federalism, the idea of national unity, a national culture and republicanism; moreover, 
he cared for the Catalan Socialists. At the same time though, he had lost substantial 
support since 1940 and now faced, in common with his colleagues, all the 
impossibilities and vagaries of acting from France -  the communications problems and
455 PRO FO 371/39744, letter from Jaume Miravitlles to Carles Pi i Sunyer, CNC, 20-12-1944. 
Document on the activities of the new Consell of London; AN, Artea, EBB 117-2,02-1944, letter from 
Miravitlles to Aguirre.
456 For an explanation of the new Consell's radicalised policy see FPS, Box 20, Folder 666, C. Pi i 
Sunyer letter to Josep Trueta, London, 19-07-1944.
457 F. Vilanova, Les ruptures de I'any 39, pp.50-52; C. Pi i Sunyer, Memdries de I'exili, Vol.l, p.209.
458AT, Poblet, Box C6, Pi i Sunyer's document, London, 10-04-1944.
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poverty of resources. Circumstances had evidently contrived against a moderate path. 
Josep Tarradellas, the ERC leader in exile, summarised Pi i Sunyer’s ideology in 1944: 
'Carles Pi i Sunyer was seeking for Catalonia: Catalan unity and structuring of 
an organisation of national character. Secondly, he expected to improve the 
relations with the Basque nationalits and the Galician nationalists. Thirdly, the 
Catalans should have a common attitude regarding the republican Cortes in 
Mexico.'459
Pi i Sunyer’s defence of the right of self-determination and the structure of Spain as a 
confederation of equal and free states was not in agreement with the position of the 
ERC in Mexico. Pi i Sunyer wrote to Trueta, the CNC doctor, in 1944: ‘We refused 
the constitution of a statute, claiming self-determination. We maintain our proposition 
of the widening of the Consell of America.’460
Pi i Sunyer461 wished to keep the centre of Catalan power in London, but his 
policy line was contested by Batista i Roca and Trueta462, whose designs were more 
radical, purely nationalist and anti-Communist. The policy of the new Consell rather 
reflected their ambitions. 463
Pi i Sunyer’s power was further compromised when his principal ally, Pere 
Bosch i Gimpera, left for America in the summer of 1940. With Pi i Sunyer distracted 
by the challenge of managing and co-ordinating the activity of the comunitats in Latin 
America, Josep Trueta and Batista i Roca continued to seek more influence. Neither 
was dependent on political and historical responsibilities to the old guard, but, at the 
same time, in their situation as ex-counsellors of the Generalitat, both could represent 
a sort of institutional continuity and avoid offending the older Republican politicians. 
With Pi i Sunyer more and more isolated, Batista i Roca and Trueta assumed 
increasing importance. Within the new Consell, the balance of forces changed. A 
member of the UK Foreign Office, Mr. Harvey, explained:
459 FPS, Box 19, Folder 645B, letters between Josep Tarradellas and Carles Pi i Sunyer, London, 21-11- 
1944.
460 FPS, Box 20, Folder 666, C. Pi i Sunyer letter to Josep Trueta, London, 19-07-1944.
461 F. Vilanova, Les ruptures de I'any 39, p.50.
462 PRO, File F0371/49582,05-05-1945, Mr. Harvey's conversation with Dr. Trueta on the political 
situation. The letter summarises Tmeta's policy.
463 FPS, Box D5, Declaracid CNC, 1943; F. Vilanova, Les ruptures de I'any 39, pp.48-53; C. Pi i 
Sunyer, Memories de I'exili, Vol.l., p. 163.
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"Dr. Trueta’s remedy for Spain was a federal Spain (to escape 
Communism and fascism) in which Catalonia and the Basque country as 
federal states would counterbalance the influence of the rest of Spain.
Whereas the Basques and Catalans were a progressive and mercantile 
community, the Spaniards were not. However, he was not confident 
that this regime could be brought about."464 
The new Consell faced then a number of problems after its reconstitution: the system 
of comunitats was still not working efficiendy, resources remained tight, and political 
infighting continued at home and abroad. These factors would prove detrimental to its 
effectiveness, and to its power. 465 The new Consell would be dissolved just a year 
later in 1945.
53  CATALAN DEVELOPMENTS IN FRANCE AND SPAIN
Between 1942 and 1944, a small number of groups, including the Estat Catala 
(EC) and the Esquerra Republican Catalonia (ERC)466, began to reorganise themselves 
in both France and Spain. Three years on from the end of the Civil War, Catalan 
fortunes slowly started to improve on the home front. However, both EC and ERC 
would have to wait for the liberation of France before they could become open 
formalised political organisations rather than shadowy associations.467
Estat Catala (EC) had been formed again in June 1936 through the unification of 
Partit Nacionalista Catala, the paramilitary group Nosaltres Sols! and sections of 
Joventuts d’Esquerra Republicans EC began to stir on 24 January 1941, when Joan 
Carol Ventosa - a member of a group of militants within the party- arrived secretly in 
Barcelona. During his visit to Catalunya Nord he interviewed Vicen? Borrell468, 
general secretary of EC, and asked him to make contact with political groups in 
Catalonia to promote the idea of a liberal and independent Catalonia within a 
democratic Europe. From France, EC was giving support to the Allied information
464 PRO File FO 371/49582, Mr. Harvey's conversation with Dr. Trueta, London, 05-05-1945.
465 F.Vilanova, Les ruptures de I'any 39, pp.48-49.
466 D. Diaz Esculies, L 'oposicio catalanista al franquisme: el republicanisme liberal i la nova oposicio 
(1939-1960), (Barcelona, Publicacions de l'Abadia de Montserrat, 1996), pp.44-48.
467 A. Viladot i Presas, Nacionalisme ipremsa clandestina, p. 189.
468 Viceng Borrell was a leader of Estat Catall
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services, both the British Intelligence Service and the French Deuxieme Bureau. 
Although the activity of the party was rather weak between 1942 and 1944, the 
Joventuts d’Estat Catala (JEC) were created. In 1944, the general secretary, Viceng 
Borrell, entered Catalonia consolidating the reorganisation of EC and it started 
developing in both Catalonia and France.469 Inside Spain, EC was radical, aspiring to a 
high degree of self-determination for Catalonia as its manifesto claimed: ‘It is 
necessary that our organisation acquires from its formation the title of a national 
movement. It is necessary to make it plain and clear from the beginning that Catalonia 
aspires to a wide national freedom.’470
The other relevant left wing party to reorganise in 1942 was Esquerra 
Republicana de Catalunya 471 The pre-eminent leader of the ERC was Josep 
Tarradellas, who resided in France. ERC pursued a legalistic line, favouring a return 
to the republican constitution of 1931 472 ERC defended autonomy on the basis of the 
statute of 1932 and wished to recover the constitution of the second republic.473 ERC 
policy was similar in France and in Mexico. The party aspired to hegemony among its 
Catalan peers and tried by all available means to boycott the new Consell of London. 
Between 1939 and 1951, there were several phases in the reorganisation of ERC. 
Before 1941, ERC’s very existence was tenuous. In 1941, a core leadership was 
formed, whose immediate task was to regroup those militants that had stayed in the 
capital of Catalonia, before making contact with the nuclei of the regions around 
Barcelona. In the prisons of Catalonia, the militants of ERC started to regroup. In 
mid-1942, a section of ERC decided to join the Front Nacional de Catalunya (FNC), 
without abandoning the autonomous structure of the party. Formally, the section of 
ERC that joined the FNC maintained its autonomy. By this stage, the connections with
469 Diaz Esculies, L 'oposicio catalanista alfranquisme, pp.45-47.
470 AGA, Box 11287, Folder 4, report 063, Red Separatist Catalans, Spanish embassy in Paris, Estat 
Catalans manifest.
471 ERC aimed to secure the sovereignty of Catalonia, and the upholding of the constitutional rights in 
the territory. ERC also favoured federation with other Iberian regions. From 1939, it worked, in exile, 
to maintain the institutions of the Generalitat, and the Catalan Parliament, and held the presidency of 
the Generalitat, first in the figure of Josep Irla, who was interim president of the Generalitat after die 
death of Companys, until 1954, and then with Josep Tarradellas, from 1954 onwards. AT, Poblet, 
ERC14,20-10-1944, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya.
472 The developments of the ERC are very well documented in the Arxiu Tarradellas in Poblet. AT, 
Poblet, ERC, Paris, 20-10-1944
473 F.Vilanova, Les ruptures de I'any 39, p.48.
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occupied France had, for practical purposes, all but disappeared. The members that 
remained inside Catalonia were opposed to their peers in France. ERC influence 
would, in the main, be channelled through the FNC platform, which represented a 
large section of the Catalan youth.
A clear division in Catalan nationalism emerged between those supporting Pi i 
Sunyer’s policy and those supporting ERC policy. The predominance of Pi i Sunyer 
and the Consell Nacional de Catalunya (CNC) came to an end in 1942, as the nuclei of 
ERC began to reorganise. Santalo disappeared from the political sphere after his 
failure to reconstitute the Consell in Mexico. By contrast, Josep Irla would continue as 
de facto president of the Generalitat of Catalonia until 1954. Pi i Sunyer, who was 
widely respected by Catalans in exile formed part of the Catalan govemment-in-exile 
until 1947. Tarradellas was president of a Generalitat with a debatable legality from 
1954 onwards.474
Overall, from 1942-1944, the leading force in Catalan nationalism was the Front 
Nacional de Catalunya (FNC) in France and Spain. The National Executive Council 
of the Front Nacional was formed by Joan Comudella (President), Manuel Cruells 
(Secretary for Organisation and Propaganda), Jaume Martinez (Military Secretary), 
and Llufs Seires, Ramon Arrufat, Domenec Ramon and Pere Narbona as 
spokesmen 475 Many militants joined the FNC from Estat Catala. Nosaltres Sols476 
was integrated into the FNC, though its paramilitary section retained a degree of 
autonomy. A majority of the militants from ERC, dispersed and disconnected, also 
joined the FNC. FNC became the focal point for Catalan militancy inside Spain. The 
influence of the FNC also extended to the anarcho-unionist movement. A significant 
sector of the Confederacio Nacional del Treball (Workers National Confederation or 
CNT) - the anarcho-syndicalist trade union - collaborated with the FNC from 1942 
onwards. The FNC also succeeded in integrating the membership of Accio Catalana
474 J.M. Bricall, La Generalitat de Catalunya a I'exili, (Barcelona, Aym&, 1977).
475 J. Martinez Vendrell, Una vida per Catalunya, Memdries (1939-1946), (Barcelona, Pbrtic, 1991), 
p.145.
476 Nosaltres Sols was a Catalan political group created by Daniel Cardona in 1931. It emerged as the 
radicalisation of the Catalan nationalism of Estat CataliL It counted on a paramilitary organisation. In 
1936 it merged with the Partit Nacionalista Republic^ and the Joventut dTRC in order to reconstitute 
Estat Catalk.
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Republicana (Catalan Republican Action, ACR),477 demonstrating a considerable 
capacity for integration, drawing allegiance from forces as diverse as anarcho- 
unionists, moderate Catalan centrists, republican nationalists, and separatists. Though 
under the control of pro-independence radicals, the FNC became the organisation for 
all Catalan democrats.
In September 1943, the leaders of the FNC asked Pi i Sunyer to compose a 
document calling for unity and perseverance among Catalans. The manifesto that Pi i 
Sunyer produced was entitled Primeres Paraules (First Words), and was distributed 
secretly around Catalonia. It contributed to the consolidation and the widening of the 
FNC by being a good basis of propaganda for the Catalan cause. A few thousand 
copies of Primeres Paraules were distributed around Catalonia, some achievement 
since Francoism fully repressed and persecuted anti-Francoist propaganda.
The document Primeres Paraules clearly showed the extent to which the FNC 
and Catalans more generally, supported the Allied cause. Pi i Sunyer claimed in 
London in September 1943:
The ideology of Catalan nationalism, what the Catalans felt and 
defended, are the same principles of human dignity that are also debated 
in the present war, and those that will win eventually. (...) Pi i Sunyer 
concluded saying: “The Catalans should persevere in their faith and 
loyalty to Catalonia. (.. .)The United Nations that fight for their self- 
assertion (the Charter of the Adantic) have promised to give all people 
that are honest and have manifested their will, the freedom that was 
taken away from us."478 
Pi i Sunyer took as his point of reference the Adantic Charter of 1941 and tried to 
identify the Catalan cause with that of the Allies, thereby hoping to obtain help from 
them.
477 Acrid Catalana Republicana (ACR) was a Catalan political party founded in March 1931 with the 
merging of Acrid Catalana and Accid Republicana de Catalunya. The party was represented in the 
government of the Generalitat. It also formed part of the Front Popular de Catalunya in the elections 
of the 16 Februaiy 1936. During the Civil War, it stayed close to the republican side.
478 AT, C127, Trimeres Paraules', Pi i Sunyer, London, September 1943; Diaz i Esculies, L'oposicio 
Catalana alfranquisme, (Barcelona, Publications de l'Abadia de Montserrat, 1996), pp.48-63.
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Through the diffusion of the publication of Primeres Paraules, the Spanish 
police came to discover and identify the leadership of the FNC. Persecutions followed. 
Whilst arrests were made, Jaume Comudella, Antoni Andreu and others left Perpignan, 
returning to Barcelona where they immediately started to get the FNC back on its 
feet.479 A telegram from Antoni Andreu reported the situation:
"As a consequence of the diffusion of Primeres Paraules the services of 
German Gestapo480 in Catalonia strengthened their repression in 
Catalonia."481
Repression was not new to the FNC. In June 1941, the police had arrested nearly 40 
people. Once that crisis had been overcome, the FNC had created another committee, 
politically more active, and stronger. It established contact, from 1943, with the CNC 
in London.
Relations between the FNC and the CNC of London were generally good. 
Catalan contact with the British secret services was often made through FNC member 
Jaume Ribas, who often visited Barcelona from London, providing a line of 
communication between the FNC, ERC, and the CNC. 482 His arrest was strongly 
protested. As a file from the PRO suggests, Consul General Farquahr noticed in the 
Times of 16 February a letter from Dr. Trueta of Oriel College, Oxford, and 
requesting help in obtaining the release of intellectuals in Barcelona who have recendy 
been imprisoned for their pro-allied sympathies and referring particularly to Sr. Carles 
Riba. “There are reports that Secret Police have arrested 250 members. A few are still 
imprisoned but C. Riba was on conditional release a week ago.”483 Overall, the FNC 
became the leading Catalan opposition group during the period, the largest, and, in 
terms of its membership, the most inclusive.
479 Martinez Vendrell, Una vida per Catalunya,, pp.160-161,163; Viladot, Nacionalisme, pp.60-62; 
PRO, File FO 371/39744, Chancery Madrid to Central Department, Primeres Paraules, Carles Pi i 
Sunyer, London, 08-01-1944.
480 The Gestapo had secret services and agents installed all around Europe.
481 C. Pi i Sunyer, Memories de I'exili, Vol.l, pp.178-179.
482 Diaz i Esculies, L'oposicid catalanista alfranquisme, pp.48-63.
483 PRO, File FO 371/39744, Carles Riba, Barcelona, 25-02-1944.
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The first documents to detail the policy of the FNC were elaborated in 1944.m  
The main mission of the FNC was to achieve the political independence of Catalonia 
and to make the case for Catalonia to the Allies. The members of the FNC believed 
that, after the Allied triumph, democratic normality would be restored in Spain. The 
FNC believed a union of both political and military action could overthrow Franco.
The military section of the organisation, led by Nosaltres Sols and its leader Jaume 
Martinez Vendrell, tried to erode the Francoist system through military action.485 By 
1945, the FNC also managed to produce and distribute regularly around 5000 copies of 
the magazine Catalunya.4*6
In its declaration of August 1944, after asserting that FNC hoped to achieve a 
Catalan democratic unity, stress was given to a social policy that would defend 
freedom of thought and speech. Concerning the national question, the FNC defended 
the strategic objective of a co-federal structuring of the Paisos Catalans and supported 
the Charter of the Atlantic. The FNC was isolated from the government of the 
Generalitat and thus felt obliged to define its confusing ideology.487
Increasingly, the FNC’s sphere of influence was not confined to Spain. With the 
arrival in Barcelona of a few of its members from France, the organisation quickly 
began working across the two countries.488 Members of the FNC in the UK were 
working with the British Secret Services, and also supported the work of the CNC in 
the UK The FNC combined an ability to integrate members from several parties and 
to operate across borders. Fully committed to the service of the Allies and hoping to 
press the right of self-determination, the FNC programme agreed fully with that of the 
CNC.
484 FPS, Ressorgiment, 'Report sobre el Front Nacional de Catalunya', 1941. "After the arrests of 1943, 
the Front took some months to reappear. In the month of April 1944, the FNC expected an enormous 
persecution by the Francoist forces. In the month of April 1944 and directly authorized by the arrested 
companions, the Front reappeared in the streets of Barcelona with a new manifest fixing once more its 
position: Catalonia, republic, Freedom, Democracy, Social Justice.” FPS, Ressorgiment, 'Report sobre 
el Front Nacional de Catalunya', 1941.
485 Diaz Esculies, L 'oposicio catalanista al franquisme, pp.55-56.
486 Diaz Esculies, el FNC, (Barcelona, Magrana, 1983).
487 Diaz Esculies, L 'oposicio catalanista al franquisme, pp.60-62.
488 Diaz i Esculies, L'oposicid catalanista al franquisme, pp.48-63.
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5.4 LATIN AMERICA DEVELOPMENTS
Concurrently with developments in the European political arena, anti-Francoist 
opposition in Latin America was also trying to get organised. During the period, 
republicans, who in the main subscribed to the fundamental principles of the republic 
of 1931, also began their reorganisation. They accepted constitutional legality and did 
not accept defence of the right of self-determination by the nationalists, precluding any 
agreement between them. Both Catalans and Basque nationalists were committed to 
establishing a democratic and republican system in the Iberian Peninsula, strongly 
opposing both fascism and the monarchy, but also insisting on recognition of their 
right of self-determination.
The most remarkable attempt of left-wing parties on the American continent to 
create a united left platform was the formation of the Junta de Liberacion (Liberation 
Council or JL489), in Mexico on 25 November 1943. It was composed of elements 
from both Spanish Republican and Socialist organisations and Catalans. The pact for 
republican restoration was signed in Mexico by Izquierda Unida, Union Republicana, 
ERC, Accio Catalana Republicana and PSOE. As such, it was an association of 
political parties and groups, and did not represent Spanish democracy as a whole. The 
Communists were excluded. Equally, the Basques did not play a part. This was, 
specifically, another attempt by Republicans and Catalans to join together. The JL was 
an organisation of government presided over by Diego Martinez Barrio, and Prieto, 
who was its secretary. In terms of policy, it represented an intermediate point between 
these two leaders.490 All parties to the JL followed the principles of the constitution of 
1931, though, as the JL itself emphasised, it did not expect to form a government. 
Among the Catalan parties, ERC and ACR joined the JL since they combined 
Republican aims with Catalan ones. Bosch i Gimpera explained the pillars of the JL: 
"Afterwards the Junta de Liberacion constituted an agreement amongst 
the parties that had been the ones that had promoted the republic. It is 
not and does not expect to be a government and it only tries to work for
489 A2RE, Box Sbert, 12-09-1944, Discurso pronunciado por el senor Antonio Maria Sbert, miembro de 
la JL. Document that explains the pillars of the JL; A2RE, Box Sbert 1.7.2.
490 PRO, File FO 371/39744, Pi i Sunyer, London, 08-01-1944; AN, letter from Julio de J&uregui to Jos6 
Antonio de Aguirre, Mexico, 23-11-1943; C. Pi i Sunyer, Memdries de I'exili, Vol.l, pp.133-138.
143
the overthrow of Franco in order to free Spain and establish a 
democratic republican regime in Spain and a commitment with the 
autonomic principles of the regions."491 
The JL would not endure however. Differences between the Prieto’s Socialists and 
Martinez Barrio’s Republicans proved too much of an obstacle for the success of the 
JL. Nor did the JL accept Catalan demands for self-determination. A compromise 
could not be found, as Josep Trueta claimed:492 ‘Our existence as a nation is now being 
recognised. (...) A compromise with the Spanish Republicans at this point would be a 
mistake.’493 Once again, the left-wing parties and the Catalans could not come to 
agreement on policy. Both groups lacked the capacity to compromise required to 
achieve an entente.
The JL was the rival organisation of the Union Nacional Espanola (UNE) since 
the JL was fiercely anti-communist and the UNE was created by the communists and 
pretended to be a wider front than it really was. The Communists, the PCE (Spanish 
Communist party) a growing force in France from 1941, created a unitary platform, the 
Union Nacional Espanola (UNE), uniting the groups of the left. Though the coalition 
was directed by the Communists, the involvement of Republicans, Socialists, Catalans 
and the UGT ensured there would be clashes of leadership.494 The UNE was 
remarkable as an attempt to unite Catalans, Communists, Republicans and Socialists 
who had not coalesced before, but the attempt failed 495
5.5 CONCLUSION
The period 1942-1944 proved a time of crisis for Catalan nationalism in general. 
Catalan comunitats in Latin America were similarly unconvinced, tending to stand by 
the policy of the CNC in London, notwithstanding the fact that Pi i Sunyer had 
resigned. In Mexico, Argentina, Colombia and elsewhere, this imposed limits on the
491 APS, letter from Pere Bosch I Gimpera to Carles Pi i Sunyer, Mexico, 20-11-1943.
492 C. Pi i Sunyer, Memories de I'exili, Vol.l, pp.133-138,204-206.
493 FPS, Box 20, Folder 666, letter from Josep Trueta to Carles Pi i Sunyer, 23-03-1943.
494 PRO File FO 371/39744, Letter Lizaso to Aguirre, Basque relations with the left, London, 10-12- 
1944; PRO File FO 371/39744, London, 24-10-1944. “Unidn Nacional Espanola includes here the 
Socialists (Hernandez), the Communists (Nadal), Alianza Catalana (Termes) representing all the Catalan 
parties including Uni6 Democriltica and Lliga, Republicans and UGT.”
495 PRO File FO 372/39744, Lizaso's letter to Aguirre, London, 28-11-1944).
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development of effective Catalan opposition. Overall Catalan opposition remained 
diffuse, scattered and suffering from the attendant problems of communication. 
Moreover, Santalo did not manage to reorganise the Catalans in America or implement 
his left-wing policy. His own Consell failed, with Pi i Sunyer rejecting his overtures. 
Though an effort was made to radicalise the new Consell of London -  with a degree of 
success -  limits on its effectiveness were imposed by continuing difficulties of 
communication, poverty of resources and clashes between its older and newer factions. 
Overall, 1942-1944 saw the failure of the reconstitution of the new Consell. The new 
Consell radicalised but internal leadership clashes did not allow for subsequent 
development.
Though such left-wing Catalan parties as EC and ERC were starting to 
reorganise in France, they would not make a substantial impact until 1944. Instead, the 
prominent political platform of the period was the FNC. The FNC, including members 
from ECR, Nosaltres Sols and ACR provided the leading unitary platform in this 
period. The core of FNC activity was in France, but good relations were maintained 
with the new Consell of London. However, severe persecution by the security forces 
of the Francoists put paid to its influence.
In Latin America, a significant attempt was made to foster a unitary Catalan- 
Republican platform, the Junta de Liberacion (JL) which included ERC and ACR as 
Catalan parties. However, the JL would fail due to leadership clashes and because the 
Republican parties in its midst could not accept Catalan demands for self- 
determination.
Overall, Catalan organisation suffered many problems. The organisations 
created were inherendy weak and clashes of leadership were recurrent. No dominant 
leader emerged, and lacking a clear centre of power, co-ordination and compromise 
invariably gave way to disorder and dispute. Meanwhile, the Francoist persecution 
continued.
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CHAPTER 6 - CATALAN OPPOSITION TO FRANCO FROM AUGUST 1944 
TO JUNE 1945: THE WAR’S END
6.1 INTRODUCTION
By August 1944, a very welcome Allied victory seemed to be in prospect, which, 
it was expected, would bring with it rapid intervention to overthrow Franco and to re­
establish democracy. The Allies had not yet decided how to approach the Spanish 
case. The first international debates about Spain fuelled hopes for Allied intervention 
even if no concrete action against Franco had been undertaken. Disunity and a critical 
lack of credibility of the opposition in the period (1944 -1945) stopped the Allies from 
getting more fully behind the anti-Francoist effort. Whenever Washington, London or 
Paris approached the anti-Francoists, just one segment of the opposition could be 
negotiated with, never a cohesive group with clear policy lines; this clearly detracted 
from the movement’s credibility apropos of its providing a comparable level of 
stability and security to that achieved by the Francoist regime. At this stage, the 
Allies, though not approving of Franco, did nothing to intervene in the Spanish 
situation. This chapter charts the course of Catalan nationalism between August 1944 
and June 1945. Several groups developed in Catalonia and France, both on the right 
and the left of the political spectrum, but failed to coalesce, expecting swift Allied 
intervention.
6.2 THE LIBERATION OF FRANCE
The Normandy landings of June 1944 marked the first auguries of an Allied 
victory in World War n. However, support for Catalan nationalism from the Western 
powers was not to materialise. It seemed to make sense that the USA, the UK and 
France could not accept fascist rule in Spain, and would help opposition forces to 
overthrow Franco. The threat of Communism, however, particularly the emergence of 
the USSR as a world power, ostensibly took precedence in the international agenda. 
Western powers were more concerned with securing and preserving strategic and 
economic interests in Spain than about the political problems of the Spanish population 
per se. Franco, it seemed, could ensure security and stability. Moreover, the Western
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powers were not presented with a realistic alternative in the Spain of the 1940s. The 
foreign powers’ decision not to remove Franco was shattering for Catalans.496 Josd 
Felix Lequerica, the pro-Nazi Spanish ambassador of the time, gloated in Paris that the 
anti-Francoist opposition felt badly let down: ‘Amongst the emigrants of 1939, a 
feeling of desperation grows since the opposition expected with blind faith an Anglo- 
American victory and behind it a triumphal victory in Spain supported by the
,497victorious governments.
Broadly, it was the USSR and France who wanted to overthrow Franco after 
World War n, whereas the Americans and the British were determined not to intervene 
in Spain. The Soviets, who had joined the Allied side in World War n, after Hitler’s 
invasion of the USSR, were clearly against Franco, and tried to persuade the UK to 
adopt an anti-Francoist stance 498 Nevertheless, Soviet strategic and economic interests 
in the Iberian Peninsula, a zone close to Italy and France where standing armies could 
be installed, were always close to the surface. Moreover, Spain retained a substantial 
influence over the Latin-American republics. Stalin could assert that he would not 
intervene in Spain even if he was ideologically against Franco, because he believed 
that Spain was subject to Western influence and, ipso facto, was not a main concern for 
him499
Between August 1944 and September 1944, France did not dismiss the 
possibility of collaboration with the anti-Francoists. France, of course, shared a 
common border and had a direct involvement with and interest in the Spanish 
situation. Again, it seemed likely a foreign power would offer sympathy and support: 
France had recently suffered from fascism at the hands of the Germans, and the French 
Socialists and Communists were very much anti-Francoists. On 25 May 1945, the 
French Consultative Assembly requested that the Allies break off relations with 
Franco, asking that his rule be replaced by a democratic government. The French
496 M. Guderzo, L 'incognita spagnola nella seconda guerra mondiale, (Firenze, Manent, 1995), p.467.
497 Archivo Presidencia Moncloa, Inventario de la jefatura del Estado, legajo 4, letter from LF.Lequerica, 
ambassador of Spain, about Churchill's speech, Paris, 03-06-1944.
498 PRO File FO 372/39744, Samuel Hoare’s letter, London, 28-11-1944. P.Preston, Franco, (London, 
Harper Collins, 1993); J. Varela Ortega, Una paradoja histdrica, Hitler, Stalin, Roosevelt y algunas 
consecuencias para Espafia de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, (Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva Fundacidn 
Ortega y Gasset, 2004).
499 F. Portero, Franco aislado: la cuestion espanola (1945-1950), (Madrid, Aguilar, 1989).
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government was divided over the Spanish question. On the one hand, France was 
wary of a lack of support from the Americans and the British. Moreover, 
confrontation with Franco could complicate or damage commercial links between 
Spain and France. On the other hand, the left-wing groups of the French government 
were anti-Francoists. France had just been liberated, partly thanks to Spanish 
republican support for the French resistance, and a number felt the French owed some 
help to the anti-Francoists. French Foreign policy was directly linked to home 
practice.500
Republican support in the liberation of France was an element that did not figure 
in the British or American thinking toward the Spanish question, and both countries 
felt less obliged to help the anti-Francoists. Britain feared Communist expansionism, 
taking a pragmatic stance towards the Spanish political situation, even if it publicly 
disapproved of it. An authoritarian Spain was the best bulwark against a Spain on 
good terms with the Soviets.501 Winston Churchill pardoned the Francoist regime in 
1944, grateful for Spanish neutrality in World War n, and for the services Franco had 
offered to the UK in the Allied landings in the North of Africa, noting that Spain was 
to be an important factor for maintaining peace in the Mediterranean after the war. Sir 
Samuel Hoare, ambassador in Madrid, claimed that he indeed wished to see the 
Spanish problems resolved, but asserted that the UK would not intervene:
"Franco and his regime have failed utterly and violent persecution 
continues, while political and social life has not become humanised.
(...) The British government is concerned with reference to this subject. 
Britain has no wish to meddle in the internal affairs of another country, 
but would be glad to see Spain solve this problem, allowing the return 
there of those exiled elements that represent a most important section of 
the country’s intellectuals and workers."502 
Official British policy towards Spain in 1944 was one of public condemnation and 
non-intervention. The UK kept its distance from Spain. Sir Samuel Hoare, British
500 H. Heine, La oposicion politica al franquismo, (Barcelona, Editorial Cntica Grijalbo, 1983).
501 APM, dossier 7, Foreign Office Stockholm, 20-10-1945.
502 PRO File FO 372/39744, Hoare's letter to Aguirre, London, 28-11-1944.
ambassador to Spain, claimed that he wished to see the Spanish problem solved but 
that the UK would not intervene in Spain as the following quote reinforces:
‘Lord Templewood (Sir Samuel Hoare) stated that Franco and his regime have 
failed utterly and that violent persecution continues, while political and social life has 
not become humanised. Lord Templewood had an interview with Lequerica to whom 
he expressed the concern of the British government with reference to this subject, 
adding that England had no wish to meddle in the internal affairs of another country. 
However, Britain would be glad to see Spain solve this problem, allowing the return 
there of those exiled elements that represent a most important section of the country’s 
intellectuals and workers. No positive result has followed this suggestion. Samuel 
Hoare was the promoter of the friendship with Franco and most responsible for the 
policy of the Foreign Office towards Spain. Samuel Hoare has systematically 
concealed Euzkadi and Catalonia’s national problems. He is now suggesting that the 
nationalist elements be sounded on the subject of a monarchical solution with a general 
as a bridge.’503
A similar attitude prevailed within the UN and among the democratic powers.504 The 
forces of opposition remained unable to achieve unity or consistency, and without it, 
the British decided to accept the Francoist regime. British interests partly depended on 
the American position. In the event, it was decided to abide by a policy of non­
intervention, whilst hoping for change in the future.505
The Americans considered Spanish neutrality in World War II to be crucial.
They also believed that Franco provided the best means of constraining the 
advancement of Communism on the European continent. In these respects, the USA
503 PRO File FO 372/39744, Lizaso's letter to Aguirre, London, 28-11-1944. Eden (Foreign Minister 
between 1940 and 1945) summed up Britain’s official policy towards Spain in 1944 in a meeting with 
Rene Massigli, the French provisional government’s representative in London, on 28-08-1944: “Our 
main desire is that order and peace should be maintained in Spain. Above all, we do not intend to 
interfere with Spanish internal affairs or to support any particular party, whether that of the 
monarchists or the republicans.” PRO FO 371/39817, Cl 1471/10324/41.
504 Borrds, Politicas de los exiliados espaholes (1944-1950)’, DJ.Dunthom, Britain and the Anti-Franco 
opposition, 1940-1950, (Bristol, thesis submitted at the University of the West of England, July 1999), 
pp.l 16-141; Preston, Franco,, p.559; Aberasturi, De la derrota, p.705.
505 Dunthom,Britain,p. 117.
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position reflected the British one, ambiguously condemning the Francoist regime but 
pursuing a policy of non-intervention in Spanish affairs. The USA understood that 
opposition groups could avert a Francoist monopolisation of power, whilst Franco, for 
the time being, had his uses.506 Overall, the only thing to vary concerning the Allies’ 
position towards Spain was the intensity of the anti-Francoists’ petitions for help, but 
the overall consensus remained one of non-intervention.507
The Spanish question was debated at a variety of international meetings. Spain 
was a means of stopping Soviet expansion. Soviet power and influence was tangibly 
growing, with neighbouring countries entering into bilateral agreements and 
arrangements. The international agenda was changed radically to face the spread of 
Communism. In the meantime, Franco had moved quickly and with no small amount 
of guile, in response to a likely Allied victory.508 Progressively distancing himself from 
the Axis powers, he was careful to underline his credentials as a factor in the 
international struggle against Communism. His restraint during the Allied landings in 
the North of Africa clearly influenced Allied opinion towards the regime.509
The first international conference of the Allies to address the post-World War II 
political landscape was held at Yalta, on 11 February 1945, prior to the conflict’s end. 
Winston Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Joseph V. Stalin led the conference, 
under the auspices of the Atlantic Charter.510 Europe, it was pronounced, should 
undergo a process of reconstruction by which free people would dismantle the remains 
of fascism and would create institutions according to their own choice.511 The 
conference called for free elections in the liberated countries. At this stage, both the
506 J.L. Delgado editor., El primer franquismo, Espaha durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial, (Madrid, 
S.XXI de Espana, editores, 1989); R.Espinar Gallego, Ramdn, El impacto de la Segunda Guerra 
Mundial en Europa y en Espana, (Madrid, Asamblea de Madrid, 1986).
507 J. Varela Ortega, Una paradoja histdrica, Hitler, Stalin, Roosevelt y algunas consecuencias para 
Espana de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, (Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva Fundacidn Ortega y Gasset, 
2004), p. 140.
508 For a long time, for example, Franco made the Allies think that he would restore the monarchy in 
Spain. PRO F0371/49589, Z7168/233/41, Bowker to Churchill, 05-1945.
509 Aberasturi, De la derrota, p.706; P. Preston, Franco, (London, Harper Collins, 1993), pp.517-519.
510 The Atlantic Charter is described in Chapter 3.
511 For information on Yalta's conference see E. Moradiellos, El refiidero de Europa, (Barcelona, 
Grupo Ediciones 62,2001).
512 Yalta’s conference resolutions were summarised in the following document. MAEE, dossier R3305, 
report 15, Yalta’s conference', 11-02-1945. “In Yalta, the future of Spain has been decided without 
the participation of Europe. (...) The declaration about free Europe was the following: The 
establishment of order in Europe and the reconstruction of the national economic life will have to be
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USA and the UK were confident that Franco would be succeeded by a regime based on 
democratic principles, giving succour to the anti-Francoist opposition. There was no 
specific mention of Spain, however, in the Yalta declarations. 513 The joint 
declaration of the assembled powers at Yalta claimed:
The establishment of order in Europe and the reconstruction of the 
national economic life will have to be implemented through a process 
that allows the free people to destroy the remains of Nazism and 
Fascism and create institutions according to their own choice/514 
The hope of the anti-Francoists was based on a belief about where the USA and UK 
sympathies lay. There were no public pronouncements promising help to the anti- 
Francoists but rather implicit belief in democratic complicity.
A second conference was held in San Francisco from 25 April to 26 June 1945. 
This time, the participants were China, Mexico, France, the USA, the UK and the 
USSR: it was the founding conference of the United Nations (UN). With Spain now to 
be debated at the international level, it presented the perfect opportunity to present the 
case for a democratic alternative to dictatorship and to enlist the support of the Allies 
in the fight against Franco. On 19 June, the Mexican delegation proposed the 
exclusion of any country whose regime had been installed with the help of the armed 
forces of states that had entered into conflict against the will of the UN. The Mexican 
resolution, drafted with the help of exiled Spanish republicans, applied to Franco’s 
Spain and was approved unanimously. Francoist Spain was excluded from the UN, 
but little help was forthcoming at a practical level.515
The San Francisco conference was attended by a representation of the Junta 
Espanola de Liberation (Spanish Liberation Council or JEL), founded in August 1944, 
after the liberation of France by sections of the same groups, together with the CNT 
met in Toulouse. The JEL was an extension, in France, of the Mexican based 
organisation. Its principal aim was to re-establish republican legality in Spain. The
implemented through a process that allows the free people to destroy the remains of Nazism and 
Fascism and create institutions according to their own choice. The conference claimed for the 
principles established in the Atlantic Charter.”
513 P. Preston, Franco, (London, Harper Collins, 1993), pp. 525-527.
514 MAEE, dossier R3305, report 15, Yalta's conference', 11-02-1945.
515 Preston, Franco, ,  p.536; Aberasturi, De la derrota, p.701.
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JEL saw its task as the preparation of the way for the entry of the Allies army into 
Spain.516 The JEL in France included all the Republican parties - ERC, the Socialists, 
the UGT, and the CNT, with each maintaining its autonomy.517 Jose Antonio Aguirre, 
on behalf of the Basque government and Negrih also participated in proceedings at the 
San Francisco conference. The anti-Francoist opposition presence in the conference 
served mainly as propaganda. The group presented a memorandum criticising the 
totalitarian nature of Francoism and pleading for the need for democracy in Spain. 
Divisions among Republicans were glaring however, and Aguirre’s attempts to 
reconcile them proved to be in vain.
Aguirre wished to send just a single representation to San Francisco, instead of 
one each from the JEL, Negrih, and the Basques. His preference was for the Cortes in 
Mexico to appoint a president of the republic, who could in turn appoint a president of 
the government legally representing all opposition groups at San Francisco. He 
attempted a rapprochement between Negrfn and Prieto. Though Socialists, 
Republicans and nationalists endeavoured to create a common front, Prieto did not 
agree to a pact with the nationalists. Thus, Spanish in exile remained disunited, and 
disorganised. The lack of unity among the anti-Francoists Spaniards in San Francisco 
weakened their demands.
Since they had not been able to send any representation to the San Francisco 
conference, the Catalans submitted a written appeal for the UN518 in which demands 
for self-determination were set down. An excerpt of the appeal to the UN reads as 
follows:
"Summing up, Catalonia requests from the UN: to be scheduled as 
needing immediate action; that her case for self-government should be 
considered; that her position in the political organisation be decided by 
herself, through plebiscite; Catalonia requests justice from the UN/519 
The impact of the document was less significant than the impact proper representation 
would have had at the conference. Catalans were neither strong enough to send a
516 P.Preston, Spain in crisis, p. 132.
517 Aberasturi, De la derrota, pp.700-701.
518 AT, Poblet, Box C5, 'ConferSncia de San Francisco-Apel.lacid de Catalunya a les Nacions Unides'.
519 PRO File FO 371/49582, Traeta, 'Appeal to the UN on behalf of Catalonia', London, 05-05-1945.
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representative to the conference, nor well enough organised to ally with the JEL, the 
Basques nor Negrih, in order to make sure their voice was heard. The best chance for 
Catalans would have been to send a representation together with that of the JEL but 
once again their lack of organisation and capacity to agree to policy concessions in 
order to enter this group impeded their personal participation in the conference.
None of the anti-Francoist demands were transformed into real concrete action 
against Franco in San Francisco. With no clear project on the table before them, the 
Allies agreed no measures against the regime, such as an economic embargo - which 
could have tremendously weakened Franco - or direct economic assistance to the 
opposition.
Paris had been liberated in August 1944 (with the assistance, amongst the 
coalition, of the Spanish Republicans). Hostilities officially continued until 8 May 
1945, with Germany’s formal capitulation. Franco shifted again from a policy of non- 
belligerence to one of neutrality in World War n. On 11 May 1945, the armistice of 
Reims was signed, signalling the end of World War II in Europe. Foreseeing an Allied 
victory, a majority of Catalans were convinced that the Franco regime would decay 
and that, although its demise might be delayed, the regime would indeed disappear in 
time.520 The Allies had not specifically promised any help to the anti-Francoist 
opposition, but, all the same, the opposition expected help since Franco was 
ideologically close to Hitler and Mussolini who had been overthrown, and was 
regarded as a threat to the Western democracies.
63 DEVELOPMENTS IN FRANCE, CATALONIA AND BRITAIN
France’s liberation restored it as the principal seat of Catalan opposition to the 
Francoist regime. Activity was reorganised. The two major centres in this period were 
Paris and Perpignan. Communication between France and Spain proved much easier 
than between both the UK and the Americas and the homeland. The Catalan party 
spectrum at this point may be divided between right wing parties, left wing parties, and 
independent and non-Catalan parties. The strength of these parties will be considered
520 An opinion expressed by, amongst others, Joan Ventosa, the Catalan financier and former Lliga 
politician. PRO File FO 371/49582, Joan Ventosa's documents, London, 30-10-1945.
153
in the main in terms of their following, their publications, their leaderships, financial 
resources and networks outside Catalonia.
On the right of the political spectrum, a significant group to organise in Catalonia 
was Unio Democratica de Catalunya (UDC), a Christian Democrat Catalan party.
Coll i Alentom and Maurici Serrahima, two of its leading figures, opted to focus on 
cultural recovery, since the scope for Catalan political activity seemed limited. UDC 
was limited to elite culture521, and marked, at an early stage, a tendency towards a 
more cultural orientation of Catalan nationalism. UDC defended the recurrent 
attempts to create more unitary platforms and participated in each of them. Like other 
parties on the right, UDC continued its activity after 1947, through Ant6n Canellas522 
and Miquel Coll i Alentom.523 As a Christian Democratic party, it found itself well 
placed to fight the Catalan comer since the Catalan church had retained its 
independence. So UDC played the Catholicism card, placed the resurrection of the 
Catalan language at the forefront of its struggle, and counted many of the younger 
bourgeoisies amongst its rank and file.524 UDC sought to secure an autonomous 
region in a Spanish structure. It had a moderate nature that appealed to the Catalan 
bourgeoisie. UDC became the main right-wing party of this period and looked to the 
significant leadership of Coll i Alentom. Cultural Catalan nationalism was its basis 
and this placed great weight on the effectiveness of its publications. UDC mainly 
developed in Catalonia.
Another right-wing group was both Christian and Catalan, but focused on 
activity within the universities. Joventut Catalana Democratica (JCD), founded by 
Anton Canellas, Antoni Bassols, Jordi Sarsanedes and others, made contacts with the
521 D. Diaz Esculies, L'oposicio catalanista alfranquisme, pp.25-27.
522 Author’s interview with Ant6n Canellas, Barcelona, December 2001. Antdn Canellas was the 
Catalan Ombudsman (Stndic de Greuges) in Catalonia until 2003. In his early years, he participated in 
the Catalan opposition to Franco. He was one of the main pillars of Uni6 Democratica de Catalunya 
(UDC) and the founder of Joventut Catalana Democratica (JCD).
523 For information on UDC developments see A. Balcells, Catalan nationalism: past and present, 
(Basingtoke, McMillan, 1996) and M. Serrahima, Memdries de la guerra i de I'exili, 2 Vols, 
(Barcelona, Edicions 62,1981).
524 A. Dowling, The decline of Esquerra Republicana, the fall of the Lliga Regionalista and the 
emergence of Converg&ncia I Uni6, Approaches to the reconstitution of political Catalan nationalism 
1939-1975, thesis, pp.3-4.
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Lliga and the UDC.525 Though a separate affair to begin with, the group would become 
the youth movement of UDC in 1947, organising such diverse activities as the 
commemoration of 11 September (National Day of Catalonia), and 23 April, the day of 
Sant Jordi (Patron of Catalonia). Although the weight of JCD was less significant than 
that of UDC, it gave intellectual support to the UDC and also sought more autonomy 
for Catalonia. The most remarkable was its publication Quarterns de Sant Jordi and 
the organisation of cultural Catalan events that would have an influence on educating 
the Catalan youth on their Catalan identity. JCD mainly developed in Catalonia.
Since their main intention was to keep Catalan culture alive, neither UDC nor JCD 
posed any real threat to Francoism.
Several Catalan groups developed in France in the period, including the Front 
Nacional de Catalunya (FNC), a left-wing platform. The principal aim of the FNC was 
to establish the political independence of Catalonia, based on the right of self- 
determination.526 The FNC hoped to establish a federal state within an Iberian 
federation. The leadership of the FNC believed that Franco could be overthrown 
through a coordination of both political and military action. It boasted an active 
military section, commanded by a former official of the artillery of the republican 
army, and member of the patriotic organisation, Nosaltres Sols! Jaume Martinez 
Vendrell. A university section connected constitutionally to the military section was 
created in 1942, and its activity was intense, producing a substantial amount of anti- 
Francoist propaganda. Benefiting from a certain amount of prestige, the FNC 
published around 5,000 copies of the magazine Per Catalunya.521 It was not to last. 
Intense persecution by the Francoist regime of individual FNC members throughout 
1944 led ultimately to the dissolution of the separatist Catalan group. An attempt to 
unify a number of quite separate and independent organisations, FNC as a whole never 
amounted to more than the sum of its parts.
The FNC also developed in Catalonia, from November of 1943 to the summer of 
1945, in parallel to its development in France. At the beginning of 1944, a new
525 Diaz Esculies, L'oposicid catalanista alfranquisme, pp.27-28; J. M. Colomer, Els estudiants de 
Barcelona sota elfranquisme, (Barcelona, Curial, 1991).
526 FPS, Ressorgimenu 'Report sobre el Front Nacional de Catalunya', 1941; Diaz i Esculies,
L'oposicid catalanista alfranquisme, pp.48-63.
527 H. Heine, La oposicion .
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committee was constituted, and formed by Antoni Andreu i Abello as political
M O
secretary, and Jaume Martinez Vendrell as secretary of the organisation. A major 
part of the structure was still based on elements from Estat Catala, Nosaltres Sols and 
Federacio Nacional d’Estudiants de Catalunya. Relations with the outside world were 
managed through a delegation of Perpignan in the South of France, and also through
C O Q
the CNC in London. However, at the beginning of the 1944, political repression 
intensified in Catalonia, particularly affecting the militants of the FNC. The group was 
left-wing and separatist, and united several parties, yet looked to a single leading 
figure, Jaume Martinez Vendrell. The number of affiliates was large, and included 
several parties. With both a military section and a university section appearing to pose 
a greater threat to Francoism, the authorities rushed to undertake severe police 
repression in order to stop further development of the group.
Other Catalan groups slowly started to reorganise in 1944, including the Estat 
Catala (EC), which recovered its autonomy under Vigenc Borrell. EC advocated a 
programme of liberal nationalism and democracy,530 but to an extent, as another party 
of the left, found itself weakened by being in competition with the FNC. It also had to 
face divisions between its members in exile and those that had remained inside Spain. 
The EC was a left-wing Catalan and separatist group which sought the creation of a 
federal Catalan independent state. The main publications associated with the group 
were Circular, Diari de Catalunya, Catalunya, EC, Almogavers and Butlleti del Partit 
d'Estat Catala.531 The Joventuts d"Estat Catala (JEC), which worked together with 
Estat Catala since 1942, circulating secret publications and publishing the Butlleti de 
les Joventuts d ’Estat Catala, and Torxa 532 The JEC was the youth group that supported 
the EC and in 1943, joined EC, in whole.533 Rather than cooperating, the EC and the 
FNC competed for a similar space in the political spectrum. Little by little, the
528 PRO, File FO 371/49582, Mr. Faqhar, Barcelona, 1945; A. Viladot i Presas, Nacionalisme ipremsa 
Clandestina, (Barcelona, Curial, 1987) pp.64-65; C. Pi i Sunyer, Memdries del primer auxili, VoLI, 
p.176.
529 J. Martinez Vendrell, Una vida per Catalunya, Memdries, (1939-1946), (Barcelona, P6rtic, 1991),
pp.281-282.
530 AT, Poblet, Box 169,03-03-1945.
531Viladot, Nacionalisme, p.101,109-117; Diaz Esculies, L'oposicid catalanista al franquisme, ,  pp.47, 
84.
532 Viladot, p. 120-126.
533 Diaz Esculies, L'oposicid catalanista al franquisme, pp. 121-126.
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militants of Estat Catala were incorporated within the FNC in 1944. When Viceng 
Borrell, general secretary of EC, arrived in Barcelona in 1944, he was inducted to the 
executive council of the FNC. EC’s strength was weakened by divisions between the 
membership in France and those in Spain and by sharing the same political space with 
the FNC.
The ERC was reorganised in October 1944 under the leadership of Josep 
Tarradellas, who became its general secretary, based in Montpellier.534 It accepted the 
republic of 1931 and the statutes of autonomy and expected to re-establish Catalan 
institutions. A document found in Poblet summarises ERC’s policy pillars:
The members of ERC declared themselves supporters of the republican 
constitutional legality of the 9 December 1931, the statute of Catalonia 
of the 15 September 1932, the Statute of Catalonia and the Basque 
statute of the 6 October 1936/536 
Some members of ERC had joined the FNC in 1942 but went back to ERC in 1945 
and 1946. Both groups aspired to be at the centre of Catalan nationalism. ERC was 
the most persecuted political group among the Catalan groups. It began to reorganise 
in Barcelona, in 1943, working in close contact with the CNC of London. However, 
the situation changed radically with the liberation of France, and the secret arrival of 
Pere Puig in Barcelona, delegate of ERC and of the General Secretary of ERC, Josep 
Tarradellas, who would separate ERC from the FNC in 1942.537 In exile (mainly in 
France), ERC managed to stay together, after the Congress of Toulouse, but inside 
Spain, Pere Puig, its General Secretary, had difficulties in keeping the party together 
because of repression and ideological divisions among its members. Byl947, ERC 
was left virtually moribund.538
534 E. Udina, Josep Tarradellas, L ’aventura d ’una fidelitat, (Barcelona, Edicions 62,1992); H. Heine, 
La oposicion.
535 C. Pi i Sunyer, Memdries de I'exili de Carles Pi i Sunyer, Vol.I, pp.167-168; For information on the 
developments of ERC, see A. Rovira I Virgili, Epistolari (1939-1949), (Barcelona, Abadia de 
Montserrat, 2002) and for information on all the relevant left-wing parties in opposition to Franco, see 
H. Heine, La oposicion .
536 AT, Poblet, ERC, Paris, 20-10-1944.
537 For more information on the developments of the policy of ERC, see also Diaz Esculies, L 'oposicio 
catalanista al franquisme, pp.38-39; Viladot, Nacionalisme pp. 19-26.
538 Viladot, Nacionalisme, p.20-38,40-56; Diaz Esculies, L'oposicid catalanista al franquisme,, 
pp.36-44.
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The reorganisation of the ERC in France came as another blow to the CNC of 
London. Tarradellas was directly opposed to the CNC, criticising its radicalism and 
the fact that it was not abiding by the rules of the republican constitution, and arguing 
that the CNC’s policy was against the policy of the Generalitat and the statute. 539 Pi i 
Sunyer wrote to Batista i Roca in 1944 about Tarradellas: Tarradellas is fighting 
against the CNC. (...) Tarradellas claims that the CNC is just a sentimental group of 
people with romantic ideas and he is mainly opposed to Pi i Sunyer’s ideas.’540
The ERC was a Republican left-wing party that aspired to a high degree of 
autonomy. It looked to two significant leaders, Pere Puig and Josep Tarradellas. ERC 
was working both out of France and Spain. As proved the case with EC however, 
some of its members left the party to join the FNC, weakening the ERC. Again, the 
disunity of Catalans weakened their political efficacy. ERC competed with the CNC 
of London for Catalan predominance, instead of cooperating on policies.
In January 1945, in Paris, Tarradellas presented a unitary platform, Solidaritat 
Catalana541, that was based on the acceptance of the authority of the President of the 
Generalitat. The aim of the movement was to co-ordinate the anti-Francoist fight and 
re-establish the republican institutions.542 Tarradellas evidently regarded republican 
legality as a starting point, but declaring that this was not in itself enough, sought 
further collaboration with the Basque nationalists. Solidaritat Catalana united ERC, 
Accio Catalana Republicana (ACR), UDC, Estat Catala, the Front de Llibertat (old 
Socialists), the Fronts of Resistance and the FNC. The attempt of Solidaritat to reunite 
several political groups was the principal attempt towards a unified platform in France. 
Importantly, by not including the bloc PSUC-UGT-Unio de Rabassaires, the CNT and 
the CNC in London, Solidaritat became, in some ways, a parallel movement to the 
CNC. Losing the support of members of FNC to Solidaritat, the CNC of London was
539 F.Vilanova, Les ruptures de I'any 39, p.51.
540 AT, Poblet, Box C51, letter from Carles Pi i Sunyer to Batista I Roca, London, 31-12-1944.
541 For details on the parties that formed Solidaritat Catalana, see AT, Poblet, Box C243, 'Manifest de 
Solidaritat Catalana', Paris, 06-01-1945. “The manifesto of Solidaritat was signed by ERC, Accid 
Catalana, Els republicans de Lliga Catalana, UDC, Estat Catala, Front de la Llibertat, Front Nacional 
de Catalunya.” For more information on the developments of Solidaritat Catalana, see FPS, Box 20, 
Folder 666, letters from Josep Trueta to Carles Pi i Sunyer, 01-06-1946; AN, Artea, DP132-1,1945; 
AT, Poblet, Box C277, 'Reunid del Consell directiu de Solidaritat Catalana'.
542 M. Guibemau, Nacionalisme Catala, (Barcelona, Portic, 2002), p.94.
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reluctant to accept Tarradellas’ leadership.543 The shift was characteristic and 
indicative of a lack of cohesion in Catalan nationalism.
The distance between those in France and those in the UK substantially 
weakened its strength. Solidaritat was one more challenge to the CNC of the UK. The 
lack of cohesion between Catalans in France and Catalans in the UK was one of the 
major obstacles to a politically effective Catalan nationalism. The lines of division 
among Catalans were reflected in their respective relations with the French and British 
governments. The Catalans never presented a common front vis-a-vis the French and 
the British, but instead presented their demands each as separate groups.544
The developments of Catalan nationalism in the UK in this period centred on the 
dissolution of the reconstituted Consell of London. Pi i Sunyer arrived in Paris on 22 
May 1945. After meeting Tarradellas, Pi i Sunyer determined to dissolve the Consell, 
perceiving that there was now a clear project for the re-establishment of the 
Generalitat.545 He considered that the task of the Consell had been accomplished on 
the basis that the CNC was the provisional substitute of the legitimate institutions.546 
When Pi i Sunyer saw that Tarradellas would re-establish the Generalitat, he decided 
to step aside and dissolve the Consell. The cohesion of Catalan nationalism was no 
longer in his hands. That is not to say that there was not clear competition between Pi i 
Sunyer and Tarradellas for the centre stage of Catalan nationalism. Their relations 
were marked by poor communication, in-fighting, unwillingness to compromise with 
each other’s policies and a degree of one-upmanship.547 All of this prevented a
543 FPS, Box 20, Folder 666, letters from Josep Trueta to Carles Pi i Sunyer, 01-06-1946; AT, Poblet, 
Box C243, 'Manifest de Solidaritat Catalana', Paris, 06-01-1945; C. Pi i Sunyer, Memdries de I'exili, 
Vol.1, pp.173-188; D. Dfaz Esculies, L'oposicid catalanista al franquisme, (Barcelona, Publicacions 
Abadia de Montserrat, 1996) pp.65-67; F. Vilanova, Les ruptures de I'any 39, p.52.
544 H. Heine, La oposicidn.
545 In a letter to Batista I Roca, Pi i Sunyer explained the reasons for the dissolution of the Consell of 
London. AT, Poblet, Box 17, letter from Carles Pi i Sunyer to Batista I Roca, London, 31-12-1944; 
This dissolution is also explained in Artea, EBB 207-3, 'Notas poMcas de Cataluna', Euzko Deya, 
1945. In order to avoid confusion, it has to be pointed that Pi I Sunyer dissolved the CNC of London 
in 1943 and the reconstituted Consell in 1945.
546 FPS, Box D5, Consell Nacional Londres, T)eclaraci6 of the Consell Nacional en ser dissolt', 1945.
547 The relations between Pi i Sunyer and Tarradellas in the 1940's are well documented in FPS, Boxl9, 
Folder 645 A, B, C and D.
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common action and Pi i Sunyer preferred to step aside once he perceived that the 
Consell of London had little or no future. 548
At the end of the war, Accio Catalana Republicana (ACR), the small, liberal 
nationalist party of the republic had essentially dissolved itself, perceiving that 
republican institutions should be sacrificed to a provisional government representing 
all sections of society and capable of commanding legitimacy at the UN. ACR gave its 
full support to Josep Irla, and maintained close contacts with the monarchists. After 
World War n, ACR would abandon republican legality, seeking self-determination and 
confederation. Its leadership expected to form a government of Catalonia based on the 
statute. However, these arguments were not accepted by its counterparts in Mexico, 
and ACR fell into a period of great confusion.549 Overall, ACR was a small party in 
this period which had little impact due to internal divisions and lack of organisation.
The unions, Socialists and Communists were also reorganised in this period in 
Catalonia, but did not share Catalan aims. On 14 January 1945, the Socialist 
movement of Catalonia, another party of the left, was reorganised in Toulouse. All 
the Socialist tendencies were represented, although Catalan Socialism was not a strong 
political current and its leaders could not count on significant support. In the end, their 
impact was limited: though seeking a high degree of autonomy for Catalonia, they 
never managed to coalesce with the Spanish Socialists.
The pre-war unions followed a different strategy. The anarcho-syndicalist 
Confederation Nacional del Trabajo (CNT) and the Socialist Union General de 
Trabajadores (UGT) attempted to reorganise secret networks independent of the 
official unions. In addition to painting slogans and distributing union material, these 
groups were mainly involved in recruitment activities. This facilitated police 
infiltration, and, in Spain as a whole, seventeen national executive committees of the 
CNT fell between 1940 and 1947. In Catalonia, the pre-war unions were generally 
weakened despite the existence of dedicated and active militants.550 The UGT and the 
CNT were not Catalan organisations. They were Spanish organisations which had
548 AT, Poblet, Box 959 and Box 960. These two boxes include several letters between Pi i Sunyer and 
Tarradellas that summarise their relations. AT, Box C959, letter from Carles Pi i Sunyer to Josep 
Tarradellas, Paris, 4-12-1944.
549 Diaz Esculies, L 'oposicio catalanista al franquisme, , pp.31-39.
550 E. Kedourie, Tales of Nationalism, (London, Hutchinson, 1960), pp.39-45.
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some members in Catalonia. Overall, the unions did not share the aims of the Catalan 
movement and were tremendously weakened by Francoist repression. The Catalans 
had little contact with the Socialists and therefore little contact with the UGT. They 
were closer to the CNT, the anarchist union, since anarchism was strong in Catalonia. 
However, many Catalans had been victims of the Federation Anarquista Iberica (FAI) 
during the civil war and like that of the UGT, the CNT programme was not Catalan in 
nature.
Many republicans took to the hills rather than surrender. These huidos 
represented a cross section of republican groups and formed the guerrilla opposition. 
Their struggle was mainly defensive. Their first objective was survival. It was one 
way to avoid death or imprisonment. Some acts of sabotage took place. The 
guerrilleros considered themselves as the vanguard of an eventual army of invasion, 
but in the long term, they were doomed to failure, and by the end of the 1940s, the 
guerrilleros were reduced to stealing in order to survive.551
On the far left of the political spectrum, the Communist Partit Socialista Unificat 
de Catalunya (PSUC) in Catalonia, took its instructions from Moscow and found itself 
severely persecuted by the Francoist security forces. For instance, the Spanish 
Communists that served in the French resistance invaded the Valle de Aran in October 
1944. In fact, the majority of those involved were Communists, although the Moscow- 
based leadership of the PCE desperately tried to stop the invasion attempt.552 It was a 
serious attempt at armed action by the exiled and ended in failure. The Catalanists 
were not a significant element in the invasion. Armed resistance continued until 1947. 
As a general pattern, the Communists did not subscribe to the Catalan nationalist
553aims.
Another Catalan group was the Bloc Escolar Nacionalista (Nationalist Student 
Bloc or BEN), which was principally focused on the recovery of Catalan culture and 
language. The BEN was formed secretly in 1946 under the leadership of Joan Grasses. 
The group included a large number of Catalan students. The BEN published
551 P.Preston, Spain in crisis, pp.133-136.
552 Preston, Franco,, p.518. D. Arasa, Els Catalans de Churchill, (Barcelona, Curial, 1990).
553 E. Kedourie, Tales of Nationalism, pp.39-45.
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Redregament, Redregament Serie Blava, Randa and La Boatella,554 and as such, was 
an example of an independent Catalan group with a modest impact arising from its 
publishing activities.
Some independent Catalan groups also developed in the period around the 
margins of the traditional parties. Two groups were close to the FNC: the Organitzacio 
de Resistencia Nacional (Organisation of National Resistance or ORN) and the 
Moviment de Resistencia de Catalunya (Movement of Resistance of Catalonia or 
MRC). Neither agreed with the policy of the main Catalan parties and both believed in 
the development of the Catalan language as the main instrument for the development 
of Catalan nationalism.555
The ORN emerged in Barcelona in 1945 after the Allied victory in Europe. It 
was formed by a relatively small number of Catalans, with some economic resources. 
The group believed strongly in the power and importance of the Catalan language, and 
was more commonly known as Grup Bandera, the title of the magazine it published. 
Bandera, also called Grup Torras i Bages, had first appeared in 1942. It achieved a 
notable expansion in its publications, advocating a revisionist Catalan position. Like 
some others, the group focused on the recovery of Catalan culture and language as 
political determinants. As such, Bandera prefigures a tendency in Catalan nationalism 
in the following decades, to sustain itself primarily through culture. The group was 
another to combine its Catholicism with its Catalan nationalism.556
The MRC began to develop in Catalonia from the beginning of 1945 supported 
by independent Catalans who did not agree with the policy of the big parties. Its 
policy was based on radical opposition towards Francoism. The MRC was mainly 
known through its publication La Nacio Catalana. The central axis of the MRC 
activity was the preparation of a general strike in Catalonia, which never 
materialised.557 Both the ORN and the MRC were independent anti-Francoist groups 
which were at the margin of the main Catalan parties. The affiliated members were
554 Viladot, Nacionalisme, p.140-154.
555 Diaz i Esculies, L 'oposicid catalanista al franquisme pp.48-63; Viladot, Nacionalisme, pp. 134- 
139,158.
556 Raguer, H., Gaudeamus Igitur, (Barcelona, Publicacions de l'Abadia de Montserrat, 1999), pp.23, 33, 
118-119; Diaz Esculies, L 'oposicid catalanista al franquisme, pp.27-28.
557 Diaz Esculies, L'oposicid Catalanista al franquisme, pp. 155-157; Viladot, Nacionalisme, p. 190.
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few and could neither call upon real political structure nor on outstanding leadership. 
Moreover, they worked only in Catalonia and failed to develop serviceable links with 
the exiles. Their real weight was minor, and the two groups were mainly known 
through their publications. The existence of all such independent groups illustrates 
that Catalan nationalism was a largely heterogeneous movement failing to converge on 
and unite behind an agreed policy line. Often this was due to clashes of leadership and 
a basic lack of capacity for agreement or compromise, rather than any basic ideological 
difference. It was also a consequence of defeat in the Spanish Civil War and of the 
continuing Francoist repression. Most of the anti-Franco opposition suffered from the 
same problems of fragmentation.
Catalan groups proved adept at publishing and many managed to build 
significant underground circulations. Catalans attached great importance to the 
maintenance and development of Catalan culture and the Catalan-language, and this 
would help keep the Catalan flag flying. Such was the value of publications like 
Catalunya.55* Cultural events were organised, such as the Joes Florals (Poetry 
competition) in the UK, in order to propagate Catalan culture.559 Catalan intellectuals 
also had an important task in presenting the Catalan case abroad as was done by some 
Catalan writers presenting at the PEN international congress of Stockholm in 1946: 
"General Franco has been allowed, without any serious protest from 
abroad, to carry on one of the most terrible campaigns of persecution in 
history against the soul of a country and against a language which has 
taken shape through centuries of development. We suggest that the 
PEN should take the initiative to protect Catalan literary production/560 
A written condemnation of Francoism was obtained from the PEN but no direct action, 
only a declaration.
A number of independent publications were not linked to any particular party in 
Catalonia. As has been indicated, the secret press in these years became an important 
instrument in the Catalan struggle. Two editions of Vetlla were published in 1939 and 
1940, primarily to collect money for prisoners. L ’horn de Catalunya, a pamphlet, was
558 C. Pi i Sunyer, Memdries de I'exili, Vol.II, pp.57,197.
559 C. Pi i Sunyer, Memdries de I'exili, Vol.II, pp.153-158.
560 PRO, File FO 371/60420, Writers of Catalonia to the PEN club international congress, Stockholm,
02-06-1946.
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published on 364 occasions, before it was later converted into a newspaper, giving 
accounts of the developments of World War II. Other publications included 
Catalunya, Que Fern? and Per veure-hi clar.561 Thus, a principal mechanism of anti- 
Francoist opposition was the secret Catalan press, which to a large extent managed to 
elude Francoist censorship. Though a useful means of propaganda, its impact was 
limited without concrete action.
6.4 CATALAN EXTERNAL RELATIONS
In parallel to the reorganisation of the Catalans in France, there too the Basques 
began their own reorganisation. Aguirre arrived in Paris from the USA on 27 March 
1944562 at which time the Basque government also decided to move to Paris.563 On 31 
March 1944, Aguirre, who led the PNV, signed the Pact of Bayonne564, which 
included several projects of unity with the anti-Francoists and meant a firm agreement 
with the republican Spanish forces.565 Aguirre’s new policy of mixing nationalist aims 
with republican policy represented a radical shift from his traditional line of not 
entering into Spanish politics.566 Previously, Aguirre had shown himself willing to 
ally only with Catalans, with whom he shared nationalist aims, but not with the 
Republicans. It was accounted for by the Basque conviction that the Allies would 
intervene against Franco to restore a republican government. The Socialists and the 
PNV directly opposed the policy of the PCE however, and attempted to isolate it. Nor 
could Basque nationalists accept the monarchist option , which appeared to 
command the favour of the Western powers, believing the monarchists, in turn, would 
never accept a settlement that included the historic nationalities, let alone the
561 Diaz Esculies, L'oposicid catalanista al franquisme, pp.159-185; Viladot, Nacionalisme, p. 190.
562 AN, Artea, PNV 121-1, 'El presidente Aguirre en Paris'.
563 AN, Artea, DP 154-5, Ta situacidn de los vascos'.
564 AN, Artea, Euzko Deya, 1949, 'Aniversario de la firma del pacto de Bayona'.
565 Aberasturi, De la derrota, p.647.
566 For a summary of the Basques policy in 1945, see the following letter between Lizaso and 
Aguirre.PRO File FO 371/495582, Lizaso to Aguirre, London, 08-03-1945.
567 In order to understand the reasons why the Basques were sceptical of a pact with monarchists, see 
PRO File FO 371/39744, Note from Lizaso to Eden, Secretary of State for foreign affairs, London, 13- 
04-1944. “For the Basques, the monarchists represent the regime which repealed their “fueros”, local 
laws.”
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nationalist statutes that had emerged during the republic.568 A French article 
summarised the monarchist position in relation to Basque nationalism: ‘The 
monarchists, independently from the promises they might make, will not respect the 
Basque statute and will try to restrict it progressively while the Basque nationalists, on 
the contrary, would want to widen it little by little to their advantage.’569
Galeuzka had stalled for two years, until 1944, due to a lack of unity among 
Catalans and a lack of entente between them and the Basque nationalists.570 Many 
projects of Galeuzka were set down, however, in 1944.571 Below is a fragment of 
onesuch:
The leaders of Catalonia, Euzkadi and Galicia {Galeuzka), united by 
the common affection and interest have convened a firm pact of union 
according to their respective spirits, with the same purposes and with the 
aims of national freedom and democracy. (...) They declare that they 
never considered legitimate the dictatorial and oppressive regime of 
Franco, that they include the restoration of the Spanish republic. (...)
They also claim the equal and simultaneous restoration of Catalan,
Basque and Galician democracy in its respective territories with its 
legitimate organisations/572 
The Galeuzka agreements of 1944 claimed democracy and rejected monarchism.573 
The common objective of Galeuzka was to achieve self-determination and create a 
confederation of free countries. All Spanish democrats were also invited to join 574 
The attainment of national freedom was signalled as a priority, according to the right 
of self-determination; the present unitary Spanish state was to be transformed into a 
community of free peoples; and a democratic regime was to prevail in each of the 
countries and in the confederation. Adherence to the democratic principles of the UN
568 PRO File FO 371/39744, Note from Lizaso to Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, London, 
13-04-1944; Aberasturi, De la derrota, pp.647-650.
569AMAE, Sdrie Europe, 1940-1960, sous-sdrie Espagne, vol.36, page 3 3 ,1/avenir politique en 
Espagne', 11-09-1945 ; PRO File FO 371/39744, Note from Lizaso to Eden, Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, London, 13-04-1944.
570 For information on the origins of Galeuzka, see X.Estdvez, De la triple Alianza al pacto de San 
Sebastian, (Mundaiz, Cuademos Universitarios, 1991).
571 FPS, Box D5, J.M.Batista I Roca, London, 1944.
572Artea, EBB 105-08, 'Galeuzka', 17-10-1944.
573 FPS, Box D5, Galeuzka's common declaration, London, 21-11-1944.
574 PRO File FO 371/39744, Galeuzka, London, 28-06-1944.
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was promoted in the wider context of the integration of the Hispanic community into a 
peaceful new international order.575
The project of Galeuzka faced three main obstacles. First, the Catalans failed to 
reach an agreement with Aguirre.576 The signed pact made explicit recognition of the 
statutes of autonomy, but the defence of the right of self-determination by the PNV 
made any joint resolution by Aguirre and Pi i Sunyer impossible. Pi i Sunyer was a 
pro-nationalist but he did not seek self-determination at that time. He believed in 
achieving wider autonomy. Second, the Catalans were sceptical of entering any pact 
with the Galicians lacking a representative organisation:
The Council of Catalonia, while it agrees in principle, differs in 
practice from your plan about Galeuzka. They consider that Basque 
nationalists and Catalans are gaining nothing by entering a pact with 
Galicians which does not have a government nor an autonomous 
country. Catalans would prefer to establish first a Catalan-Basque pact; 
and then invite Galicia to join; Catalans are afraid that Galeuzka will 
weaken the international position of Catalonia and Euzkadi and would 
make it more confusing/577 
Third, the Catalans were divided internally. One faction, led by the ERC, was 
moderate. Another, associated with the Catalan nationalism of the CNC of London, 
fell under the direction of Pi i Sunyer. Galeuzka failed again since no concrete 
common action among the three nationalities was undertaken but only common 
projects and common declarations.
The projects of Galeuzka 1944 were presented in London578, New York579 and 
Latin America.580 The Basque nationalists called for unity between Catalans, Galician
575 C. Pi i Sunyer, Memdries de I'exili, VoLI, p. 196.
576 C. Pi i Sunyer, Memdries de I'exili de Carles Pi i Sunyer, Vol.I, p.189; AT, Poblet, Box G 2,1945; 
AT, Poblet, Box G 2,1945; FPS, Box D5, Annex on Galeuzka, 1944.
577 PRO File FO 371/39744, Galeuzka, London, 28-06-1944; FPS, Box D5, J.M.Batista I Roca, London, 
1944; FPS, Box D5, Galeuzka's common declaration, London, 21-11-1944.
578 PRO File FO 371/39744, Galeuzka, London, 13-04-1944; Aitea, EBB 105-08,17-10-1944; FPS, Box 
D5, J. M. Batista I Roca, London, 1944; FPS, Box D5, Annex on Galeuzka, 1944; AT, Poblet, Box 
G 2,1945.
579 FPS, Box 1, Folder 12, letter from Aguirre to Pi i Sunyer, New York, 14-02-1944. “We stress on our 
unchanging attitude of opposition to Franco, on continuity, on our adherence to the task of republican 
restoration and co-operation with the republican government; the conditions arising from the same; 
our pre-eminent ideals- the right of self-determination. The statement of principle on the international
166
nationalists, Republicans and Basque nationalists in 1945, in order to finally overthrow 
Franco.581 Aguirre prepared a draft for Galeuzka in New York:
"We stress on our unchanging attitude of opposition to Franco, on our 
support to the task of republican restoration and co-operation with the 
republican government; the conditions arising from the same; our pre­
eminent ideals: international community acceptance of the right to self- 
determination and acceptance of political freedom. Galeuzka 
encourages brotherly ties with Portugal; Galeuzka will maintain good 
relations with the USSR; Galeuzka links with Anglo-Saxon nations and 
Ibero-America; Galeuzka proclaims the necessity of mutual 
understanding between nations/582 
On 15 November 1944, the Consello de Galiza (Galician Council) was constituted in 
Buenos Aires. Though it did not enjoy a wide political basis, it was useful in 
strengthening the Galeuzka movement, though having only a local impact.583
In Latin America, the pact of Galeuzka was signed in Mexico on the 27 
November 1944, having the same foundations and aims as that signed in Europe.584 
The signatories were the Catalan comunitats, the PNV, the Partido Gallego, the ERC, 
EC, ACR, Partit Socialists Catala and Unio de Catalans independentistes.585 Both 
Basque nationalists and Galician nationalists worked hard for Galeuzka in Latin
order was the establishment of an international body; international community acceptance of the right 
to self-determination and acceptance of political freedom. Galeuzka encourages brotherly ties with 
Portugal; exponent of the postulates of civilisation and western democracy; Galeuzka will maintain 
good relations with the USSR; Galeuzka links with Anglo-Saxon nations and Ibero-America; 
Galeuzka proclaims the necessity of mutual understanding between nations.” (PRO, File FO 
371/39744, Aguirre’s draft pact of Galeuzka, Aguirre (president of Euzkadi’s government), Pi i 
Sunyer (president of the national committee of Galicia), Alfonso Castelao (president of the committee 
of Galicia) signed the Galeuzka pact New York, 06-12-1944)
580 AT, Poblet, Box G 2,1945; FPS, Box D5, Annex on Galeuzka, 1944.
581 AT, Poblet, Box 360, 'Acuerdos adoptados en el Consejo celebrado en Nueva York', New York, 02-
03-1945.
582 PRO, File FO 371/39744, Aguirre's draft pact of Galeuzka, Aguirre (president of Euzkadi’s 
government), Pi i Sunyer (president of the national committee of Galicia), Alfonso Castelao (president 
of the committee of Galicia) signed the Galeuzka pact New York, 06-12-1944; AN, Artea, PNV 24-5, 
letter from Castelao to Aguirre, 19-09-1944; AN, Artea, EBB 105-7, letter from Aguirre to Castelao, 
20-09-1944.
583 AN, Artea, EBB 213-1, Galeuzka in Latin America in 1944.
584 AT, Poblet, Tacte entre Comunitat Catalana I partits Catalans, Mexico, 25-08-1944.
585 PRO File FO 371/39744, Galeuzka, London, 13-04-1944; J.C.J. Aberasturi, De la derrota, p.666; 
FPS, Box 1, Folder 12, letter from Aguirre to Pi i Sunyer, New York, 14-02-1944; C. Pi i Sunyer, 
Memdries de I'exili, Vol.L
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America, but divisions amongst the Catalans (those supporting the CNC and those 
supporting ERC) impeded further developments.586 The tripartite pact was again 
postponed. Moreover, in 1944, the refugees started their return to Europe, particularly, 
France. Circumstances changed again. Aguirre continued fighting for Galeuzka, 
supported by the Galicians, but differences among the Catalans ultimately curtailed 
real development.587
In October 1944, a number of Republican and Socialist organisations in Madrid -  
Izquierda Republicana (IR), Union Republicana (UR), Partido Republicano Federal 
(PRF), PSOE, UGT and CNT - collaborated to found ANFD. It was presided over by 
Regulo Martinez.588 The ANFD founded in October 1944 was made up of a wide front 
of Republicans, socialists and anarchists. It was a significant move towards the 
unification of the anti-Francoist forces. ANFD presented a programme for recovering 
republican order and for creating a provisional democratic government.589 The ANFD 
tried to unite Socialist, Republican and nationalist aims including the Catalan demands 
of autonomy.590 It was a significant rapprochement between the Republicans and the 
Catalans.591 It also had representation in Catalonia and accepted the aspirations to 
autonomy, though not the principle of a federation of independent countries.592 In 
Catalonia, the ANFD was constituted in May 1945, integrating the ex-members of the 
POUM and the majority of nationalist organisations.
However, subjected to repression by the regime, it would founder on a lack of support 
from the Western powers.593 Galeuzka, the UNE and the ANFD, all attempts at 
uniting the anti-Francoist groups, were to fail due to a lack of capacity for agreement, 
extensive internal division and clashes of leadership.
586 The following document expresses the lack of entente of Catalans facing the project of Galeuzka. 
PRO File Fo 371/39744, Galeuzka, London, 28-06-1944
587 J.C.J. Aberasturi, carta de Aguirre a Telesforo Monzdn, 25-06-1945; AT, Poblet, Tacte entre 
Comunitat Catalana I partits Catalans, Mexico, 25-08-1944; PRO File FO 371/39744, Letter Lizaso to 
Aguirre, London, 10-12-1944, Galeuzka; AN, Artea, EBB 117-2,30-12-1941, letter from Monzdn to 
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588 AT, Poblet, Box 126, 'Alianza Nacional de Fueizas democratic as'.
589 AT, Box 125, Endavant, Toulouse, 23-06-1945.
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6.5 CONCLUSION
During the last months of World War n, the Catalans were buoyed first by the 
prospect and then by the reality of an Allied victory, believing that the victors would 
help them to overthrow Franco.594 At the war’s end, the USSR and the French were 
more anti-Francoist than the British and the Americans. However, at the conference of 
San Francisco, the Allies’ resolution not to intervene was made clear, disappointing 
opposition hopes, and expectations.
The Western powers did not move against the Francoist regime in the way that 
had been expected by the opposition. The perceived alternative to the regime was 
Communist, or Communist-backed, which seemed a greater threat than Francoism 
itself. Obviously, behind the lack of help by the international community also lay the 
real fear of the Western power that the return of democracy to Spain would lead to 
another Spanish Civil War and to a Communist take-over. Moreover, the opposition to 
Franco evidently failed to offer a credible alternative to the dictatorship, in the eyes of 
the Western powers. A more unified opposition, particularly Catalan opposition, was 
required to persuade the powerbrokers that there was a republican or federal alternative 
worthy of support Although there is little evidence that Western powers would 
seriously have entertained, and committed themselves to, an alternative even had it 
been credible, it seems likely the Western democracies would have opted for a 
democracy in Spain rather than a fascist dictator, and would have been willing to 
support the overthrow of Franco if the anti-Francoist opposition could have plausibly 
pledged to establish stability and security against Communism. We can assert that the 
West could have got behind a republican platform had it represented a credible 
opposition based on the historical reasoning that the most obvious alternative for the 
Western powers in Spain would have been the restoration of democracy and in that 
case the most straightforward solution was that of recovering the previous democratic 
system in Spain, that of the second republic up to 1936.
Newly liberated France resumed its place as the epicentre of Catalan political 
activity. The FNC was reorganised in 1944, but was severely persecuted by the
594 J. Martinez Vendrell, Una vida per Catalunya, Memdries, (1939-1946), (Barcelona, Pdrtic, 1991), 
p.284.
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Francoists in Spain. Estat Catala and ERC continued their slow consolidation. In an 
attempt to bring unity to the Catalan side, Tarradellas, leader of ERC, created 
Solidaritat Catalana. The Basques also reorganised in France, showing a willingness 
to engage in partnerships with such groups as the Republicans.
In the UK, the CNC had been reconstituted in 1944, radicalising in the process, 
but it would be dissolved in June 1945, on the orders of the president of the 
Generalitat in exile, Josep Irla, who wished to avoid more confusion among the 
Catalan leadership. As a site of Catalan political activity, the UK lost ground again to 
continental Europe. However, 1944 saw a significant second effort to bring together 
Basque nationalist, Catalan, and Galician aims, through the Galeuzka. The political 
spectrum of opposition comprised the left-wing parties, the parties of the right, and a 
number of independent of the left and right parties groups. Catalan nationalism 
remained active as a political force, both in the USA and Latin America.595
595 AT, Poblet, C l69, Opinions, Perpinyk, 03-03-1945, "Estat Catalk i Solidaridad Catalana"; AT, Poblet, 
Box 243, "Solidaritat Catalana".
CHAPTER 7 -  CATALAN OPPOSITION FROM JUNE 1945 TO NOVEMBER 
1950: THE RETURN OF THE AMBASSADORS
7.1 INTRODUCTION
By 1946, the Allies had already decided not to intervene in the Spanish situation, 
and from then onwards, Franco became the best realistic option for the Allies,596 the 
most credible means of assuring Spanish neutrality in the case of a confrontation with 
the USSR.597 On 12 December 1946, the UN decided to withdraw ambassadors from 
Spain. This was a largely symbolic gesture, since embassy staff remained working 
normally. However, in October 1950, the ambassadors of the Western powers returned 
to Spain, indicating at least an acceptance of Francoism, if not outright approval, by 
the international community, or at least some of its key powers.598 The moment was 
symbolic, a defeat for the hopes and expectations of the Catalan opposition groups.
By 1950, it became evident that the anti-Francoist opposition, including Catalan 
nationalism, had not managed to present a cohesive bloc and a realistic and stable 
alternative to Franco. The Cold War marked the end of the hopes of anti-Francoist 
groups to overthrow the dictator as the Allies decided not to intervene in Spain.
The course of developments of Catalan nationalism in the period is described, 
taking in primarily France and Spain, but consideration is also given to the situation in 
the UK, USA and Latin America. A number of Catalan parties, both on the right and 
the left of the political spectrum tried to re-establish themselves, often proposing 
unitary platforms. The Generalitat was reconstituted between 1945 and 1948. All 
efforts succumbed in the event to lack of resources, poor organisation, internecine 
conflict, and limited international support.
In the last section of the chapter, the aftermath of 1947 is considered, where 
Western policy helped to recast Catalan nationalism as a cultural phenomenon. 
Effective political opposition to Franco would not re-emerge until many years later in
596 J.M. Toquero, Franco y Don Juan, (Barcelona, Plaza y Jan£s, 1989) p.389; Aberasturi, De la 
derrota, p.703; AN, Salvador de Madariaga, 'General, M^rchese listed!', London, 11-1944. FPS, 
Box 13, Folder 403, letter from Salvador de Madariaga to Carles Pi i Sunyer, 19-11-1941.
597 APM, Dossier 8, Report 240-E, 'Spain between two worlds that are getting ready to attack each 
other', Lisbon, 25-01-1946.
598 P. Preston, Franco, (London, Harper Collins, 1993), p.600
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Cataloniaor elsewhere in Spain. After 1950, political Catalan nationalism was little 
more than vestigial. The policy of the Allies had long since been determined.
7.2 THE SPANISH QUESTION
The major post-World War II conference on the Allied side was held at Potsdam. 
On 16 July 1945, the American president Harry S. Truman (who had succeeded 
Roosevelt on 12 April 1945 since Roosevelt had died), the British Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill (who would be replaced by Clement Attlee on 28 July), and the 
Soviet leader Josef Stalin met at the Potsdam Conference, which seemed, at first 
glance, to advocate an absolute condemnation of the Franco regime. The USSR, the 
USA and the UK reaffirmed that Spain could not be admitted to the UN, pointing out 
the fascist origins of Francoism, and the necessity of restoring democracy in Spain.
The primary aim of the Potsdam meeting was to address and co-ordinate the matter of 
the Allied occupation of Germany and the other free countries, and the material 
reconstruction and reorganisation of the international system. For the Western powers, 
the crux of policy was the preservation of peace and stability on the Iberian Peninsula, 
and arrest of the expansion of Communism. It was based on two pillars: the public 
rejection of Franco, and respect for the principle of non-intervention in the internal 
affairs of another country.599 The Potsdam declaration stated:
Tirst, the Francoist regime did not start as a consequence of an internal 
development of Spanish politics but as a result of an intervention of the 
Axis, which imposed a fascist regime in Spain. Secondly, the Spanish 
regime constituted an enormous danger for the European and South 
American nations that sought freedom. Thirdly, Francoist repression 
had led the Spanish population to claim the restoration of a democratic 
Spain. Therefore, the Conference considered it necessary to ask the UN
599 PS, Potsdam conference, Senyera, Mexico, 1946; AGA, IDD. 17, Box 5372, Spanish Embassy in 
Havana (1905-1960), El Mundo, 10-02-1946; S.Vilar and R. De la Cierva, Pro y Contra Franco, 
(Barcelona, Planeta, 1985), p.172; L.L6pez Rod6, La larga tnarcha hacia la monarqma, (Barcelona, 
Noguer, 1978), p.51; Preston, Franco, ,  p.540; J.C.J. Aberasturi, De la derrota , p.715; E. 
Moradiellos, Ta conferencia de Potsdam de 1945 y el problema espanol' in Javier Tusell, La politica 
exterior de Espana en el siglo XX, (Madrid, UNE, 1997).
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to break its relations with Franco and to support the democratic Spanish 
forces.'600
The United Nations condemned Francoism and asked the UN members to break off its 
relations with Franco, but no further action was undertaken. From Yalta to Potsdam, 
the Allies had developed their stance. Yalta made no specific mention of Spain 
whereas Potsdam went so far as to condemn Francoism. No deeds would accompany 
these strong words. Catalans felt let down by the Potsdam conference, which at once 
publicly condemned the Francoist regime, but clearly stated the principle of non­
intervention in Spanish affairs. In one moment, the Catalans foresaw that they would 
not receive help from the Allies, as they had expected.
The policy pursued by the French Provisional government towards Spain, until 
January 1946, was non-confrontational. It was acknowledged that, without 
democracy in Spain, close Franco-Spanish relations were impossible, but like the 
British, the French government could not disregard commercial links between the two 
countries.601 On 15 January 1946, the French National Assembly unanimously adopted 
a resolution congratulating the government for having suggested that the British and 
the Americans should break off diplomatic relations with the dictatorship, and 
recognise the legitimacy of the republican govemment-in-exile. On 27 February 1946, 
the French government decided to close its frontier with Spain immediately, under 
pressure from French public opinion and, particularly, the parties of the left. France 
closed its border with Spain for a few months in 1946 but Charles de Gaulle soon
fjryy
asserted the impossibility of an economic embargo on Spain. The French 
government also called on the Allies to take similar measures against the Francoists 
and to bring the Spanish case to the UN, particularly to the Security Council, its 
supreme body. The USSR immediately gave their support to the initiative, but the 
USA refused, saying that it was up to Spaniards to decide their own government. No 
economic sanctions were imposed. The British also rejected the French proposal, in 
every aspect. Churchill, concerned for British interests on the peninsula, preferred not
600 APM, dossier 7, Foreign Office Stockholm, 20-10-1945.
601 Aberasturi, De la derrota, pp.715-731; Dunthom, Britain , p.141.
602 F. Portero, Franco aislado: la cuestidn espanola (1945-1950), (Madrid, Aguilar, 1989); H. Heine,
La oposicion politico al franquismo, (Barcelona, Editorial Crftica Grijalbo, 1983).
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to intervene in Spain.603 After World War n, if anything, the British seemed more 
inclined to help the monarchist opposition in Spain, and never seemed particularly 
keen to help the Catalan opposition.
The American administration itself put any thought of help to the anti-Francoist 
opposition out of its mind: under the direction of George F. Keenan, the American 
policy planning staff had, in February 1946, sent a report to American Secretary of 
State General Marshall, recommending a rapid normalisation of USA economic and 
political relations with Spain. Marshall approved Kennan’s recommendations 
immediately.604 American policy now was directed to the goal of containing Soviet 
expansionism, which was famously expressed in a long telegram of February 1946, in 
which Kennan denounced the aggressive politics and expansion of the USSR. 
Washington was about to abandon any thought of removing Franco from power, 
deciding it was the task of Spaniards themselves to solve their internal problems.605 
Before then, the Catalans (as was the case with the rest of the anti-Francoist 
opposition) had not managed to present a credible bloc that could be considered a 
realistic alternative to Franco. It is difficult to say to what extent things might have 
turned out differendy the forces of the opposition -  and the Catalans in particular -  had 
managed to present a more united front.
International resolutions on Spain were next debated at the UN, in New York, in 
February 1946. Spain was excluded from the table as the UN did not accept the nature 
of the regime. This seemed to signal a shift of the UN towards further action, giving 
hope to opposition groups that the UN would soon impose an economic embargo. The 
meeting took place in the context of the growing confrontation between the USSR and 
the USA as the Cold War intensified. The Americans were preoccupied by the idea 
that the Soviets would seek to gain control of Spain for strategic reasons.606
The international community launched a new anti-Francoist campaign with the 
Tripartite Note, on 5 March 1946. Reiterating the non-interventionist principle, the
603 APM, dossier 6, Report to Foreign Office about confidential news, 31-07-1945.
604 Preston, Franco,, p.574.
605 Aberasturi, De la derrota „ p.715; C. Pi i Sunyer, Memdries de I'exili de Carles Pi i Sunyer, Vol.II 
pp.35-39; Preston, Franco,, p.540.
606 For more information on the USSR interests in Spain see Aberasturi, De la derrota , p.733.
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Tripartite Note caused profound frustration among the anti-Francoist opposition.607 
The Tripartite Note stated, inter alia:
The governments of France, the UK and the USA have exchanged 
views with regard to the present Spanish government and their relations 
with that regime. It is agreed that so long as General Franco continues 
in control of Spain, the Spanish people cannot anticipate full and cordial 
relations with those nations of the world, which have by common effort 
brought defeat to German Nazism and Italian fascism. There is no 
intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Spain. The Spanish 
people themselves must in the long run work out their own destiny. The 
three governments are hopeful that the Spanish people will not again be 
subjected to the horrors and bitterness of civil strife. They hope that 
Spaniards will soon find the means to bring about a peaceful withdrawal 
of Franco.'608
The Tripartite Note reiterated the principle of non-intervention in Spain, frustrating 
Catalan hopes of help.
In 1946, Spain was not accepted into membership of the UN. This was a period 
of international condemnation of the regime, but without direct action. At the end of 
the year, the UN voted for the expulsion of the regime from all international 
organisations. However, it was only the Communist countries that demanded the more 
energetic measures required to force Franco from power, and during the period 1946- 
1947, with the minds of the Western powers bent on the expansion of Communism, 
Franco was quickly perceived the lesser of two evils.
The Catalans and the Basque nationalists attempted to press their claims by 
participating in proceedings. J.A. Aguirre presented a report to a UN subcommittee in 
1946. Also, the Catalans submitted a written appeal to the UN, asking to be included 
in the UN debates. No practical help was forthcoming from the international powers.
The Catalan and Basque written appeals did not have a major impact. Even if
607 AT, Poblet, Box G2, Nota tripartita; Dunthom, Britain, pp.150-151; L. L6pez Rod6, La larga 
marcha hacia la monarqma, (Barcelona, Noguer, 1978), p.65; Aberasturi, De la derrota , p.720; 
Preston, Franco, ,  p.554.
608 PRO File FO 371-60374, U N  Report, December 1946'
609 F. Portero, Franco aislado: la cuestion espanola (1945-1950), (Madrid, Aguilar, 1989);
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these texts presented concrete ideologies and aims, it was evident to the Allies that 
they could not be backed up by an efficient political structure in either case and, 
therefore, could not be supported.
Finally and most importantly, during 1947 the tension between the USA and the 
USSR got ever worse in structure and scale. The period was marked by the emerging 
dichotomy between Communism and the anti-Communist nations, between East and 
West. Communism as ideology received a boost after World War II when the USSR 
became an international superpower. Spain was inevitably affected by the Cold War. 
Communism was established in South East Asia, and was on the move in Europe. In 
the event, this proved favourable to Franco, who was preferred to a potentially unstable 
government that could turn into a Communist state.610 Spain would come in from the 
cold, and would be admitted to the international organisations affiliated with the UN. 
Western interests now advised that the status quo in Spain was to be maintained. The 
USA sought to remove Communists from Western European governments. Both 
Britain and the USA were caught between a dislike of the Spanish dictatorship, and an 
awareness of its value in the Cold War. As far as they were concerned, Franco was the 
best realistic alternative to a Communist or Communist-influenced Spain since the 
anti-Francoist opposition had not presented a better alternative.
On 1 May 1947, the American government convinced the British that they too 
should veto any UN action against Franco. This was followed by the Marshall Plan, 
the American programme of economic aid for European reconstruction. On 5 June 
1947, the USA announced it was ready to contribute to European reconstruction; the 
plan was agreed with the European governments.611 The Marshall Plan would make a 
decisive contribution to European recovery. With the Soviets spuming an invitation to 
join the programme, the UK and France approached all other European countries, with 
the exception of Spain, forming the Committee of European Economic Cooperation. 
Spain’s exclusion was welcomed by the anti-Francoist opposition since it was believed 
to herald a first step towards the international isolation of Franco.612
Preston, Franco,.
610 For information on the developments of the Cold War see F. Portero, Franco aislado.
611 AN, Artea, EBB 217-1, "El plan norteamericano de ayuda a Europa".
612 AN, Artea, EBB 231-1,29-11-1947, "La posicidn de Estados Unidos".
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The European governments explained Spain’s non-inclusion in the Marshall Plan 
on the basis that it had not actively participated in World War n, and had no need of 
reconstruction.613 An article in the pro-Franco British newspaper The Continental 
Daily Mail, explained the decision: ‘It is normal that Spain should remain out of this 
affair because she needs gifts from no-one. Her industries are flourishing, her bonds 
on the Swiss and London markets sell at about 90 per cent. The shops are full, the 
gold reserve is satisfactory.’614 Even if, in pure economic terms, the exclusion was a 
tough blow for Francoism, politically, Francoism was about to receive the international 
blessing of the beginnings of the Cold War.
In November 1947, the USA tried to repeal the UN resolution approved in 1946 
that recommended the withdrawal of the ambassadors from Spain. The American 
demarche in 1947 showed that the UN resolution of 1946 - one that included a note on 
working toward the democratisation of Spain - would never be applied or carried 
through, and that it was only a matter of time before it withered away. Between 1945 
and 1950, governments, diplomats and politicians debated the Spanish question at the 
UN.
The year 1947 signified, amongst other things, the beginning of the international 
consolidation of the Francoist regime. The division of the world into two power blocs 
favoured the maintenance of the dictatorship. Many dates have been taken to mark the 
end of anti-Francoist opposition hopes. Internationally, the UN resolutions of 1946 
formalised non-intervention, and, in November 1947, diplomatic relations with Spain 
were normalised. The USA repudiated the Tripartite Note; on 17 November 1947, it 
voted for the first time in favour of Franco at the UN 615 On 4 November 1950, the 
General Assembly of the UN voted to authorise the return of the ambassadors to 
Madrid.616 To add insult to injury, Spain was admitted to its Food and Agriculture 
Organisation.617 This was considered a Francoist victory and a defeat for the Catalan 
hopes. The moment Spain was allowed to apply for membership of international
613 C. Pi i Sunyer, Memories de I'exili de Carles Pi i Sunyer, VolII, p.151.
614 PRO, File FO 371/67876, Why Spain had no need of Marshall plan aid", The Continental Daily 
Mail, 8-07-1947.
615 S. Vilar and R. de la Cierva, Pro y contra Franco, (Barcelona, Planeta, 1985), pp. 172-175.
616 For the reactions after the UN approved the return of the ambassadors to Madrid in November 
1950,see PRO, Hankey's letter to Madrid, London, 03-02-1950; PRO File PREM 8/1531.
617 Preston, Franco,, p.600.
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organisations may fairly be regarded as the end of the hopes of the opposition to 
Franco. The decision effectively meant an implicit acceptance of Francoism, putting 
paid to any hope of help from the international community to the anti-Francoist 
opposition. Without it, the anti-Francoist opposition was left to waste away.618
Franco started to receive economic support from the USA from 1951, and signed 
the Concordat with the Vatican in 1953, which conferred upon him the blessing of the 
Vatican. The USA gave a credit to Spain of 62,500,000 dollars. Spain joined the UN. 
The Cold War transformed the Francoist regime into a bulwark against the expansion 
of Communism and allowed for a more positive attitude towards Francoism. On 4 
November 1950, the UN revoked the resolution of 1946, and from 1955, Spain was 
present in all international institutions promoted by the UN. This provoked a 
tremendous internal crisis within the anti-Francoist opposition.619
The international powers were never presented with a solid and credible plan by 
opposition forces. Sir Victor Mallet, the British ambassador to Spain, reported as 
much to the Foreign Office:
1 was left somewhat depressed by the lack of precision of ideas and had 
the impression that these people were building too many castles in the 
air. (...) Moreover, although there seems to be agreement between left 
and right, I foresee much haggling still over practical methods of 
establishing a future regime/620 
Mallet foresaw a rapprochement among the anti-Francoist groups through the creation 
of common platforms. He believed however that a solid political structure to be 
reckoned with, was still a long way from being created, and, in this, he was right. The 
Catalans, in common with the rest of the anti-Francoist opposition, were tremendously 
influenced by the Cold War and the spread of Communism, and by the decision of the 
UN to allow the return of the ambassadors to Spain. The international acceptance of 
Francoism was effectively the end of opposition hopes to obtain help from the Allies.
618 A. Viladot i Presas, Nacionalisme i premsa clandestina, (1939-1951), (Barcelona, Curial, 1987), 
pp.192-194.
619 M. Guibemau, Nacionalisme Catala, (Barcelona, Pdrtic, 2002), p.95; D. Diaz Esculies, L 'oposicid 
catalanista alfranquisme, (Barcelona, Publicacions de TAbadia de Montserrat, 1996), pp.83; H. 
Heine, La oposicion , pp.406-407.
620 PRO, File FO 371-60372, Sir Victor Mallet to Foreign Office, 19-01-1946.
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73  THE FORMATION OF CATALAN GOVERNMENT IN FRANCE
In the meantime, successive attempts were made to form a new government of the 
Generalitat in France, between 1945 and 1948. The first failed in 1945. The second 
succeeded but finally succumbed to circumstantial difficulties, dissolving in 1948. 
Josep Irla originally asked Pi i Sunyer to form a government in 1945. In May of 1945, 
Pi i Sunyer agreed plans to organise a government of the Generalitat in exile, under 
the presidency of Josep Irla, in which he would act as counsellor. The new 
government needed to integrate the reconstituted Consell of London, the political 
parties, those in exile, as well as the groups inside Spain. Pi i Sunyer returned to 
London and decided to dissolve the Consell of London on the basis that, since the 
Generalitat was working again, the Consell had therefore accomplished its main 
objective.621
The task of forming the new government was highly problematic since it 
represented an attempt to unite disparate Catalan forces both ideologically and 
politically. It tried to unite Catalans in exile, and inside Spain. Pi i Sunyer’s particular 
ideas clashed with those of the FNC. Those demanding a return to the statutory regime 
and those taking for granted immediate use of the right of self-determination, had to be 
brought into the fold.622 Pi i Sunyer knew that the older followers of the CNC did not 
approve of the plan, and, in proceeding, he would be obliged to recognise the statute 
and the constitution. Moreover, he had difficulty travelling. Unable to form a 
coalition in the way he desired, Pi i Sunyer instead asked Irla to proceed himself to 
form the new government. In September of 1945, on a trip to Paris, Pi i Sunyer 
presented his resignation to Irla because he felt that the new project clashed with the 
ideas of the Consell. Ideological clashes and leadership divisions were indeed 
recurrent problems among Catalans.
621 FPS, Box D5, Consell Nacional Londres, Declaracid of the Consell Nacional en ser dissolt', 1945; 
Poblet, Box G3, Endavant, T i i Sunyer i el govern provisional de Catalunya', Toulouse, 06-08-1945; 
C. Pi i Sunyer, Memdries de I'exili, Vol.I, p.231;C. Pi i Sunyer, Memories de I'exili, Vol.II, pp. 129- 
131.
622 C. Pi i Sunyer, Memdries de I'exili, Vol.II, pp.5,17-19,23,231; F. Vilanova, Les ruptures de I'any 
39, pp.53-54.
Pi i Sunyer resigned considering that the task of the Consell of London was 
finished since there was now a project for the reconstitution of the Generalitat. The 
Consell he led was merely intended as a substitute for the Generalitat while it was not 
working. Pi i Sunyer also resigned for professional reasons; there was no money left 
to pay the civil servants and counsellors of the Generalitat so Pi i Sunyer decided to
C S)*!
accept a job as an engineer in Uruguay. Finally, Pi i Sunyer resigned because he 
envisaged that the reconstituted Generalitat would fail and the relations of the 
Generalitat and those inside Spain were broken.
Josep Irla remained steadfast and his second attempt to fashion a coalition 
govemment-in-exile was successful. He became president of the new Catalan 
government on 14 September 1945, in Paris.624 The new Generalitat was being created 
on the basis that it was the continuum of the one defeated in 1939. The new 
Generalitat was the institutional, legal and legitimate continuation of the Generalitat 
1939-1940. According to the Catalan statute, Irla, as President of the Parliament, 
succeeded Companys when he died; therefore, the legality was respected and was only 
limited by the difficulties of the exile.625
The resources of the Generalitat were very limited. Catalans constantly 
depended on their negotiations with the republican government; when negotiations 
with Republicans did not work, they asked for money from the Basques, knowing that 
they would not be able to repay it.626 The lack of resources was one of the main 
reasons for the failure of the reconstituted Generalitat. In terms of personnel, there 
were a few relevant, and badly paid, figures. The majority of them were Companys’ 
fellows from 1939-1940 and members of ERC. This being the case, the Generalitaf s 
ideology was very similar to that of 1939. The members included Emili Vigo who died 
at the end of the 1940s and Joan Tauler, who had been a parliamentary deputy before
623 C.Pi i Sunyer, Memdries de I'exili, Vol.n.
624 FPS, Box 478, Endavant, Toulouse, 06-08-1945, T i i Sunyer i el govern provisional de Catalunya'; 
PRO FO 371/49582, Pi i Sunyer's letter to Noel Baker about the formation of the Catalan 
govemment-in-exile.
625 C.Pi i Sunyer, Memdries de I'exili, Vol.II.
626 F.Vilanova, Als dos costats de la frontera.
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1939.627 Pere Puig was yet another figure that formed the new Generalitat. He ended 
up going to Bolivia where he would become a businessman. There was also Jaume 
Serra i Gasulla who was the delegate of the government inside Catalonia and Armand 
Obiols who was the editor of the magazine Revista de Catalunya. In 1948, after the 
dissolution of the government, Victor Torres, general secretary of the presidency of the 
Generalitat, was in charge of reducing the structure of the government to the 
minimum.628
Relations with the French government were tolerated by the new Generalitat but 
were actually very rare. They had contacts with French civil servants and politicians 
but without much trascendancy. In the period 1946-1948, the French together with the 
British tried to put pressure on the Republicans for them to approach the monarchists 
in the figure of Don Juan. Pi i Sunyer explains in his memories that a French secret 
agent proposed to him a way to get to Barcelona if he agreed to go first to Estoril to see 
Don Juan. Pi i Sunyer did not accept the proposition.629
One of the axes of the new Generalitat* s activities was cultural propaganda. In 
addition to publishing the emblematic Revista de Catalunya, the government also 
organised Catalan language lessons and tried to develop information services. The 
services of relations with Catalonia were led by Pere Puig and the focal point of 
transmission of papers and packages was Enveigt, on French territory, very close to the 
frontier of the Cerdanya. Finally, the services of help, even if they were very modest 
managed to do some humanitarian activity.630
The government’s broadest aim was to bring about national unity and the 
restoration of the autonomous republican institutions with the help of international 
pressure.631 Catalan identity in this period was based on the right of self-determination
627 Joan Tauter was a lawyer and a politician. He was bom in Figueres in 1879 and died in Barcelona 
1959. He was a personnal assistant to Companys from 1931 onwards. He was deputy of ERC to the 
Parliamnet of Catalunya from 1932 to 1934.
628 Vilanova, Als dos costats, last chapter.
629 C.Pi i Sunyer, Memdries de I'exili, Vol.R
630 C.Pi i Sunyer, Memdries de I'exili, Vol.II, pp. 194-206.
631 C. Pi i Sunyer, Memdries de I'exili, Vol.II, pp. 40-42.
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of the Catalan people.632 The government represented the continuity of a will and a 
right and mainly the democratic feeling of Catalan people. Carles Pi 1 Sunyer 
explained the purpose of this new government to Josep Trueta:
"A government has been formed in a very difficult situation that 
represents a provisional solution and a first nucleus around which there 
is the hope of articulating a more complete unity. (...) The new 
government, even with a limited composition, has the purpose of 
national unity."634
A key matter for the embryonic government was its aspiration to inclusiveness. 
Through trying to include members both from the Right, and from the opposition 
inside Spain,636 deadlock was soon reached.637 The government lacked resources, and 
any capacity to unify the policies of the various strands of Catalan opposition. The 
ERC of Catalonia did not agree with the formation of the govemment-in-exile. It also 
lost the support of the Catalans in the UK.
The activity of the government was restricted by the difficult circumstances of 
its exile and its ambition to co-ordinate a number of different factions. It was 
dissolved by Josep Irla in January 1948.638 Those in the government had lost any hope 
of continuing.639 With the government dissolved, the president remained the sole 
representative of institutional continuity recognised inside Spain. The institutional 
crisis of Catalan nationalism again came to the fore.640 Pi i Sunyer explained the 
feeling of failure after the dissolution of the government:
632 P S ,' Declaracid govern de Catalunya a Paris, Nova Catalunya de Cuba, Cuba, 1946. Viladot , 
Nacionalisme, pp.70.72.
633 C. Pi i Sunyer, Memdries de I'exili, VoL.II, p.230; C. Pi i Sunyer, Memdries de I'exili, Vol.II, pp.79- 
80; Letter from A.Rovira I Virgili to Miquel Guinart, Perpignan, 18-09-1947 in A.Rovira I Virgili, 
Cartes de I'exili (1939-1949), (Barcelona, Publicacions de l'Abadia de Montserrat, 2002).
634 FPS, Box 20, Folder 666, letters from Carles Pi i Sunyer to Josep Trueta, 20-09-1945.
635 AT, Poblet, Box L6, 'Aquest 6s un govern d'unitat Catalana'.
636 AT, Poblet, Box 877, 'Considerations entom de l'unitat catalana amb motiu de la formaci6 del 
govern de Catalunya', 1946.
637 C. Pi i Sunyer, Memdries de I'exili, Vol.II, pp.58-61,84,87,208; Letter from A.Rovira I Virgili to 
Humbert Torres, Paris, 12-03-1946 in A.Rovira I Virgili, Cartes de I'exili, (1939-1949), (Barcelona, 
Publicacions de l'abadia de Montserrat, 2002).
638 AT, Poblet, Box L6, Josep Irla.
639 AT, Artea, EBB 211-2, Ta disoluci6n del gobiemo Catalan'; AT, Artea, EBB165-4, T)esaparaci6n 
del gobiemo de la Generalidad'.
640 C. Pi i Sunyer, Memdries de I'exili, Vol.lI, pp.212-213,235-236.
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The world reflected in these works could be qualified as failed. All this 
work, all these efforts in order to put together a govemment-in-exile 
that, inside Spain, was not perceived; the battles with the republican 
Spanish authorities in order to obtain a minimum economic autonomy.
(...) Sometimes, I have imagined these historical links as part of a tree 
that has broken or maybe as a path with no exit."641
7.4 PLATFORMS OF OPPOSITION
Perhaps the most remarkable political characteristic of Catalan nationalism in the 
period was the attempts to create unitary political platforms. Several such attempts 
were made, often achieving the participation of all leading political and union groups, 
excepting the Communists of the Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (PSUC), who 
were held responsible for the loss of Catalonia during the Civil War.642
In Paris and Catalonia, the FNC643 continued to seek a means of unifying the 
opposition forces. In 1945, it was excluded from the government of the Generalitat in 
exile. After 1945, the FNC was forced to resolve its confusing ideology after the re- 
emergence of the Republican parties both in exile and inside Spain. The FNC 
proposed a more socially-oriented policy and defended the co-federal structure of the 
Catalan countries, finally joining the Charter of the Atlantic. The FNC had been the 
most remarkable platform of unity until 1945. However, after 1945, its relative 
strength diminished because it was excluded from the government of the Generalitat 
and severely persecuted by Francoist forces. In June 1946, there was a massive 
persecution of the members of the FNC in Montjui'ch by Francoist forces. Police 
persecution dismantled the military sections, the university sections and the apparatus 
of propaganda, but it did not manage to dismantle the FNC, which managed to 
reorganise itself. 644 The Second Conference of the FNC was celebrated in October 
1947 in Sant Just Desvem.645 The main point of departure from its previous policy was 
the desire to become a primarily political party and to renounce armed activism. It also
641 F. Vilanova, Als dos costats de lafrontera, (Barcelona, Abadia de Montserrat, 2001) p.16.
642 Diaz Esculies, L 'oposicid catalanista alfranquisme, pp.23-31.
643 Viladot, Nacionalisme, p.103.
644 Diaz Esculies, L 'oposicid catalanista alfranquisme, pp.60-61.
645 AN, Artea, EBB 222-4, 'Congreso de Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya'.
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hoped to obtain help from the democratic powers. The FNC stayed loyal to the 
president of the Generalitat and officially recognised the CNDC.646 Nevertheless, by 
1947, the executive board of the FNC had reached a view that Catalan hopes were, in 
reality, at an end. The FNC renounced the armed struggle.647
In Spain, another attempt at a cross-party platform was the Alianga dels Partits 
Republicans Catalans (APRC) of 1944, associated with Josep Pous i Pag&s648. Pous i 
Pages, a writer, had returned to Barcelona from exile in the spring of 1944, to be told 
by Pere Puig, the general secretary’s voice in the Catalonia-based ERC, to organise a 
common platform for the Catalan organisations. Pous i Pages managed his task well, 
separating the Catalan parties from the ANFD, and constituting, in July 1945, the 
APRC, over which he presided himself.649 The APRC was a remarkable attempt at 
uniting Republican Catalan forces.
In Spain overall, the most noteworthy and concerted attempt to engender a 
platform for a multiplicity of opposition groups and bring together all Catalan 
Republican parties, was the Consell Nacional de la Democracia Catalana (CNDC).
The CNDC was constituted on 6 December 1945 and led by Josep Pous i Pages of the 
APRC, thus it was alternatively known as the Comite Pous i Pages. The CNDC 
recognised Josep Irla as president of the Catalans, but failed to recognise the 
government of the Generalitat in exile because the CNDC believed that the centre for 
Catalan fight should be in Catalonia and not in exile.650 The CNDC included Accio 
Catalana Republicana (ACR), Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), Estat Catala 
(EC), Unio Democratica de Catalunya (UDC), Moviment Socialists de Catalunya651, 
Joventut Catalana Democratica (JCD) and Moviment de la Resistencia Catalana 
(MRC), Unio de Rabassaires, Front Nacional de Catalunya (FNC), Partit Republica 
d’Esquerra, Unio Catalana and Partit Nacionalista Catala; all parties except the
646 Diaz Esculies, L 'oposicid catalanista alfranquisme, pp.63
647 For more information on the developments of the Front Nacional de Catalunya see Viladot , 
Nacionalisme, pp.68-73,100.
648 Josep Pous I Pag&s was a writer and a journalist (1873-1952). He was exiled in France between 1939 
and 1944. When he went back to Catalonia in 1945, he organised one of the first political platforms in 
opposition to Francoism, the Consell Nacional de la Democracia Catalana (CNDC), known as Comitfc 
Pous I Pagfcs. It would disappear after his death.
649 Diaz Esculies, L'oposicio Catalanista alfranquisme, pp.65-67.
650 PS, Ressorgiment, 'Consell Nacional de la Democracia Catalana: Bases de constitucid'.
651 AT, Poblet, C99, Endavant, Toulouse, 24-02-1945, 'Acta de Constitucid del Moviment Socialista de 
Catalunya'.
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Communist. FNC activity thereafter was limited to its involvement in the CNDC.652 
The FNC disappeared from the political map entirely after the dissolution of the 
CNDC in 1952.653 The CNDC was the most successful platform of unity in terms of 
the scope of the political spectrum that it covered. It even integrated the FNC.654
The leaders of the CNDC believed the Catalan struggle should take place in 
Catalonia itself. There were a number of motivations. First, Franco had to be 
overthrown, Catalonia liberated, and some semblance of democracy restored. Second, 
the continuity of the institution of the presidency, still occupied by Josep Irla, needed 
to be assured. Third, whilst Franco was still in power, the presidential functions inside 
Catalonia were to be represented by the CNDC. Fourth, a federal system in Spain 
would replace the dictatorship. Last of all, the pact of Galeuzka was to be upheld.655 
CNDC policy was to co-ordinate action with Euzkadi, the Catalan monarchists, and the 
ANFD in Spain. In the international sphere, the CNDC maintained relations with the 
Western democracies.656
Despite its successes in engendering unity among the parties, little of note was 
accomplished by the CNDC except rather small demonstrations on September 11 
1946. Divisions within the CNDC soon started to show. The ERC’s participation in 
the CNDC was directly contradictory, as ERC supported the policy of the government 
of the Generalitat in exile and the CNDC did not recognise its legitimacy. The CNDC 
reserved the exercise of presidential functions inside Catalonia to itself. In June 1947, 
the ERC decided to separate from the CNDC 657Also, the CNDC suffered its most 
severe persecution by the Francoist forces in 1946. It may be argued that the CNDC
652 AT, Poblet, Box C464; AT, Poblet, Box C62.
653 For information on the CNDC see FPS, Box 20, Folder 666, letters from Carles Pi i Sunyer to Josep 
Trueta, 22-09-1945; AT, Poblet, Box C464, "Bases de Constitucid del Consell Nacional de la 
Democntcia Catalana; PS, Ressorgiment, Argentina, 1945 and F. Vilanova, Als dos costats de la 
frontera, (Barcelona, Montserrat, 2001).
654 AT, Poblet, Box 62, "Comentaris entom del Consell Nacional de la Democr&cia Catalana".
655 PS, Ressorgiment, Argentina, 1945; J. Martmez Vendrell, Una vida per Catalunya, Memdries, 
(1939-1946), (Barcelona, Pdrtic, 1991), pp.305-306 ; E. Kedourie, Tales o f Nationalism, pp.39-45; 
Viladot, Naccionalisme, pp. 70-72,190; AT, Poblet, Box C464, "Bases de Constitucid del Consell 
Nacional de la Democracia Catalana"; FPS, Box 20, Folder 666, letters from Carles Pi i Sunyer to 
Josep Trueta, 22-09-1945; Diaz Esculies, L 'oposicio Catalanista al franquisme, pp.69-70; C. Pi i 
Sunyer, Memdries de I'exili, Vol.ll, pp.64-68.
656 PRO, File FO 371/60420, National council of die Catalan democracy, Barcelona, 11-09-1946; Diaz 
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failed both through its support for the policy of the new government of the Generalitat 
(which cost it many members) and because of Francoist persecution.
Finally, the CNDC expanded in 1946 by an alliance with the left platform 
ANFD. There was a Catalan representation within the Spanish ANFD as we have seen 
in chapter 6. The ANFD in Catalonia accepted the autonomical Catalan demands and 
was direcdy related to the ANFD in Spain. The CNDC developed into the Comite 
Permanent de la Democracia Catalana (CPDC) and accepted Irla as President of the 
Generalitat. It was an important attempt at unity, with each of the two entities 
conserving its name and its autonomy.658 The CPDC was a final attempt at a unitary 
platform which extended to the Spanish Republican anti-opposition groups. Each 
group tenaciously maintained its own identity and, hamstrung, the CPDC never 
translated its constituency into concrete action.
I S  THE ATLANTIC EXILE
A group of Catalans remained in New York659, Mexico, Chile and Argentina, 
working for democracy and for the Catalan right of self-determination.660 Used to 
looking to the Consell of London for leadership, there was confusion when it was 
dissolved. The Atlantic exile - both that in the USA and that in Latin America661 - 
suffered from the dissolution of the Consell of London, since it had provided guidance 
in terms of policy to be followed.662 Increasing independence and variety in the 
comunitats dissipated and diluted their influence.663
A fragment of a letter from the Catalan community in Mexico in 1947 shows that 
their democratic and Catalan desires were still very much alive but the Latin American 
comunitats were not in truth achieving their aims :
658 Diaz Esculies, L'oposicid catalanista alfranquisme,, pp.77-83.
659 Poblet, Box G3, 1/estada de Carles Pi i Sunyer a Nova York', 1945.
660 PS, Ressorgiment, Argentina, 1946; PRO, File FO 371/60420, Basque delegation in Chile, Chile, 17- 
08-1946.
661 PRO File FO 371/60420,17-10-1947, From the Catalan community in Mexico.
662 The comunitats in Latin America complained about the lack of guidance after the dissolution of the 
Consell of London. FPS, Box 1, Folder 9, Tost-ConselT, Santiago de Chile, 25-06-1946; AT, Poblet, 
ERC-60.
663 AT, Poblet, Box 470; AT, Poblet, Box 24; AT, Poblet, Box 464. Several documents on the activity of 
Catalans in Mexico after World War n.
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The Catalan community of Mexico, in the view of the assembly of the 
UN, takes the liberty of insisting on the breaking of relations on the part 
of all democracies with the fascist regime of Franco so as to bring about 
the fall of the dictator and the re-establishment of democracy. Franco 
should be in court for being a war criminal. (.. .)The exiled Catalans, in 
their own name, and in that of those within Catalonia, claim the right of 
the people to the exercise of their national sovereignty, champion the 
building up of the peninsula on the basis of the equality of the various 
nationalities, which make up the present Spanish state. We are 
struggling for a confederation of nations and a democratic government.
The peace of Europe demands the immediate liberation of the Hispanic 
peoples and the establishment of the republican democracy.'664
7.6 CATALAN EXTERNAL RELATIONS
The Catalans were, of course, one of a number of groups making up the external 
opposition to the regime. Two prominent elements with whom relationships were to 
be maintained were the Basques and the left-wing parties. The Basque govemment- 
in-exile was finally constituted in 1946 on the basis of statutory and republican 
legality.665 The Basque nationalist projects were not implemented due to left wing 
resistance and to the reaction of the Franco regime.666 Geographical instability under 
continuous international political change fuelled institutional and leadership 
instability667, making the implementation and propagation of the Basque case very 
difficult.668
In his Christmas address, President Aguirre called for the Basque people to resort 
to violence, if necessary, in order to achieve their aims. The sentiment behind his 
speech echoed that of the address he gave on Christina's day in 1941, which marked
664 PRO, File FO 371/60420, From the Catalan community of Mexico, Mexico, 17-10-1947.
665 The reconstitution of the Basque government is summarised in the following documents. PS, Buenos 
Aires, 1945; AT, Poblet, Box 360, 'Acuerdos adoptados en el Consejo celebrado en Nueva York', 
New York, 02-03-1945.
666 AT, Artea, EBB 169-1,01-09-1945, 'Constitucidn del gobiemo exiliado y su repercusi6n en el 
interior'.
667 AN, Artea, EBB42-14,1947, 'El problema vasco'.
668 PRO, File FO 371/60420, Victor Mallet conversation with Lizaso, Madrid, 15-03-1946.
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the first time Basque nationalists were called to engage in direct action and this marked 
the beginning of radical Basque nationalism. A fragment of President Aguirre’s speech 
follows:
'We, the Basques, have been the typical example of an oppressed 
people. (...) We seek democracy and freedom. (...) We fight for the 
freedom of Euzkadi and for the end of the oppression of the Basque 
people. We now enter a third phase in our fight. This new period has to 
be characterised by the direct and persistent action of the people. (...)
The opposition inside Spain has to intensify its action, in the public and 
private sphere. (...) And we the Basques have to keep up our flag.'669 
Aguirre’s call to the Basque nationalists to use armed resistance was not followed by 
the Catalans, who never undertook or attempted to undertake armed resistance towards 
Francoism.
The Galeuzka project assumed by the Basque nationalists, Galician nationalists 
and Catalans ended the moment the three presidents signed a pact with republican 
legality, one accepting the republican institutions and laws on 23 February 1946. Also, 
from the moment that the Catalan and Basque governments were reconstituted, 
contacts would be made government to government However, the ideological
f f l dprinciples of Galeuzka remained alive in Catalano-Basque relations and projects.
Relationships were also to be maintained with the opposition groups of the Left: 
the Republicans, Socialists and Communists. The Catalans understood that they faced 
the same fundamental problems as the rest of the anti-Francoists: lack of democracy 
and Francoist repression, but a major difference between them was which system they 
believed would best replace Franco. The conciliation, and attempts to co-ordinate 
activity came late and lacked effectiveness. By the end of World War II, the 
republican solution seemed increasingly the most viable alternative to Francoism and 
in realising this, as well as attempting to improve their international stance, the 
Catalans tried to get closer to the Republicans. The republican institutions were re­
established and it became more and more difficult to maintain nationalism at the
669 AT, Box 367, Mensaje de Gabon del President Aguirre, Suplemento al boletm OPE n.166 del 23-12- 
1947.
670 Aberasturi, De la derrota, p.670; C. Pi i Sunyer, Memdries de I'exili, Vol.1, pp.201-202.
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margins. The nationalists thought that the most realistic possibility in the event of an 
Allied intervention in Spain would be that of a restoration of the republic of 1931. The 
closest alliance of Catalans within the Spanish territory was with the Basque 
nationalists.671
The Republican Cortes met in Mexico on the 17 August 1945. The new 
president of the republic, Diego Martmez Barrio , allocated the formation of the new 
government to Professor Jose Giral, from Izquierda Republicana, hoping to be 
recognised by the Allies. On 27 August 1945, a Republican government was formed 
in exile, in Mexico and the Mexican president recognised its legitimacy.673 It would be 
subsequendy moved to Paris. Jose Giral convoked the Cortes and the republican 
parliament met in 1945.674 Giral hoped to obtain international recognition and the re­
establishment of the second republic. Martmez Barrio would be the president of the 
republic, and Giral would be in charge of forming a new government. Negrm had 
presented his resignation.675 In September 1945, the ANFD recognised the republican 
government of J. Giral and became its instrument within Spain because the ANFD 
needed help. This meant that when the government failed, it brought the ANFD down 
with it. The French accepted Giral’s government, but the British did not. Irujo was 
nominated minister of aviation. Other ministers included Miquel Santal6, who was 
nominated minister of Public Instruction, and Luis Nicolau d’Olwer, from ACR.676
In March 1945, Giral, Martinez Barrio, Irla and Aguirre met in Paris to which 
the Giral government had relocated. The nationalists were keen to collaborate, since 
participation brought with it the possibility of influence in political decisions. Another 
advantage for the nationalists was potential access to Republican networks of
671 AN, Artea, Alderdi EAJ, 11-1947, "Relaciones vasco-catalanas".
672 Aberasturi, De la derrota , p.653; C. Pi i Sunyer, Memdries de I'exili, V.II, p.127; J. Tusell, "El 
apogeo del franquismo" (1939-1959), in Archivo General de la Guardia Civil, Madrid.
673 A summary of the reconstitution of the republican government in Mexico is found in the following 
document. PRO File FO 371/39744, Letter Lizaso to Aguirre, Basque relations with the left, London, 
10-12-1944.
674 AT, Poblet, Box G2, "Declaracidn del Sr. Giral sobre el gobiemo republicano en el exilio."
675 Aberasturi, De la derrota, p.653.
676 AT, Box 126, Irla, "Notes sobre el govern de I'exili, London 1947-1948.
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communications and services. This, it was presumed, would assist in their 
unification.677
Irujo specified a number of conditions: freedom of religious expression, the 
incorporation of Navarra in the Basque autonomic laws, approval of the Galician 
statute, and the nomination of a Galician minister. The two major nationalist bones of 
contention - the widening of the statute and recognition of the right of self- 
determination - were put off.678 As such, Aguirre could not accept the participation of 
the PNV in Giral’s government. The PNV divided between those wanting to support 
the republic, and those that did not.679
In February 1946, the republican institutions and the Basque and Catalan 
governments moved to Paris in order to develop an intense diplomatic activity. 
Negrm’s government was recognised by many countries. Giral was too obsessed with 
the restoration of the republic and did not see that the only way forward was a 
government of concentration.680 Thus, after the Tripartite Note, monarchists contacted 
the ANFD but Giral rejected a rapprochement.
When the Giral’s failure became apparent, he was replaced by the Socialist 
Rodolfo Llopis, the Secretary General of the Socialist party, in February 1947. Llopis 
tried to reach an agreement with the monarchists681 but the monarchists rejected the 
offer, saying they would only deal with the PSOE 682 The Llopis government would 
not include conservative republicans, monarchists or Catalans and would fail. 
Though republican institutions would continue to exist, the govemment-in-exile was, 
for practical purposes, at an end684 because it was anachronistic, abandoned by all
677 Aberasturi, De la derrota, p.659; C. Pi i Sunyer, Memdries de I'exili, Vo/.//, pp.51-54; H. Heine, 
La oposicion, p. 162.
678 For more information on the constitution and developments of GiraTs government, see C. Pi i 
Sunyer, Memdries de I'exili, Vol.ll, p.133; J.C.J. Aberasturi, De la derrota , p.657; Espanoles en 
Francia 1936-1946, (Salamanca, Universidad de Salamanca, Coloquio Intemacional, 1991),p.l64.
679 C. Pi i Sunyer, Memdries de I'exili, Vol.! (Barcelona, Curial, 1979), pp.130-131.
680 P.Preston, Spain in crisis, pp. 132-133.
681 Ed.Pablo Iglesias, El socialismo en Espana, (Madrid, Anales de la historia, 1986), p.357
682 P.Preston, Spain in crisis, p. 137. C. Pi i Sunyer, Memdries de I'exili de Carles Pi i Sunyer, Vol.ll, 
p. 124; Espanoles en Francia 1936-1946, (Salamanca, Universidad de Salamanca, Coloquio 
Intemacional, 1991),p.l76.
683 AN, Artea, EBB 207-3, Ta crisis del gobiemo republicano', 21-01-1947.
684 AN, Artea, EBB 217-1, Ta segunda crisis del gobiemo de la republica'
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groups except the republicans who dreamt of a return to 1931. Moreover, the 
Socialists were demoralised and discredited and the CNT and communists were riven 
by internal dissent.685
In July 1947, the Socialists led by Prieto, entered into conversations with the 
monarchists under the auspices of the British government.686 Prieto did so in the hope
f.on
of finding an alternative government to Franco which the Allies might accept.
Prieto met with Gil Robles, the representative of Don Juan de Borbon. Both agreed on 
the so-called Pacto de San Juan de Luz (August 1948) in order to re-establish 
democracy in Spain.688 The pact would fail since it had no support from the Western
r o Q
democracies. Moreover, the Catalans were never included within its scope. The 
monarchists ultimately preferred to reach an agreement with Franco for the eventual 
restoration of the crown, undermining Prieto’s project. In 1950, Prieto returned to 
Mexico.
On the far left of the political spectrum, there were the communists. Many of the 
leaders of the PCE and the Catalan PSUC went into exile into Stalin’s Russia 690 The 
Communists that stayed in Spain determined instead to pursue an armed struggle 
through organising guerrilla activities. Both the PNV and the Socialists were opposed 
to Communist politics, and tried to isolate them. By the end of 1945, a full-scale 
guerrilla war against the regime was beginning to build up in the north and east. 
Dominated by Communists, but also including Socialists and anarchists, the so-called
685 P.Preston, Spain in crisis, p. 137.
686 PRO File FO 371/60372, Sir Victor Mallet, Madrid Office to Foreign Office, 12-01-1946. The 
ANFD declared that although it favoured a republic, it was not totally opposed to the restoration of a 
constitutional monarchy. “Close contact still exists between monarchist and moderate let wing elements. 
Monarchists fully appreciate the importance of a broadly based provisional government. Only yesterday, 
Gil Robles sent a message to his contact man in Madrid impressing on him the vital necessity of 
persuading left-wing elements to accept the return of the king with a provisional government to be 
followed by a plebiscite and elections. There has, however, been some delay in actual signature of 
agreement between the democratic alliance and monarchists because Socialist leader now insists that 
before signing up the representative of the left in Paris, Josd Giral, should be made aware of the views of 
the Spanish left-wing opposition.”
687 AN, Artea, 31-10-1947, Prieto.
688 PRO FO 371/73359, Z8130/1027/41.
689 Martin Casas, El exilio espafiol, pp.197-201.
690 Martin Casas, El exilio Espafiol, p. 171.
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Spanish maquis would threaten the regime until 1947.691 The Communists and 
Catalans never allied in their anti-Francoist fight.
7.7 END OF CATALAN HOPES
Between 1947 and 1951, Catalan nationalism more or less dissipated as a
£.(y%
political force. The period ended with the famous tramway strike of 1951. In Spain, 
the progressive acceptance of Francoism at an international level had serious 
consequences for those parties in opposition to Franco, all of which began to fade 
away. Franco was able to further weaken his monarchist rivals through the Law of 
Succession in 1947, which promised a future restoration of the monarchy and so 
diminished international criticism.693 The monarchist pretender to the throne, Don 
Juan, agreed to a meeting with Franco, a decision whose sequel, in the autumn of 1948, 
to send his son Juan Carlos to Spain to receive his secondary education, presaged the 
suspension of monarchist opposition in July 1951.694 Left wing opposition faltered 
after 1947, partly due to a lack of organisation and resources and partly due to a lack of 
support from the Western powers.695 After the dissolution of the republican 
government, left-wing opposition vanished as a realistic alternative. Furthermore, 
between 1948 and 1950, distance grew between the opposition in exile and that inside 
Spain. The Basque opposition also faded away in 1948. Basque nationalists were 
overtly reluctant to pact with the republican forces which, in turn, were reluctant to
691 Preston, Franco,, p.549.
692 H. Raguer, Hilari, El quadem de Montju'ich, Record de la vaga de tramvies, (Barcelona, Claret 
2001); M.Richards, ’ Falange, autarky and Crisis: The Barcelona general strike of 1951’, European 
History Quarterly, October 1999, pp.543-585
693 The developments of the Spanish monarchist opposition were followed from the British Foreign 
Office. PRO F0371/60373, Z2125/41/41, Mallet to Bevin, 15-02-1946.
694 Viladot, Nacionalisme, pp.192-194; Dunthom, Britain , p.282; Gil Robles, Diary, 25 September, 'La 
monarqufa', pp. 272,5.
695 For an explanation of the fading away of left-wing opposition after 1947, see PRO, Hankey to 
Foreign Office, London, 20-04-1950. “With the exception of the Communists and the Basque 
nationalist, the left-wing opposition is disorganised and temporarily inactive as a result of apathy 
within and successful police repression without. The dissemination of printed propaganda is only a 
small fraction of what it was 2 years ago. Even the Basques, whose organisation is compact and 
almost impervious to police infiltration, find the times bad for overt action, organised opposition is 
becoming feebler. All but a small fraction seems to have lost hope of salvation thorough any of the 
democratic parties. Working class people have given up hope on a peaceful resolution. That is the 
reason for many more supporting the Communists. Complaints are now directed to: hunger, high 
prices and shortage of food, black market, deductions from their wage.”
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accept the autonomy pact. The Basque nationalists held out for independence, limiting 
the paths open to them.
After 1946, Catalan nationalism was transformed into a cultural rather than a 
political force. The Mare de Deu de Montserrat enthronement celebration, on 27 
April 1947, announced the change, mixing religious devotion and an explosion of 
Catalan sentiment. The event marked the first public act of recovery of the Catalan 
language and culture since the onset of Francoism.696 Catalan nationalism, after having 
failed in its political attempts, shifted towards a cultural nationalism that would keep 
the Catalan flame alive up to the democratic transition in the 1970s 697 The Catalans 
felt that they had to start everything anew.698 After the failure to organise an effective 
anti-Francoist opposition, it was considered that the cultural path presented the best 
and only option to continue the struggle. After the vanishing of Catalan political 
parties in 1947, two new tendencies in opposition came to light. In addition to cultural 
Catalan nationalism, Communist activity would intensify. From 1948 onwards, the 
anti-Francoist fight fell into the hands of groups such as, the PSUC, or was organised 
in new opposition forms such as cultural groups, university and unionist structures.699
The government of the Generalitat was dissolved on 24 January 1948, though 
Josep Irla would continue as President until 1954, the year in which Josep Tarradellas 
was elected as new president of the Generalitat. The first Tarradellas government 
would be formed over twenty years later, in the context of a democratic Spain. The 
final symbol of the end of Catalan opposition was the tramway strike of March 1951, 
in Barcelona, a mass protest of citizens wearied by years of poverty. It was a 
spontaneous action, and the last Catalan political action on the streets of Catalonia for
696 Guibemau, Nacionalisme Catala, p.76.
697 Bardolet, S, Les festes de I'entronitzacid de la Mare de Deu de Montserrat, (1946-1947), (Barcelona, 
Publicacions de l'Abadia de Montserrat, 1997), pp.13, 21,23, 30,42.
698 Author's interview with Josep Benet, November 2001, Barcelona.
699 F.Vilanova I Vila-Abadal, Als dos costats de lafrontera, p.15.
700Raguer, H., Gaudeamus Igitur, (Barcelona, Publicacions de l'Abadia de Montserrat, 1999), p.101; 
Diaz Esculies, L'oposicid catalanista alfranquisme,, pp.99; H. Raguer, El quadem de Montjuich, 
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7.8 CONCLUSION
From 1946 to 1947, the international community declared both its condemnation 
of the Francoist regime and a policy of non-intervention. The world was beginning to 
polarise with the onset of the Cold War. Spain was no longer a priority on the 
international agenda, and in the eyes of the Western powers trained on Eastern Europe, 
Franco was quickly perceived as the lesser of two evils. Fearing the disorder another 
Civil War could bring to the European strategic situation, the French, British, and the 
Americans implicit acceptance of the Francoists soon became explicit.
The period after World War II is significant both for the re-establishment of the 
Catalan government, the Basque government and the republican government, and for 
all the successive attempts to create unitary political platforms. However, by the time 
of the creation of unitary platforms by Catalans, Basque nationalists and the left-wing 
opposition, it was too late since the Allies had already decided not to intervene in 
Spain.
Catalan nationalism itself, though not moribund, was far from a vital force. Such 
activity as there was - centred in France and Spain - was not effective, with several 
attempts to coalesce with the Left, or to organise an alternative proposition with 
credibility in the international community, ending in failure. All efforts to unite behind 
common platforms failed. The most remarkable attempt at creating a unitary platform 
was the CNDC. With the dissolution of the Generalitat in 1948, Catalan opposition 
lost its sole institutional instrument. Hopes dimmed.
In the USA and Latin America, the dissolution of the Consell of London and the 
increasing significance of the French exile created considerable confusion and 
uncertainty. Nevertheless, the forces of the Left managed to restructure the republican 
govemment-in-exile in Mexico. Unlike the Catalans, the Basques and the republicans 
were able to reconstitute their governments, though the achievement was pyrrhic, 
suffering ultimately the same fate. The project of Galeuzka also failed. With the 
monarchists slowly approaching the Francoist regime, the political aspirations of the 
anti-Francoist opposition faded away.
The story of opposition throughout the period remained what it had been: one of 
faction, diffusion and the sporadic formation and dissolution of political groups. This 
is indicated not so much by the failure, as by the sheer number of unitary platforms or
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movements. What remained of Catalan nationalism was dispute over policy, the 
primacy of one faction over another, territory, and confused relations with the satellite 
groups across the Atlantic.
EPILOGUE OF THE THESIS
The purpose of this study has been to shed light on the failure of the Catalan 
opposition to Franco between the end of the Spanish Civil War in 1930 and the 
acceptance of Francoism by the international community in the 1950s. In particular, 
its object is to develop a complete and integrated description of political Catalan 
nationalism, during the Second World War and in the immediate post-war period, 
which has so far been lacking, and to produce a more measured evaluation of the 
nature of Catalan opposition to the regime and its place in the wider spectrum of 
opposition, internal and external, both at home and abroad. The complex picture that 
emerges would seem to confirm existing accounts in some of their detail, but also 
suggests that the extent to which Catalan nationalism may have contributed toward its 
own failures have been downplayed.
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Although there is a plethora of information on Francoism and Catalan 
nationalism, there is not as much discussion on why or how Catalan nationalism failed 
and specifically what Catalans did to contribute to their own failure. This study aims to 
close this gap, by giving a comprehensive account of events inside Catalonia, inside 
Spain and throughout the exile in France, UK, USA and Latin America. It also adds to 
the historical record evidence of the course of Allied policy and decision-making 
throughout the period as it impacted on the Catalan situation and the Spanish question. 
That Catalan nationalism, like other regional nationalisms, faced a very difficult 
international situation, with many hundreds of thousands in exile, at one point or 
another is acknowledged. My thesis tried to evaluate the extent to which Catalanists 
were responsible for their own failure.
In order to close this historiographical gap, the author consulted public and 
private archives and interviewed several activists of the era. As such, the study moves 
beyond some of the limitations of the existing literature, which suffers from either a 
lack of breadth or depth of coverage, and which has been most concentrated upon 
monarchist and Republican opposition to the regime. The public archives in Catalonia 
offer evidence of the views of the principal leaders of Catalan nationalism on both 
sides of the political spectrum. Certain abstracts from, and certain sections of the 
presses are accessible in Catalan archives such as the Pabelld Sert in Barcelona, 
offering an overview of developments in the Catalan exile on the other side of the 
Atlantic, particularly in the comunitats of Latin America. Public archives in Madrid, 
and in Italy give an insight into official state opinion, whilst such private archives as 
the one of Jose Enrique Varela Iglesias, provide the Francoist perspective. The 
evolving Allied position is documented in the public archives in France and the UK, 
and the British Foreign Office and the Ministere des Affaires Etrangers in Paris also 
proved useful in charting the development of the policy of non-intervention. In 
counterpoint, the Ministeri de Affari Esteri in Italy provides evidence of the Axis view 
of Spanish political developments. Together with a number of interviews of some of 
those few figures still alive, and consideration of a range of secondary material on the 
international, Spanish and Catalan history of the period, such sources go to make up 
the foundation for a panoramic view of Catalan nationalism in the period in question,
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one comprehending the voices of the principal Catalan leaderships, of the communities 
in exile, and of those of the Allied and Axis powers.
The Catalan opposition to Franco developed after the Spanish Civil War as a 
reaction against Franco’s imposition of totalitarian power and his repression of Catalan 
tradition and culture. Because of the very repression they were fighting against, many 
Catalans went on self-imposed exile, seeking refuge first in France, where they 
founded the Front Nacional de Catalunya (FNC) as an attempt to unite their forces. 
After the German invasion of France in 1940, Catalans had to flee the country and find 
a new refuge. At this point some flew towards the UK, while others crossed the 
Atlantic towards the USA or Latin America. In the UK, Carles Pi i Sunyer founded the 
Consell Nacional de Catalunya (CNC), which became the main Catalan organisation in 
exile and organised Catalans in independent communitats that would report to it. 
During World War n, the Catalans lent their support to the Allies, with the hope that 
on winning the war, the Allies would be able to, in turn, help the Catalans. In 1944, 
after the liberation of Paris, France and the FNC became once again the centre of 
Catalan activity. However, in the immediate post-war era, the international powers 
decided not to help the anti-Francoists because communism was seen as more of a 
threat than the repressive regime in Spain. This decision by the international powers 
dealt a major blow to the Catalans, effectively putting an end to their fight from 1947 
onwards.
Although the Catalan opposition to Franco failed, it was successful in some 
areas. For instance, despite the threat of persecution inside Spain and various 
difficulties Catalans faced outside the country, Catalans were able to keep their 
language and the culture alive with the establishment of such institutions as the Casal 
Catala, which often formed part of the several Catalan communities spread around the 
world and where conferences in Catalan were held or where Catalan classes were 
taught. The fact the Catalans were also able to establish a thriving secret press should 
also be viewed very positively. Various Catalan organisations published their own 
newspapers and magazines, even under Francoist censorship. For instance, the Lliga 
managed to publish the Veu de Catalunya, EC published the Diari de Catalunya, ERC 
managed to publish the Humanitat, the ORN published Bandera, the MRC La nacio 
catalana and the BEN Randa and La Boatella. All of these publications were illegal
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under Franco and were printed and distributed secretly. But perhaps the biggest 
achievement of the Catalan movement was its ability to organise a govemment-in- 
exile, as detailed in Chapter 7. Even though Catalans were left without legitimate 
institutions that would represent them after the Civil War the attempt at reconstituting 
the Generalitat between 1945 and 1948 is remarkable.
Notwithstanding these successes, there were major problems that the Catalans 
could not overcome, both internal and external, within Spain and outside it. The anti- 
Francoist opposition on the left and the right of the political spectrum, was politically 
incapable and overall, Catalans failed to create a unitary and realistic alternative to 
Francoism. They lacked internal unity, which was reflected in all their actions, and as 
this thesis attempts to prove, was a determinant factor in their failure in the 1940s. The 
leadership clashes among the different Catalan organisations that followed the death of 
Lluis Companys in 1940 seemed further symptoms of an endemic problem within 
Catalan nationalism as a political movement, and as has been shown, often had a 
personal as well as a political aspect Internal leadership clashes within individual 
organisations were also common. One example described in Chapter 5 occurred when 
Pi i Sunyer’s leadership of the new Consell of London (1944-1945) was contested by 
Batista i Roca and Trueta. These signal failures evidenced certain incapacity or will for 
pragmatism. Without i t  Catalan nationalism foundered without a single political 
leadership enjoying true legitimacy even within its own ranks.
In exile, Catalans were divided between two main policy fronts: those that 
believed in recovering the republic and the statute of autonomy of 1932 as was the case 
of the FNC in France, and those that defended the independence of Catalonia from a 
radical nationalism as was the case of the CNC of the UK. The results were recurrently 
poor communication (worsened by the Catalan Adantic exile) even where 
infrastructure was not the primary issue, the emergence of factions affiliated along 
party lines, the failure of factions to come to terms with one another, and even in­
fighting and outright challenges to leadership, for example, Santalo’s challenge to Pi i 
Sunyer described in chapter 4. Such policy divisions between the various groups 
contributed in creating enormous confusion among Catalans.
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The same incapacity to agree on policy amongst themselves blighted Catalans’ 
attempts to form or maintain alliances outside of Catalan nationalism. One example is 
the Basque-Catalan relationship. The two national groups always maintained good 
relations but failed to create a common political front. The relationship never went so 
far as achieving concrete political action and managed only to go as far as organising 
projects and manifestos. For instance, the project of Galeuzka (that hoped to unite 
Galician nationalists, Basque nationalists and Catalan nationalists) never managed to 
get off the ground due to internal infighting among its factions and an inability to make 
policy concessions in order to achieve an agreement. Another example is the Catalan 
failure to coalesce with Republicans as was the case with the Catalans in Latin 
America described in Chapter 4 and the case of the failed Junta de Liberation, 
discussed in Chapter 5. This was a major mistake. An alliance with Republicans was 
fundamental, not least because of the fact that Republicans controlled Catalans 
resources. If the Allies had offered to help the anti-Francoists after the war, the most 
likely outcome would have been to return Spain to its previous regime, a republic. 
However, Republicans tended to accept Catalan demands for autonomy but not its 
demands for self-determination and Catalans were not pragmatic enough to agree to 
some policy concessions. Thus, there was lack of pragmatism on the side of the Allies 
both within Catalan nationalism itself and with their external relations. Both levels of 
fragmentation negatively impacted the developments of Catalan nationalism in the 
1940s. The rivalries between those in exile and those in Spain were a tremendous 
obstacle for the organisation of Catalan nationalism as a united platform. The more 
Francoist repression there was, the less contact there was between Catalans in exile 
and those inside Spain since their networks of communication were intercepted.
The remarkable lack of entente between Catalans exile and those inside Spain 
was yet another internal problem that contributed to their failure. Those in exile lacked 
legitimacy partly because those that had stayed in Catalonia did not recognise it. It is 
possible that the scattering of Catalan centres and the lack of legitimacy was even 
worse in exile than inside Catalonia but overall the weaknesses of Catalan nationalism 
were very similar in Catalonia and outside it.
Furthermore, the Catalans did not judge the strength of Francoism and the 
weakness of Catalan resources and morale after the Civil War. Even more so, Catalans
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fully relied on a premise which turned out to be false: that of the help they would 
obtain from the Allies after World War n. It can be argued that this hope of help was a 
bit naive because there was no written compromise by the Allies that would secure this 
help. All of these factors demonstrate the incapacity of the Catalans to organise 
effective opposition to Franco.
The external reasons for the failure of Catalan nationalism included the perilous 
situation in which Catalans found themselves after the Civil War and the brutal 
efficiency of the Francoist machinery of repression. As has been shown mainly in 
Chapter 1, Francoist repression impeded communication between the various centres 
of Catalan nationalism and had a far greater impact on morale and operations than 
opposition forces expected the regime to achieve. The lack of organisation of the other 
groups of anti-Francoists and their lack of capacity of agreement and compromise, 
similar to the disorganisation within the Catalans, also contributed to the failure of 
Catalan nationalism.
A very widely discussed factor in the failure of the Catalan opposition to Franco 
is the non-intervention of a victorious Allied side, which was contrary to what was 
expected. As discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, Allied support appeared to be on the cards 
(for example, after the signing of the Atlantic Charter in August 1941 which defended 
democracy and self-determination and stated that the Allies would re-establish 
freedom in the cases where it had been taken away), but was effectively withdrawn 
after the end of the War.
It is evident that Western policy towards the Francoist regime and towards the Spanish 
question in general shifted over time, and that a firm or final decision on policy had not 
been made for years. During the period preceding the end of World War n, 
conferences still left opened the door of Allied help to the anti-Francoists. The Yalta 
conference in February 1945 stated that Europe should dismantle the remains of 
fascism but there was no specific mention of Spain. The San Francisco conference in 
April 1945 that founded the United Nations excluded Francoist Spain but no practical 
help was obtained. The Potsdam conference of July 1945 condemned the Franco 
regime but also announced the respect for the principle of non-intervention in other 
countries. This was a period of condemnation of Francoism but also a period of non­
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intervention. Finally, after World War n, in 1946-1947, in the face of the growing 
threat of Communism the Allies decided to accept Franco which ensured that Spain 
would not become Communist. Spain was excluded from the February 1946 meetings 
of the UN. The Tripartite Note of March 1946 again stated condemnation but non­
intervention. In December 1946 the UN ambassadors recommended the retreat of 
ambassadors from Madrid. There was still some hope for anti-Francoists. However, 
after that, the growing threat of Communism made the Allies shift towards a policy of 
acceptance of Francoism. Allied policy was as yet not decided until 1947 and there 
was an opportunity for Republican and nationalist forces to find a compromise and 
seek its support in the international arena. Like others, Catalan nationalism was not 
seemingly capable of pragmatism, at least not to the extent required. The anti- 
Francoist opposition failed to profit the political possibilities available before the Allies 
decided to accept Franco. In November 1950, the ambassadors could return to Madrid. 
The lack of clear definition of the Allies towards anti-Francoism for years did not help 
Catalans. However, what can be blamed on the anti-Francoists was the lack of 
capacity of presenting a credible united and realistic alternative to Franco when the 
Allies were still undecided in their policy.
The Catalan opposition to Franco was, in short, politically incapable. Overall, 
Catalans failed to create a unitary and realistic alternative to Francoism and did not 
judge the strength of Francoism or their own weaknesses. Furthermore, Catalans fully 
relied on the false premise that they would obtain help from the Allies following 
World War H Unity among the anti-Francoists would have been a necessary 
condition of Allied assistance, even though probably not a sufficient one.
The question of what could have been achieved by a more pragmatic leadership, 
or political culture necessarily involves conjecture. Similarly, though the return of the 
ambassadors to Spain marked a decision by the Western powers that the Francoists 
provided the best available insurance against Communist expansion on the 
westernmost European continent, my research suggests that a more cohesive alliance 
against the dictatorship, particularly on the part of the Republican forces and the 
regional nationalists could have been sufficiently attractive to warrant support. 
Opposition in general and Catalans in particular should have created a common unified
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front that would have strengthened their potential greatly. A consolidated anti- 
Francoist opposition could have moved the Francoists from power through force.
The second alternative would have been intervention by a foreign power. The 
missing international support could have been political (in the form of isolation and 
condemnation of Francoism), military (in the form of armed intervention against 
Franco) or financial (either setting an embargo on Francoism or helping economically 
the anti-Francoist opposition). The British, the French or the Americans would have 
moved through the carrot of a secure, unified democratic regime in Spain or through 
the stick of a Communist backed alternative. Moreover, Catalans should have been 
able to secure economic stability if they really expected allied help. Taking into 
account that the Allies had several strategic priorities in Spain, the Catalans should 
have been more concerned about offering an image of stability and security. They 
should have discredited Franco in the eyes of the international community.
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Appendix 1. Main Catalan Parties pre-1939
Right-wing Catalan Parties Policy Timing Leader
Lliga Moderate right-wing Catalan 
party-seeks autonomy but ready 
to coalesce with Madrid- 
supported by Catalan 
bourgeoisie-created the 
Mancomunitat
Barcelona 
1901-1936- 
end of Lliga’s 
hegemony in 
1923
Cambo
UDC Catalan right-wing party- 
supported by Catholic middle 
classes-influenced by European 
Christian tradition-little support
1931 Manuel
Carrasco
Formiguera
FJC Combined Catholicism and 
Catalan nationalism-Catalan 
religious association
1931 Albert Bonet
Left-wing Catalan Parties Policy Timing Leader
EC Separatist 1922 Francesc
Macia
ERC Left-wing Republican and 
separatist party- supported by 
Catalan working class
1931-main 
Catalan party 
during the 
second 
republic
Lluis
Companys
AC Liberal and nationalist, radical 
but non-separatist-created by a 
section of the Lliga unhappy with 
Cambo
1922
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Appendix 2. Main Catalan Political Organisations between 1939-1950
Appendix 2A Right Wing
Party Objectives Policy Leader Publication
Lliga Increasing Catalan 
autonomy
Moderate Catalan 
nationalism-many 
support
Francoism-very 
weakened after 
the Civil War
Cambo Veude
Catalunya
UDC Cultural Catalan 
nationalism-mainly 
developed in 
Catalonia
Right-wing 
autonomy and 
Catholicism-aimed 
at cultural 
recovery- 
supported by 
bourgeoisie
Miquel Coll i 
Alentom i Maurici 
Serrahima- 
reorganised in 
1940 until 1947
JCD Youth group of 
UDC-Christian, 
Catalan, focused on 
university activity- 
democrat group- 
mainly developed in 
Catalonia
Right-wing 
autonomy-based 
on Catalan 
propaganda 
through secret 
press
Anton Cahellas Quadems de 
SantJordi
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Appendix 2B Left Wing
Party Objectives Policy Leader Publication
EC Catalan 
independence- 
recovery of republic- 
recovered autonomy 
in 1944
Left-wing 
separatist-liberal 
nationalism and 
democracy-some 
claim total 
independence, 
some join the FNC 
in 1944
Viceng Borrell, 
Joan Comudella, 
Liu is Companys
Circular, Diari de 
Catalunya, 
Almogavers, 
Butlletf del partit 
Estat Catala
JEC Youth group of EC 
(1942-1943)-in 1943 
the JEC joined EC 
fully
Butlletf de les 
Joventuts d'EC, 
Torxa
ERC Catalan
independence- aim 
at recovery of 
republican 
constitution 1931 
and statute 1932- 
members of ERC 
joined FNC in 1942 
and back to ERC in 
1945-party virtually 
moribund in 1947-
Left-wing
separatist-majority 
party of Generalitat 
until 1940-from 
1939 worked in 
exile to maintain 
Generalitat and 
Parliament-ERC 
against the CNC of 
London- 
enormously 
persecuted by 
Francoism
Pere Puig, Carles 
Pi i Sunyer, Josep 
Tarradellas, Josep 
Irla, Miquel 
Santalo
La Humanitat
ACR Greater autonomy- 
support to Josep Irla 
and close to 
monarchists- by the 
end of the war, ACR 
had essentially 
dissolved-after 
WWII sought self- 
determination and 
confederation
Republican, small, 
liberal, Catalan, 
originally non­
separatist and 
culturally oriented- 
developed from 
non-separatist to 
separatist
Jaume Bofill 1 
Mates, Antoni 
Rovira 1 Virgili,
Liu is Nicolau d’ 
Olwer, Pere Bosch 
i Gimpera
Nosaltres Sols Political separatist 
Catalan group- 
created in 1931
Some of its 
members 
previously 
members of EC- 
military section of 
FNC later
Jaume Martinez 
Vendrell
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Appendix 2C Independent Groups
Party Objectives Policy Leader Publication
ORN Catholic, Catalan 
and cultural group- 
language a s main 
instrument-1942
Small independent 
group-against 
main parties- 
counted on few 
members and only 
based in Catalonia
Torres i Bages Bandera
MRC Language as main 
instrument-1945
Small independent 
group-against 
main parties- 
counted on few 
members and 
activity focused in 
Catalonia
La nacio 
catalana
BEN Cultural group- 
based on language 
recovery-1946
Moderate
autonomy-included 
a  large number of 
students-small 
impact through its 
publications
Joan Grasses Redregament, 
Randa, La 
Boatella, 
Redregament 
Serie Blava
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Appendix 2D Non-Catalan nationalist as Main Objective, but related to Catalans
Parties Objectives Policy Leader Publication
UGT (Union) Socialist union- 
suffered 
tremendous 
Francoist
persecution- activity 
based on secret 
networks, 
recruitment 
activities, painting 
slogans and 
distributing union 
material
far away from
Catalan
nationalism
CNT (Union) Anarchist union-
anarchism strong in
Catalonia-suffered
tremendous
Francoist
persecution
Catalan
nationalism closer 
to CNT than UGT 
but Catalan 
nationalism not in 
the nature of CNT
Socialist 
Movement of 
Catalunya
Reorganised in 
1945-all Socialist 
tendencies 
represented but 
never managed to 
coalesce with 
Spanish Socialists
Sought high 
degree of 
autonomy for 
Catalonia
PSUC
(Communists)
Union of Catalan 
Socialists and 
Catalan 
Communists 
founded in 1936- 
Catalan nationalism 
was not its priority 
yet Comorera 
persecuted by PCE 
due to his Catalan 
nationalism
Armed resistance 
until 1947 but 
Communists did 
not subscribe to 
Catalan aims- 
tremendously 
persecuted by 
Francoists
Joan Comorera
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Appendix 2E Catalan Unitary Platforms
Party Objectives Policy Leader Publication
FNC-1940- 
1947
France and Catalonia- 
left-wing platform­
faced enormous 
Francoist repression- 
union of EC, BEN, 
FNEC, ERC, ACR, 
CNT and Nosaltres 
Sols-worked with CNC 
later-united around the 
figure of Companys 
and the Generalitat
Catalan independence-self- 
determination and creation 
of a  confederation of free 
states- Left-wing separatist 
main platform-united around 
the figure of Companys and 
the Generalitat in Paris in 
April 1940-ideology more 
defined in 1945-socially 
oriented policy and co- 
federal structure of Pai'sos 
Catalans-isolated from 
government of Generalitat in 
1945-1947--loyal to 
president of the Generalitat 
and reorganised CN DC- 
included both university 
section and military section
Jaume 
Martinez 
Vendrell, Joan 
Comudella, 
Manuel 
Cruells, Enric 
Pages-Jaume 
Ribas
Catalunya-
Manifest
Primeres
Parauies
CNCof 
London (1940- 
43)
Sought complete 
independence and 
unity
Democrat and liberal- 
federalism, Catalan self- 
determination and 
Europeanism-supported by 
Catalan comunitats in Latin 
America-rejected republican 
constitution of 1931 and the 
statute of 1932 (accepted by 
the Generalitat) and claimed 
total independence-CNC 
more radical than FNC
Pi i Sunyer
Santalo’s 
Consell (1941- 
44)
Led by moderate 
sectors of ERC- 
defended republican 
legality and statute of 
autonomy -power 
from Irla but no 
support from CNC nor 
comunitats in Latin 
America
Reconstituted 
Consell of 
London (1944-
Radicalised policy- 
overt defence of the 
right of self-
Dissolution of Consell facing 
reconstitution of the 
Generalitat
Pi i Sunyer-  
increasing co­
leadership
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45) determination- 
dissolved in 1945 
facing reconstitution of 
Generalitat
with Batista i 
Roca and 
Trueta
Solidaritat
Catalana
ERC, ACR, UDC, EC, 
Front de Llibertat (old 
Socialists), Fronts of 
Resistance, PSUC, 
UGT, Unio de 
Rabassaires, CNT, 
CNC of UK
Accepted republican legality 
a s a starting point-parallel 
movement in France of the 
CNC- accepted the authority 
of the president of the 
Generalitat
Josep 
Tarradellas- 
January 1945
APRC Attempt at uniting 
Republican Catalan hopes- 
recognised Josep Irla but 
NOT the government of the 
Generalitat
Pous i Pagfes- 
1944
CNDC Based in Catalonia- 
included all 
Republican parties 
except the 
Communists- ACR, 
ERC, EC, UDC, 
Moviment Socialista 
de Catalunya, JCD, 
MRC, Uni6 de 
Rabassaires, FNC, 
Partit Republica 
d’Esquerra, Unio 
Catalana and Partit 
Nacionalista Catala
Support to Irla but did not 
recognise the Generalitat
Pous i Pag6s
CPDC-
December
1945-1952
Final attempt at 
unitary platform
CPDC expanded in 1946 by 
alliance with ANFD 
accepting Irla as president 
of the Generalitat
FNEC Catalan youth movement Josep Maria 
Ainaud de 
Lasarte
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Appendix 2F Non-Catalan nationalist Unitary Platforms, but related to Catalans
Party Objectives Policy Leader Publication
UNE-1944 Unitary platform of 
the Left created by 
Communists- 
included 
Republicans, 
Socialists, Catalans 
and UGT
ANFD Socialists and 
Republicans created 
ANFD in October 
1944- union of 
Izquierda
Republicana, Union 
Republicana,
Partido Republicano 
Federal, PSOE,
UGT and CNT
Included Catalans 
and accepted 
demands of 
autonomy but not 
of self-
determination- 
UNE failed and 
was absorbed by 
ANFD-attempt to 
return to a 
republican order 
uniting Socialists, 
Republicans and 
Catalans
Regulo Martinez
JEL (Mexico) 1943- union of 
Izquierda Unida, 
Union Republicana, 
ERC, ACR and 
PSOE-included 
Republicans, 
Socialists and 
Catalans
Diego Martinez 
Barrio
JEL (France) 1944-1945- 
extension in France 
of Mexico 
organisation-aimed 
at re-establishing 
republican legality in 
Spain- included 
ERC, Socialists, 
UGT and CNT
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Appendix 3. Geography, Time-framework & Strength of main Catalan 
Organisations
Appendix 3A From April 1939 to June 1940
Parties Countries Strength
Lliga France and Catalonia Virtually moribund
UDC France and Catalonia Weak
JCD France and Catalonia Weak
EC France and Catalonia Weak
ERC France and Catalonia Weak
FNC Mainly France but also Catalonia Main organisation
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Appendix 3B From July 1940 to August 1942
Parties Countries Strength
CNC UK Strong
USA communities USA, mainly New York Weak
Latin America Mainly Mexico but all around 
Latin America
Strong
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Appendix 3C From September 1942 to October 1944
Parties Countries Strength
Santalo’s new Consell Mexico Weak
EC France and Spain Weak
ERC France and Spain Weak
FNC France and Spain Weak
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Appendix 3D From November 1944 to June 1945
Parties Countries Strength
Pi i Sunyer’s  New Consell UK Weak
UDC Mainly Catalonia Weak
JCD Mainly Catalonia Weak
FNC France and Catalonia Strong
ORN France and Catalonia Weak
MRC France and Catalonia Weak
EC France and Catalonia Weak
JEC France and Catalonia Weak
ERC France and Catalonia Weak
ACR France and Catalonia Weak
Socialist Movement France and Catalonia Weak
PSUC France and Catalonia Weak
BEN France and Catalonia Weak
ANFD France and Catalonia Weak
UNE France and Catalonia Weak
JL France and Catalonia Weak
Solidaritat Catalana France and Catalonia Weak
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Appendix 3E From July 1945 to December 1950
Parties Countries Strength
ANFD Weak
APRC Weak
CNDC Weak
CPDC Weak
FNC Weak
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Appendix 4 Catalans in Latin America
Country Policy Leader
USA- mainly New York Small group but effective Josep Maria Fontanals
Latin America comunitats Federation of Catalan entities- 
depended on CNC of London
Josep Tomas i Piera and later 
Pere Bosch i Gimpera
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GLOSSARY
AC -  Accio Catalana (Catalan Action)
ACR -  Accio Catalana Republicana (Catalan Republican Action)
ANFD -  Alianza Nacional de Fuerzas Democraticas (National Alliance of Democratic 
Forces)
APCR -  Alianga de Partits Republicans Catalans (Catalan Republican parties’ 
alliance)
BEN -  Bloc Escolar Nacionalista (Nationalist School bloc)
BNC -  Consell Nacional Base (Basque National Council)
CEDA -  Confederacion Espanola de Derechas Autonomas (Spanish co-federation of 
right-wing parties)
CIA -  Central Intelligence Authority (American Secret Services)
CNC -  Consell Nacional de Catalunya (Catalan National Council)
CNDC -  Consell Nacional de la Democracia Catalana (National Council of Catalan 
Democracy)
CNR -  Centre Nacionalista Republica (Republican Nationalist Centre)
CNT -  Confederacion Nacional del Trabajo (National Confederation of Labour, 
anarchist union)
CPDC -  Comite Permanent de la Democracia Catalana (Permanent Committee of 
Catalan democracy)
EC -  Estat Catala (Catalan State)
ERC -  Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (The left Republican party of Catalonia) 
FAI -  Iberian Anarchist Federation
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FET -  Falange Espanola Tradicionalista (Spanish fascist party created in 1937 after the 
unification of the Carlists with the Falange Espanola (FE))
FNC -  Front Nacional de Catalunya (National Front of Catalonia)
FNEC -  Federacio Nacional d’Estudiants de Catalunya (Catalan National Youth 
Federation)
GALEUZKA (abbrev. for Galicia, Euzkadi, Catalonia)
IR -  Izquierda Republicana (Republican left-wing party)
JARE -  Junta Auxilio Refugiados Espanoles (SOS council of Spanish refugees)
JCD -  Joventut Catalana Democratica (Catalan democratic youth movement)
JEC -  Joventuts d’Estat Catala (Estat Catala youth’s party)
JEL -  Junta Espanola de Liberacion (Spanish liberation platform)
JL -Junta de Liberacion (Liberation platform)
JONS -  Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista (The nationalist party established in 
1937 by Franco’s unification decree)
MRC -  Moviment de Resistencia de Catalunya (Resistance Movement of Catalonia)
ORN -  Organitzacio de Resistencia Nacional (National Resistance Organisation)
PCE -  Partido Comunista de Espana (The Moscow-oriented Spanish Communist party 
founded in 1920-1921)
PNV -  Partido Nacionalista Vasco (The Christian Democrat Basque Nationalist Party)
POUM -  Partit Obrer d’unificacio Marxista (An amalgam of left Communists 
dissidents and Trotskyists and the Izquierda Comunista who united in 1935 to create a 
revolutionary vanguard party). The POUM was not a Catalan party strictly speaking.
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PSOE -  Partido Socialists Obrero Espanol (The Spanish Socialist workers party 
established in 1879)
PSUC -  Partit Socialists Unificat de Catalunya (Communist-controlled Catalan 
Socialist party which came into being in late July 1936)
SERE -  Servicio de Evacuation de Refiigiados Espanoles (Evacuation Service of 
Spanish refugees)
UC -  Unio Catalanista (Catalan Union)
UDC -  Unio Democratica de Catalonia (Catalan Democratic Union)
UGT -  Union General de Trabajadores (Socialist Spanish Union)
UNE -  Union Nacional Espanola (National Spanish Union)
UN -  United Nations
UR -  Uni6 Republicana (Republican Union)
USSR -  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
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CHRONOLOGY
1939-
26 January -  entry of Nationalist troops in Catalonia
27 January -  the first 1,500 Spanish refugees, wounded and civils, enter France after 
the French government changed its previous attitude and allowed for the entrance of 
refugees
29 January -  fall of Barcelona; Generalitat ceased to exist
1 February -  The republican Cortes met for the last time in non-occupied territory
5 February -  The lehendakari Aguirre and Companys seek refuge in France together 
with Julio Jauregui, Pi i Sunyer, Sbert and Tarradellas. Also Negrrn and Azana go to 
France. The French government allows for the entrance of civil, wounded and ex­
fighters into its territory
9 February -  Francoist Law of Political Responsibilities approved
10 February -  fall of Catalonia
21 February -  the poet Antonio Machado dies in Colliure (South of France)
27 February -  Recognition of Franco by Britain and France; resignation of Manuel 
Azana
March -  SERE created in Paris
1 March -  The French government appoints Petain as ambassador facing Franco 
5 March -  Negrm goes into exile
8 March -  the Duke of Alba is appointed Spanish ambassador in the UK
9 March -  Dolores Ibarruri (Spanish Communist leader) gets to Paris 
15 March -  German annexations of Bohemia and Moravia
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27 March -  Franco supports the Anti-Comintern Pact (formed by Germany and Japan, 
November 136; joined by Italy, September 1937. Spain’s support announced 6 April)
28 March -  The Francoist troops enter in Madrid with no opposition 
31 March -  All of Spain in Francoist hands
1 April -  End of the Civil War
3 April -  The USA recognise Franco
8 May -  Spain withdraws form the League of Nations 
August 1939 -  JARE created in Mexico 
1 September -  World War II begins
4 September -  Spanish declaration of neutrality in World war II
1940-
18 March -  Anglo-Spanish trade agreements
22 March -  Paul Reynaud replaces Edouard Daladier in the presidency of the Council 
in France
7 April -  Anti-Comintern pact signed by Spain
18 April -  Companys creates the Consell of Catalonia as representative organisation of 
the Catalans in exile
21 April -  The group of Prieto creates the cultural centre Pablo Iglesias in Mexico; 
Front Nacional de Catalunya (FNC) created in France
1 June -  Sir Samuel Hoare, new British ambassador in Spain, is sent to Madrid to 
avoid the entrance of Spain next to the Axis-German invasion of France
13 June -  Spain’s neutrality to non-belligerence made public. The Nazi forces occupy 
Paris. The French government settles in Bordeaux
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16 June -  Franco’s first offer of belligerence to Hitler-Paul Reynaud presents its 
dismissal. Marechal Petain in charge of forming a new government
18 June -  General de Gaulle speaks in the BBC calling for French resistance
I July -  the French government settles in Vichy
II July -  Foundation of the Basque National Council (BNC) in London
29 July -  Foundational meeting in London of the Consell Nacional de Catalunya 
(CNC) whose president is Carles Pi i Sunyer. The other counsellors are Josep Maria 
Batista I Roca, Josep Trueta, Pere Bosch i Gimpera, Ramon Perera and Fermi Verges. 
The council is in contact with the British authorities and seeks Catalan independence.
11 August -  First meeting in London of the Consell Nacional of Catalonia (CNC)
13 August -  Companys is imprisoned in the Baule by the German police in 
collaboration with commissary Urraca of the Spanish police in the embassy
21 August -  Franco-Mexican agreements by which Vichy and the Mexican 
government agree to collaborate to give refuge to the Spanish refugees
15 October -  Execution of Lluis Companys in Barcelona
October -  Serrano Suner appointed Foreign Minister of the Francoist regime
23 October -  Franco meets Hitler at Hendaye in order to decide the conditions of the 
entrance of Spain in the war next to the Axis
4 November -  Manuel Azana dies in Montauban as last president of the Spanish 
republic
5 November -  Roosevelt is re-elected president of the USA
9 December -  The British attack the Italians in the North of Africa 
-  reorganisation of Unio Democratica de Catalunya (UDC)
-Vichy regime settled in France (1940-1944)
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1941 -
10 January -  Agreement signed in London of the pact between the Basque National 
Council and the Catalan National Council
15 January -  King Alfonso XIII abdicates
18 January -  Common declaration of the Consell Nacional de Catalunya and the 
Basque National Council directed to the British government in Spain in which they 
reassert their support to the Allies, their right of self-determination and underline that 
the solidarity between Euzkadi and Catalonia for geographic position and its economic 
puissance constitute a solid basis for the reconstruction and stability in the Peninsula.
21 January -  decree by the Mexican government by which the number of Spanish 
refugees entering the country is limited
12 February -  interview between Franco and Mussolini in Bordighera, in which the 
entrance of Spain in favour of the Axis is discussed
28 February -  Alfonso XU! dies in Rome
21 April -  Manifest of the Basque National Council in London claiming its fight 
against totalitarianism next to the Allies
22 June -  The German attacks against the USSR starts in which the Rumanian army 
also participates
6 August -  The Germans forbid the exit of the Spanish refugees towards America from 
French territory
14 August -  Publication of the Atlantic Charter after the meeting between Churchill 
and Roosevelt
5 December -  the counter soviet offensive starts in the doors of Moscow
7 December -  Japanese attack against the North American basis of Pearl Harbour and 
entry of the USA in the war
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18 December -  The Francoist government declares non-belligerence once more in the 
war started between the USA and Japan
1942-
20 January -  Josep Irla, president of the Catalan Parliament and the facto president of 
the Generalitat, in a letter directed to Pi i Sunyer, president of the National Council of 
Catalonia in London, expresses him his reservation in respect to the legitimacy of the 
Consell Nacional de Catalunya (CNC)
28 January -  the Basque National Council ceased its activity assuming the Basque 
representation of president Aguirre from America
17 July -  J.A. Aguirre gets to Mexico from New York
21 July -  J.A. Aguirre abandons Mexico towards Guatemala and Panama
10 September -  meeting in Mexico among the representatives of the Spanish 
Republican presided by Martinez Barrio, Catalan representatives of Acci6 Catalana 
and Esquerra Republicana and representatives from the PNV as Julio Jduregui in order 
to discuss a possible common action in exile and the organisation of the future Spanish 
state. The absence of the PSOE in these meetings and the subject of self-determination 
will make these conversations fail
27 October -  Miquel Santalo, member of the executive council of Esquerra 
Republicana of Catalonia, gets to Mexico defending republican legality and the statute 
of autonomy de-legitimising Carles Pi i Sunyer’s CNC power and creating confusion 
among the comunitats in Latin America
8 November -  Franco declares neutrality in World War II
27 November -  decree of the president of Mexico creating the commission CAFARE 
that should take care of the resources of the JARE
1943-
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4 January -  Meeting of Basques and Catalans in Mexico in order to unify their 
policies-meeting presided by Aguirre
14 April -  Basque and Catalan nationalists get in Mexico to an agreement on how the 
sovereign nations should reorder Spain after the war
November -  Constitution in Mexico of Junta Espanola de Liberation (JL) -  including 
Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol, Izquierda Republicana, Union Republicana, 
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, Accio Republicana de Catalunya
1944-
26 January -  Declaration of the Francoist foreign minister asking for the strict 
neutrality of Spain in World War II
6 June -  Allied disembarkation of the Normandy coast
1 October -  Alianza Nacional de Fuerzas Democrdticas (ANFD) constituted including 
the Republican, the Socialist-UGT and the libertarian-co federalist. It is a unitary 
platform of the anti-Francoist non-Communist forces
9 October -  meeting between Churchill and Stalin about the reorganisation of the 
European map after the war in Moscow
23 October -  constitution of the JL in France
28 October -  Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya meets led by Josep Tarradellas to 
approve the republican legality as only alternative to Francoism
22 December -  Meeting in Hotel Majestic in the city of Mexico of the nationalist 
representations of Euzkadi, Galicia and Catalonia to sign the pact Galeuzka in which 
the three regions claim their right to freedom, sovereignty and their right to self- 
determination. The Basque government does not participate as such
1945-
6 January -  Manifest of Solidaritat Catalana presided by Josep Tarradellas that group 
Esquerra Republicana, Estat Catala and Front Nacional
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6 March -  Creation of Solidaritat Catalana led by Josep Tarradellas in Paris. It has 
unitary aspirations and defends the republican legality and recognises the authority of 
the new president of the Generalitat, Josep Irla
30 March -  The Assistant committee to the presidency of the Generalitat is created as 
an institutional organization of President Irla
March -  Bayonne Declaration: all Basque parties support the government of Euzkadi 
and the consultative council is constituted, organisation of political character
30 April -  Hitler commits suicide in his bunker in Berlin
22 May -  Pi i Sunyer goes to Paris from London
3-4 June -  First meeting in Toulouse of Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya in which 
Pi i Sunyer, president of the CNC in London, participates and abandons his aims of 
self-determination, claiming republican legality and the recognition of the statutes
14 June -  Pi i Sunyer asks for the constitution of a new government
2 August -  Potsdam conference ratifies Spain’s exclusion from the UN; formation of 
Republican govemment-in-exile
14 September -  Josep Irla appoints the new Catalan government or Generalitat formed 
by himself, Pompeu Fabra, Pi i Sunyer and Rovira I Virgili
18 September Giral’s govemment-in-exile excludes Communists
19 December -  The French Constituent Assembly asks the government to break 
diplomatic relations with Francoist Spain
1946-
January -  Diplomatic note of the French government directed to the UK, USA and 
Russia asking the Security Council to consider the Spanish case
4 March -  Tripartite Note, signed by Bidault, Byrnes and Bevin. In this note, the 
governments of France, UK and USA show their hope that the Spaniards will get rid of
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Franco by pacific means, that a government of transition would be formed, will 
proclaim a general amnesty and the return of the exile. This declaration implies the 
condemnation of action of the guerrillas and the resistance, the declaration of non­
military Allied intervention in Spain and an invitation to those in exile to enter a pact 
with the monarchists for the formation of a transitory government that will include all 
the democratic groups.
12 December -  Resolution of the UN condemning the regime of Franco and 
recommending the retreat of ambassadors from Spain to the members of the UN.
1947-
February -  Giral government succeeded by Llopis government.
12 March -  Cold War; Truman Doctrine
31 March -  Publication Ley de Sucesion (Succession Law)
July -  referendum of the Spanish state on whether Spain should become a reign. The 
YES wins. Franco is trying to legitimize his power.
1948-
April -Facing European pressure, Spain is excluded from the plan Marshall.
1949-
22 September -  Cold War: USSR atomic bomb capacity becomes known 
October -  Cold War: Mao Tse-Tung triumphs in China
1950-
4 November -  General Assembly of the United Nations votes to authorise the return of 
the ambassadors to Madrid meaning implicit acceptance of Francoism
1951 -
12 March -  General Strike in Barcelona
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23 April -  Strike in the Basque country
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